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Holy Wisdom, originally called Sancta Sophia, was published in Douai, 
France, in 1657. Its editor was Fr Serenus Cressy, but its content was drawn 
from the voluminous spiritual writings of Fr Augustine Baker CSB (1575- 
1641). Baker was well versed in patristic and medieval spiritual thought as 
well as in contemporary writings. Holy Wisdom came to exercise great 
influence both within and beyond the English Benedictine Congregation to 
which Baker belonged; many today would acknowledge the continuing value of 
the book as a manual of spiritual instruction and as a work summing up 
several strands of the ascetical tradition. 
A theory of the human person, sometimes explicit but more often 
implied, is assumed by Holy Wisdom. Moving from the belief that Christianity 
is centred in the Incarnation, the present thesis develops an incernetionel 
theology from the perspective of which Baker's work is criticized. Three 
main areas are dealt with: firstly, the model of conflict. Baker locates 
conflict within the arena of the human person in such a way as to violate 
the essential unity of the person. Secondly, his understanding of the human 
person as an individual displays a spiritualizing tendency that undermines 
the value of embodiment. Thirdly, his consideration of the social context of 
human personhood is characterized by a spiritualizing individualism that 
conflicts with key incarnational notions such as the body of Christ and 
human relationships. 
The thesis concludes that Baker's Christian anthropology, and, by 
implication, that of the spiritual strands he represents, is deficient from 
the perspective of the Incarnation. 
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I NTRODUCTI ON 
The aim of this thesis is to produce a critique of the 
anthropological assumptions that underlie Sancta Sophia or Directions for 
the Prayer of Contemplation, a handbook of the spiritual life which presents 
the teachings of the English Benedictine Augustine Baker (1575-1641). 
Nowadays, it is commonly known by the English title Holy Wisdom. All such 
works adopt, implicitly or explicitly, a way of understanding the human 
person. Indeed, any writing that discusses the relationship between human 
beings and the divine must assume some theory of the human person. The 
study of such theories in the context of Christianity, constitutes Christian 
anthropology. My concern will be to establish the extent to which the 
anthropology of Holy Wisdom accords with the requirements of an 
incarnational theology, the lineaments of which I shall draw in chapter 3. 
One of the main reasons for my opting to study Holy Wisdom is that, 
as an English Benedictine, I have been trained in a tradition that has been 
nourished on the spirituality of Baker. My concern is to expose this 
tradition to a critical assessment. I am not primarily interested in the 
book as an historical text: it is still read and still, by many, considered 
relevant to their lives. Many more, within the Christian church, attempt to 
live by principles that are similar to those assumed or recommended in this 
book. It is not particularly original. It is a work that finds its place 
within the tradition of Christian spiritual teaching. That tradition is 
neither single nor simple, but is characterized by a rich variety of 
attitudes and emphases. Baker's writings, and therefore Holy Wisdom, draw 
from the church fathers, from monastic traditions, from the medieval English 
mystics and from an extensive array of 16th and 17th century Catholic 
Ii 
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writers. A critique of Baker is a critique of more than Baker. 
My stance is that of a 20th century incarnational theologian who 
draws inspiration from the Christian anthropology of the second Vatican 
Council and particularly of Gaudium et Spes. There are, of course, several 
kinds of incarnationalism: it is not a monolithic discipline. In chapter 3, 
as I have said, I shall attempt to describe some principles of such a 
theology. What I say there will be by no means systematic or complete. My 
conclusions will be brought to bear on Holy Wisdom. The reader may question 
the admissibility of subjecting an historical text to such a scrutiny. If the 
text were purely of historical interest, then I would agree. But I am 
claiming that Holy Wisdom is not merely of historical interest. Its 
exponents would argue its relevance today and recommend it as teaching a 
valuable way of living the Christian life. ' If their recommendation is to 
be accepted, then the living work must stand before the tribunal of modern 
theological insights. If it cannot accord with the theological understanding 
and experience of today, then it may have to be relegated to the status of 
a period piece. My main interest is in a modern critique; nevertheless, 
chapter 3 will present an historical perspective in addition and will glance 
at how Baker fares in the context of two of his own precursors. 
Holy Wisdom will be investigated in detail in chapters 4-6. Chapter 
4 will assess its use of conflict imagery, chapter 5 the understanding of 
the human person as an individual and chapter 6, the human person in the 
social context. My general conclusion will be a rather negative one: that 
Baker's anthropology, an anthropology that is not unique to him, conflicts 
with the insights of an incarnational theology inspired by Vatican II. 
Before moving into chapter 1, it would be helpful to introduce Holy 
Wisdom here in a little more detail. The book was published in Douai, 
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France, in 1657. It is the work of Fr Serenus Cressy OSB and is a digest 
drawn from the voluminous writings of Baker. Despt-e Cressy's editorial hand 
the content is Baker's and the book can be taken as summing up Faker's 
spiritual teaching. Thus, after the preliminary chapter, I shall talk 
constantly of Baker and rarely mention Cressy. 
Although published as Sancta Sophia, it has been known as Holy 
Wisdom since the reprint of 1911.1 shall use the modern name. All my 
references will be to the edition currently in print, that edited by Gerard 
Sitwell, 2 and will refer, for convenience, to page numbers in that edition 
rather than to chapters and paragraphs. 
Holy Wisdom was produced within English Benedictine communities 
established on the continent; Catholic priests and religious had been banned 
from England since the middle of the 16th century. The Catholic history of 
the period is interesting and complex, but it is not my direct concern. 
Nevertheless, an historical text must be read with a sensitivity to 
historical circumstances. Therefore my opening chapter will set the scene 
and present Baker and his editor. The second chapter will trace the 
production of Holy Wisdom and its journey down the centuries to the present 
day. 
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"THAT MYSTERIOUS MAN"' 
AUGUSTINE BAKER'S LIFE AND SETTING 
I THE PERIOD 
a) Reform and counter-reform 
The period in which Augustine Baker lived, that of the Reformation 
and Counter-Reformation, is a particularly rich one for the student of 
Christianity. In 1540, thirty-five years before Baker's birth, monasticism in 
England was effectively abolished, despite the short-lived revival of 
Westminster Abbey under Queen Mary. Nearly a thousand years had passed 
since 597, the year in which Augustine of Canterbury brought Roman 
Christianity to England. 2 A monk himself, Augustine's mission had opened a 
millenium in which monasticism was a major force in the English church. 
Although ideas associated with the Protestant reformers can be traced back 
into the middle ages, ' the 16th century was the period which produced the 
great reformers such as Luther, Calvin, Zwingli and, in England, Cranmer. On 
the Roman side the Council of Trent (1545-1563) would not merely address 
itself to the Protestant challenge, but would be a reforming council in its 
own right. What Protestantism did was to force the Roman Church to clarify, 
refine and systematize its theology. 
But this was not only a period of debate and discussion. Many men 
and women of both Protestant and Roman persuasion would give their lives 
in defence of their religious beliefs. The English recusant communities on 
the continent knew that life on the home mission carried the possibility of 
14 
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imprisonment, torture and death. Baker died in London, probably fr--m plague, 
on August 9th 1641. In the English Benedictine necrologies, the monk whose 
death immediately preceded his was Lawrence Mabbs, who died in chains in 
Newgate Prison on July 20th. Those who followed Baker were Ambrose Barlow 
(hanged at Lancaster on September 20th) and Alban Roe (hanged at Tyburn on 
January 31st 1642). 4 Barlow and Roe were among the forty martyrs 
canonized by Pope Paul VI in 1970. 
It was in this turbulent period and mainly in English monastic 
communities on the continent that Baker would preserve and transmit the 
wisdom of the medieval English mystics. He knew the great western doctors, 
Augustine of Hippo, Gregory and Bernard. He knew the monastic desert 
tradition and the Rule of St Benedict. He had read several medieval 
continental mystics such as Tauler and was widely familiar with a range of 
spiritual writers of the 16th and early 17th centuries. Although there was 
originality in what he wrote, his spiritual works reflect clearly the 
strands of influence to which he was exposed. ' 
b) The English Benedictines6 
If an English man or woman wished to lead the religious life then 
there was no option but to go to the continent. Thus the last years of the 
16th and the beginning of the 17th century saw the formation of seminaries 
for secular priests in such places as Valladolid, Douai and Rome, and houses 
for men and women of different religious orders. One of the earliest of 
such English communities was the Benedictine convent of nuns set up in 
Brussels in 1598 by Lady Mary Percy. Catholic men from Britain who wished 
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Although individual monasteries had some d -tree of autonomy, they 
were linked together in federations known as congregations. These were 
often organized on a national basis. In the early years of the 17th century, 
British missionary monks came back to their homela:. d from both the Spanish 
and Cassinese (Italian) congregations. The latter, which Baker joined, had 
grown from the Benedictine reform started in the monastery of St Justine in 
Padua at the beginning of the 15th century under Abbot Ludovico Barbo. ' 
There may have been some rivalry between the members of these two 
congregations, but soon four houses of English monks were founded, initially 
drawing their personnel from the continental monasteries. These houses were 
St Gregory's at Douai (1607), St Lawrence's at Dieulouard in Lorraine (1608), 
St Benedict's at St Malo (1611) and St Edmund's in Paris (1615). In 1607 Fr 
Sigebert Buckley, the last survivor of Marian Westminster, witnessed the 
profession of two Englishmen as members of the Cassinese congregation, and 
affiliated them to Westminster. Thus was revived, on rather questionable 
legal grounds, the supposed Benedictine congregation of medieval England. It 
was Augustine Baker who dealt with the legal complications of this revival. 
The English Benedictine Congregation (henceforth EBC) finally emerged 
in 1619. Taking its cue from its Spanish and Cassinese roots, it would 
operate in a fairly centralized way, the president wielding more authority 
than the superiors or priors of the individual houses. Only gradually, over 
the following centuries, did the houses gain a full autonomy within the 
federation of the congregation. 
In these early years there was a variety of work and a considerable 
level of mobility between the houses on the continent and the English and 
Welsh mission. Thus the monks might live in English gentry houses, serving 
as chaplains and ministering to the local Catholics, or they might live in 
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community on the continent. But there was the possibility of tension 
between conventuals, who argued that monks should live in monasteries, and 
missioners who felt that the conversion of England was the primary 
concern. e Members of religious orders on the continent were involved in 
the ecclesiastical life of Europe and thus were in a unique position to 
straddle the division between the English scene and continental Europe. This 
cosmopolitan factor is witnessed by the breadth of Baker's reading. 
Women too found a place in the EBC, although their way of life was 
more strictly enclosed than that of the monks. The monastery of Our Lady of 
Comfort at Cambrai was opened in 1623. Baker produced his earliest 
spiritual writings whilst spiritual director at Cambrai. 
It is with this recusant background in mind that I shall consider the 
life of Baker before moving on to the central concerns of the thesis. 
II BAKER'S LIFE9 
c) Baker's life: 1575-1596 
David Baker1O was born at Abergavenny on December 9th 1575, the 
thirteenth and youngest child of William Baker and his wife Maud Lewis. 
Leander Prichard, Baker's fellow Benedictine and first biographer, comments 
piously on David's position in the family: "therefore he may be likened to 
Benjamin, the youngest of Jacob's thirteen children and the type of 
contemplatives; Benjamin in mentis excessu, Psalm 67. "' 1 He was named after 
his uncle David Lewis, a lawyer and high civil servant under Elizabeth I. His 
father was steward of the lordship of Abergavenny, justice of the peace and 
sheriff of Monmouthshire. 
In terms of religion, his parents were probably "church papists": they 
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had "accommodated themselves at least exteriorly to the common though 
schismaticall service of the land"' 2 while retaining private Catholic 
sympathies. This ambivalent position undermined the zeal required to ensure 
a sound religious upbringing for their children. Nevertheless, William Baker 
spent time in "vocall prayers" and discreetly read "Latin Catholick 
authors. "' 3 As time went on, however, his Catholic sympathies cooled while 
his Protestant ones never warmed at all. Prichard describes Maud as "a good 
and Catholick gentlewoman, alwaies busy and doing. " If the religious 
influence of the parents was peripheral, they gave their children a good 
moral upbringing. Baker's own account is embellished with quaint details: he 
was not naturally inclined to drinking's and "his nature brooked not the 
use of taking tobacco" although he greatly liked its smell. ' b 
His education up to the age of eleven was at the local free school 
which did not give him much religious sense beyond the mere awareness of 
there being a God. Then, just after his eleventh birthday, he was sent to 
London to "Christ Church, alias Greyfriars. "" This school, founded by Henry 
VIII in 1547, still exists today as Christ's Hospital. Baker was sent there 
for better learning and to acquire proper English since the principal 
language in Abergavenny was Welsh. He arrived on February 8th 1587 (new 
style), the day on which the Catholic Mary Queen of Scots was executed at 
Fotheringhay. He describes the bonfires and celebrations in London as "most 
unworthy joy, odious to all truely pious hearts. "' e 
The headmaster of Christ Church was a fervent Protestant: the 
scriptures were read at meals; the Book of Common Prayer was used; a psalm 
was sung each evening; church was attended on Sundays and holydays and 
learned sermons were preached. Despite his sectarian tone elsewhere, Baker 
acknowledges that his education was honest and moral and that he learned 
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good scholarship and good English and gained a sound knowledge of the 
bible. He describes some of the persecution of Catholic priests in 1587 and 
the alarm in 1588 at the prospect of the Armada. As a result of the latter, 
his father temporarily recalled him to Wales. 
At the age of fifteen, knowing Latin and Greek and destined for the 
law, he was sent to Oxford. He arrived there in May 1590, became a member 
of Broadgates Hall' 3 and studied under his kinsman, William Prichard MA, "a 
true and zealous protestant and an hearty anti-puritan. "20 Under Prichard he 
was given an English bible and was taught more elegant Latin. He also 
studied "arithmetick" and some "logick" to which he did not take. "Much less 
went he any further to philosophy. "' Before long, however, he got into bad 
company and he describes with unexpected candour the hypocrisy and 
corruption in which he and his companions engaged. They abused the season 
of Lent and "glutted most of all on Good Friday. "22 But Baker was more 
repulsed in retrospect by the rampant homosexuality he found at the 
university, even if he may have indulged in it at the time. "The greatest 
corruption in our land, as to such abominable vice (besides that of 
fornication and drinking) cometh from the two universities of England, the 
which the enemy of mankind hath extremely corrupted in these dales of 
heresy with the forsaid most detestable vice. "23 He left his tutor and went 
to another college and continued his undisciplined life style. At the age of 
sixteen and a half, his parents called him home to Wales. 
He now spent about four years at home and studied the law and legal 
French with his elder brother Richard (1557-1598). His father entered into 
marriage negotiations on his behalf with the guardians of "an inheretrix or 
heiresse of a good and fair estate in lands, "2° but the plans came to 
nothing. His father and brother hoped that he would be ordained in the 
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established church and made efforts to secure for him the wealthy benefice 
of Llanwenarth. This too fell through. His religious position was sceptical 
and "tending more to a certain atheism. "gis He quotes two immediate causes 
of this scepticism: firstly, the sardonic tone of Erasmus' Colloquies and 
Encomium Moriae, which he read daily, and secondly, the "most terrene study" 
of 1aw. 26 
It is at this point in his life that the prose autobiography ends, 
although a list of brief headings carry the story on to about 1606. Baker 
is now almost twenty-one years of age, and is about to depart to London 
for the second time, to study at the Inns of Court. The time is Michaelmas 
1596. 
I have dwelt in this section on the academic, religious and moral 
influences on Baker. A youth of twenty-one, he had had a broad education in 
the standard studies of the day. There is a candour in the tone of his 
autobiography, a straightforwardness and a balance. These qualities moderate 
the occasional shrillness of the retrospective convert. There is too a 
quirkiness and an eye for the unexpected detail. He emerges as a young man, 
loved and perhaps a little indulged by his family. He has no financial 
cares; in the background stand influential and solicitous patrons. He shows 
an intellectual curiosity. In the midst of this ease it is not surprising 
that, like many young people of his age, his religious sensibility should be 
so under-developed. 
d) Baker's life: 1596-1605 
Prichard's account of Baker's first twenty-one years contradicts the 
autobiography in some points of detail, 27 but the general gist is the same. 
I shall here follow Prichard's biography since it is the earliest. 
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Baker, by his own account, arrived at Clifford's Inn in late 1596. 
Although the study was harder than at Oxford, the more mature Baker took 
to it well. Prichard bears witness to his legal competence, his "great 
naturall witt, "18 his assiduous and regular attendance at the bar and his 
increasing impatience with treason trials that seemed merely for the 
gratification of the Prince. As an interesting sidelight on these years, 
Prichard tells us that "his second sort of recreation was to resort to 
playes; whither yet he never went without a pocket book of the law, which 
he did read when the play or any sort of it pleased him not. 29 New plays 
being staged at this period (1596-99) included Richard II, A Midsummer 
Night's Dream, and The Merchant of Venice. 30 
In 1599, Baker's father obtained for him the recordership of 
Abergavenny; this gave him practical experience while he continued his legal 
studies. About the year 1600 a significant event occurred that shook his 
atheism. He was returning on horseback from some legal business when he 
absent-mindedly allowed his horse to walk onto a narrow plank bridge high 
above the flood stream of the River Monnow. In the middle of the bridge he 
realized the extreme danger of his position. The horse could go neither 
forward nor backwards. In panic he called on God "If ever I git out of this 
danger, I will believe there is a God who hath more care of my life and 
safty, then I have had of his service and worshipe. "31 Then he found "the 
horse's head was turned, and all was out of danger, both horse and man. "32 
Whatever actually happened on this occasion, Baker saw it as a significant 
moment, and he began to study religion with greater receptivity. But even 
before the experience, he had "met with books that brought him to a sense 
and verity of beliefe as to religion. 133 It is clear that the "conversion" 
followed a period of brooding over the religious question. 
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Now he read widely in Catholic literature and sought even prohibited 
books in the London bookshops. Through his study "his reason and 
understanding was won to the truth yet was his will and affection more 
violently carried to love and embrace the Catholicke religion. "3° Three 
things in particular attracted him to Catholicism: the good discipline, the 
suffering of priests and layfolk on behalf of it and the whole-hearted 
commitment of its adherents. He was finally received into the Roman 
communion in May 1603 by a secular priest, Richard Floyd. With the zeal of 
the convert he attempted to persuade others to join him. "A great contempt 
of the world"31- followed, and a desire for perfection and the religious 
state. His mind was now "altogether sett on a monasticall course. "3E On his 
next visit to London he arranged to meet some Benedictine fathers. Dom 
Justin McCann, the 20th century editor of several of Baker's works, suggests 
that the date may have been January 1605.37 Baker would have been in his 
thirtieth year. 
During the decade of his twenties, his primary concern was the study 
and practice of the law, a discipline that would influence his written 
style. 3e The accounts of his life suggest an honesty and a questing spirit. 
Despite the River Monnow experience, the main influence seems to have come 
through books, as is perhaps often the case with educated and intellectually 
curious people. Baker, it is clear, read widely and carefully and responded 
to what he read, whether Plautus and Erasmus or the prohibited Catholic 
books. The extent of his reading is confirmed by a glance at the index. 39 
This point is important because it provides external evidence for my 
suggestion that Baker's spiritual writings reflect a considerable level of 
influence from a wide range of Catholic religious literature. I shall 
develop this in some detail in chapter 2 section m) which considers the 
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influences on Baker's spiritual teachýri3. He would give his own stamp, but 
his theology and anthropology would have much in common with many other 
writers. 
e) Baker's life: 1605-1624 
Baker had told his family that he was going to London on business, 
but his intention was to go abroad to become a religious. At this stage 
there were no English monasteries: as I mentioned in section b), Englishmen 
who wished to embrace the monastic life had to join foreign communities on 
the continent. " The first Benedictine missionaries from Italy and Spain had 
arrived in England in the spring of 1603. The monks whom Baker met in 
London in 1605, Dom Thomas Preston and Dom Anselm Beech, belonged to the 
Cass-inese congregation, the main abbey of which was St Justina's in Padua. 
Baker was looking for a moderate order, with neither excessive austerities 
nor unmitigated pastoral work, so, accompanied by Preston, he left London at 
the end of February 1605.. They reached Padua on April 20th. 
Baker was clothed in the monastic habit on May 27th 1605. He tells 
us: 
My said cloathing day 
Was on the eve day 
Of White-Sunday, 
And the ensuing day 
Of Saint Austin's day, 
The Apostle of England, 
That is our native land. 
For which Saints sake 
I did on me take 
The like name of Augustin. 41 
Although his novice-master was kind, he received little spiritual 
instruction except for the Rule and a few other books. He thought in 
retrospect that books alone were not really sufficient for starting somecre 
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on a spiritual course. Nevertheless, he rapidly reali gor h'_mselý that God zed 
and perfection were to be sought through mental prayers= and not Just 
through vocal prayer and choir attendance. He embraced mental prayer at 
the start of his noviciate, but he gave up a: ew weeks later, after a 
"desolation", an experience of futility and dryness in prayer. Now he 
resorted to the pattern of "externall regularities. "43 His fellow novices, 
the easy-going younger sons of Italian noblemen, were kind to him, but not 
surprisingly, he did not really feel part of it. 
It was ill health that finally forced his departure from St Justina's, 
his noviciate incomplete. He would have delayed the home journey through 
Venice and Milan, had not a mysterious foreboding urged him to hurry. On 
arriving in London he heard that his father was dying. He reached the old 
man's side in time, and was delighted that he agreed to be reconciled to 
the Church. Unlike Hamlet's poor father, he died shriven, houseled and 
aneled. 
Baker kept in close touch with his English brethren of the Italian 
Congregation and his legal knowledge proved of value to them. It was he, 
apparently, who pointed out the possibility of the rights and privileges of 
the pre-Reformation English Benedictines being passed on through an 
individual. The Cassinese monks had been in touch since 1603 with the last 
survivor of Marian Westminster, Dom Sigebert Buckley, and the legal transfer 
came to fruition in 1607.1d The incident shows another side of Baker: his 
historical interests. The opening sections of his prose autobiography reveal 
him as someone fascinated by historical detail. °s The EBC would use him 
later to conduct historical research for propagandist reasons. This would 
bring him into contact with Sir Robert Cotton, William Camden, John Selden 
and other great Anglican antiquarians. 46 
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But Baker still sought a retired life. It was while living in the 
house of Sir Nicholas Fortescue in Worcestershire that he underwent "a 
passive contemplation. "d' This might be described as an experience whereby 
the subject, without any apparent effort of his or her own, is caught into a 
deep attentiveness to God. But it was short-lived and there was no one 
competent to help him to understand it. As at Padua, he slumped back into 
tepidity. 49 He even considered following the spiritual exercises of the 
Jesuits "which had bin a meer folly in him to have done, as himselfe 
afterwards plainly perceived. 1149 It was around this time that he went to 
Rheims and was ordained priest. Outwardly he did effective pastoral work 
including the gaining of converts. In England he engaged in various 
activities, legal and otherwise. When the EBC was set up in 1619 to include 
all English Benedictine monks, Baker joined and became attached to the 
community of Dieulouard, SO although he never actually lived there. 
While residing at the Devonshire house of Philip Fursden he started 
the spiritual course of prayer that would last till his death. He 
experienced considerable ill health during his year in Devon. Then he felt 
an inner call to return to London and moved into Grays Inn Lane near the 
Inns of Court. It was at this period that he set about searching old 
records in an attempt to refute John Barnes's attack on the restored EBC. s' 
The fruit of his researches was published at Douai in 1626 as Apostoletus 
Benedictinorum in Anglia. 
The breach of treaty over the plans for the marriage of Prince 
Charles with the Infanta of Spain raised fears about a persecution of 
Catholics. As a result, Baker crossed to the continent. It was now the early 
summer of 1624. He went to the English Benedictine house of St Gregory at 
Douai where he was welcomed by Fr Rudesind Barlow, then president of the 
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EBC. It was from here, not many days pater, that he was aske-- to go as 
confessor to the recently founded English Benedictine convent of Our Lady 
of Comfort at Cambrai. 52 He would stay at Cambrai for nine years and would 
gain there his first great experience of spiritual direction. 
f) Baker's life: 1624-1641 
The final part of Baker's life falls into three sections: the period 
at Cambrai, 1624-1633; 53 the residence at St Gregory's, Douai, 1633-1638; 
and the last years in England, 1638-1641. 
A description of the early days of the community of Cambrai is given 
by the Benedictines of Stanbrook. 54 The young and enthusiastic Englishwomen 
who started the community petitioned the president of the EBC for a monk 
qualified to train them in Benedictine contemplative prayer: Fr Augustine 
Baker was sent. He found a receptive disciple in Dame Catherine Gascoigne, 
who would be appointed abbess in 1629 and remain in that post, apart from 
a short break, until 1673. Another disciple was Dame Gertrude More. " Many 
of the nuns of Cambrai found that through the instructions of Fr Baker they 
were led into a deeper experience of prayer. It is to this period that 
several of his spiritual writings may be assigned, finding their origin as 
conferences delivered to the community. 
The Counter-Reformation and the Council of Trent had given rise to a 
spirit of renewal within the Catholic Church that affected the old religious 
orders and brought about the foundation of new ones. One outcome was the 
general favour towards the Jesuit method of discursive meditation, a method 
used even in many communities of nuns. 56 This method involved the 
imaginative pondering on, say, a gospel scene, which helped the subject to 
generate prayers and resolutions. It differed from that of Baker. " In 1629 
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general chapter appointed Fr Francis Hull as of "_c'_a1 chaplaf ^ to *he 
Cambrai community, leaving Baker as spiritual director. "he two men were 
temperamentally very different: Hull seems to have preferred discursive 
meditation and to have resented the extent of Baker's influence. The 
majority of the nuns supported Baker, but the situation was untenable. Both 
priests were called upon to explain their point of view at the chapter of 
1633. A detailed investigation of Baker's manuscripts resulted in his 
teaching being fully vindicated. But the tension was such that neither could 
return to Cambrai; thus Baker began a period of residence at St Gregory's, 
Douai. Throughout he continued to enjoy the warm support of the Cambrai 
community. Interestingly, Fr Peter Salvin, a disciple and biographer of 
Baker, attended Francis Hull at his death bed in St Malo in 1645 and says 
that Hull repented his opposition to Baker. 5e 
Baker's years at Douai saw him establishing a reputation as a 
spiritual director both within and beyond the community. It was not a 
particularly smooth and harmonious time and Prichard describes in detail 
some of the disagreements and arguments that occurred. The writings of this 
period differ in style from those written at Cambrai. "For those of Cambray 
(for the most part) were institutions or canons of a contemplative life; 
these of Doway, though they also treate of contemplation, yet proceed and 
insist much upon proving, reasoning, and arguing; and are much of that kind 
of writing which is called dissertation. 1b9 
It is not entirely clear why tension arose between Baker and the 
powerful Rudesind Barlow. The latter may have been jealous of Baker's 
success as a spiritual director and disturbed by the tactless enthusiasm of 
Baker's disciples. 60 Or he may have objected to the eccentricity of Baker's 
conventual observance. 61 The final break came when Barlow used Baker's 
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Treatise on the English Mission as a propaganda weacon against troublesome 
missionary monks. Baker resented being used and wrote a long introduction 
to the same work in which he bitterly attacked an unnamed conventual, a 
thinly disguised version of Barlow himself. 62 
The final outcome of all this was that Baker, although apparently ill, 
was forced to leave France for the English mission, accompanied by his 
disciples Leander Prichard and Peter Salvin. He was now in his sixties and 
his health was far from robust. As civil war approached, the situation in 
England would become increasingly tense, particularly for Catholic priests. 
Both Prichard and Salvin give touching details of the journey from 
Dunkirk. '-: 3 They all had, of course, to travel in disguise. The old man kept 
forgetting himself and saying his prayers in an embarrassingly loud voice. 
"He also forgetting himselfe and the place and company, who were hereticks, 
called upon us by our names of Fa. Peter and Fa. Leander. "" A rough ride 
in a wagon from Dover to Canterbury was followed by a journey on horseback 
to Gravesend, thence by boat to London. 
In the capital he moved from place to place and his health 
fluctuated. He wrote nothing now except a few letters. The Cambrai 
community asked after him and he told Prichard to tell them that he was 
now "totus in passionibus. " By this he meant that his prayer was "wholly 
passive. "-5 The last months included living in hiding and narrow escapes 
from the pursuivants. He died after a violent fever on August 9th 1641. 
g) Baker's spiritual development 
In the previous sections of the present chapter, I considered the 
events and influences surrounding Baker's life. It would be valuable now to 
look at the stages of his spiritual progress. He describes this in his 
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Secretum Sive Mysticum, the relevant sections of which have been published 
by Justin McCann. °d In addition, his biographers mike extensive comments 
on this aspect of his life. 
We can, of course, approach his spiritual life only through the 
medium of the written language that he and others use about it. This 
language employs a number of terms with a technical or semi-technical 
meaning. Most of these terms are used metaphorically. All, I presume, refer 
to experiences that may be had today. Some, such as "acts", are still common 
parlance within modern Roman Catholicism. An investigation of Baker's 
language of prayer is not my central concern, although I shall look closely 
in chapter 4 at a pervasive model of the spiritual life that he uses. In the 
present section, as I describe his spiritual development, I shall quote 
terms that he and his contemporaries used and shall attempt, despite the 
difficulty, to give a brief working explanation of them. My explanations are 
not intended to suggest an evaluative stance on his experiences. 
Cressy says that Baker underwent three conversions to mental prayer: 
the first was short-lived and occurred during his noviciate in Padua in 
1605. The second began in England in 1608, and the third, also in England, 
in 1620.67 Baker himself disregards the Padua experience and refers simply 
to his first and second conversions. 
Padua provided him with little personal instruction in prayer. He felt 
intuitively, however, that vocal prayer and choir office needed to be 
supplemented by mental prayer. 68 He gave himself up to a process of mental 
prayer which lasted for a few weeks. A period of "aridity", an experience in 
which prayer seems futile or unattractive, brought it to an end, and there 
was no one to help him persevere. But he did learn from this experience: he 
began to realize the centrality of mental prayer for a religious life. He 
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saw that it could provide "illumination", a dee er insi-. - into the 
mysterious workings of God, and could draw the will to him. ' Cressy's 
account differs slightly: Baker used discursive meditation for two to three 
months but then found that he could no longer work in his imagination and 
understanding. What he needed was prayer of the will, but there was no one 
to show him how this was done. 7° Both Prichard and Cressy agree that, as a 
result of this confusion, he resorted to vocal prayers and exterior 
observances. 
The second conversion occurred when Baker was in his thirty-second 
year and brought him to passive contemplation in about sixteen months. " 
This was while he was lodging in Worcestershire at the home of Sir Nicholas 
Fortescue, around 1607-1608. He began to pray for five or six hours a day, 
using "acts", short verbal prayers expressing, for example, contrition or 
adoration or thanksgiving. A month or two before the passive contemplation, 
he moved to "aspirations". Baker sometimes calls these "elevations" or 
"affections" or "inward stirrings of the spirit . "'2 They are more 
spontaneous than "acts", are characterized by a greater longing for God and 
are believed to be more directly the work of the Holy Spirit. His process of 
prayer at this time was linked with an involuntary "mortification", " a 
stomach condition that prevented his eating while leaving him feeling 
hungry. An intense experience came one day at about 11 am. In this "God 
becometh the sole worker. "74 It lasted between seven and fifteen minutes 
and "it was with alienation from senses; I mean, in a rapt . "76 Here, 
presumably, he is referring to a mystical condition where the normal ways 
of perceiving and experiencing seem to be suspended and the person is 
entirely passive under the influence of God's presence. This had various 
effects. Firstly, it gave rise to "far purer prayer, far easier, less painful 
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to nature, and more abstract from sense. "-,, E- secondly, it brought 
illumination which enabled Baker to understand the deeper significance of 
the spiritual books he was reading. Thirdly, it brought a greater subjection 
of "sensuality" to the "superior will". " But this "rapt" was followed a day 
or two later by an experience of desolation with which Baker did not have 
the wherewithal to cope. 
He remained in a lukewarm state for a further twelve years until 
about 1620. At this time he was probably living in Devonshire with the 
Fursdens. 7 The isolation enabled him to commit himself to daily prayer. He 
began with about three months of meditation and this was followed by a 
year or so in the exercise of immediate acts. Gradually his prayer became 
entirely aspirative. 79 He tells us, as he writes the Secretum, that he has 
continued in this prayer for nine years and five months. °O He writes this 
autobiographical work in the third person and its composition can be dated 
to 1629, during his residence at Cambrai. 
The prayer which he discusses in 1629 is an exercise of the will in 
which the imagination and the understanding have gradually been superseded. 
Initially, the will operates by "forcement" but later by interior impulse of 
lost irring". a' The prayer of the will starts with acts and becomes 
aspirative. "Aspirations" are so called because "by them the soul doth seek 
and labour to get out of her inferior nature and to attain up to the height 
or top of the spirit where God more properly is and dwelleth to the end 
that she may be more perfectly united with him. "92 Baker tells us that his 
soul "did work and exercise (aspirations) forth and without the body. ' *93 
"Afterward it seemed ... that his working came to draw towards and into the 
body. And first they came to the extreme parts of it, as into the hands and 
feet, and afterwards into the arms and legs. "e° This strange combination of 
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bodily and extra-bodily experiences causes 3aker to make an 
uncharacteristic remark about possible philosophical problems: "I know not 
how my relation therein will stand with the common t --aching of philosophers 
about the residence and working of a soul within ab =dy. "ss 
The conversion experience that began in : 520 raises a point of 
particular interest for my purposes in this thesis. The spiritual 
experiences related in the Secret um and described by Prichard and Cressy, 
clearly exemplify the process of growth in the spiritual life decribed in 
Holy Wisdom. In other words, Baker is not simply recounting the teaching of 
other spiritual people: his instructions are validated by his own experience. 
This is not the place to discuss in detail what has been decribed here. I 
shall consider in chapter 5 some of the problems raised by his 
anthropological assumptions. The focus of my interest is Holy Wisdom, but 
the account in the Secretum runs parallel to that in the digest and in some 
ways supplements it. 
Whether or not Baker was a mystic must surely depend on how broadly 
or narrowly one defines the term. We can judge only on the basis of his 
formal writings and the witness of his contemporaries. In the last three 
years of his life he wrote nothing, but, under the pressures of sickness, 
insecurity and impending persecution, seems to have reached a condition of 
passive contemplation. His landlady, present at his last hours, confirmed 
that "perfect resignation and a total subjection to the will and good 
pleasure of Almighty God was plainly seen to be performed by him to his 
last breath. ' mob David Knowles, a sharp critic of Baker, will conclude that he 
was not a mystic, because he confuses active and passive contemplation. 87 
Certainly, his descriptions of aspirations, for example, are inconsistent as 
to the degree of passivity. The soul aspiring "to raise and elevate 
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herself"'1111 and "the Holy Spirit ... completeýy and Vie- -ecý1y the foer., a'^ of 
(asp irations), "`ýý suggest a confusion over the prE =ise link between the 
activity and passivity of the soul. On the oche: - hand, Justin McCann, 
probably the foremost Baker scholar, says that "mys`. icism is ... Primarily 
and essentially a life"' and that the Secretum is "truly the autobiography 
of a mystic. ' In chapter 21 will consider and criticize some of the 
scholars who have written about Baker. 
The vagueness of the term "mystic" makes it difficult to categorize 
Baker. Grace Jantzen argues that a dominant 20th century understanding of 
mysticism, derived from post-Kantian Idealism and Romanticism via the 
writings of William James and focussing on the subjective psychological 
states of the individual, stands in contrast to an older view. The older 
view, arising from a close consideration of paradigmatic mystics such as 
Bernard of Clairvaux and Julian of Norwich, suggests that mysticism pertains 
to a whole way of life centred on God. 92 This view accords with McCann's 
definition. Nevertheless, as Knowles has pointed out, the note of personal 
authority in Holy Wisdom diminishes as Baker describes the higher reaches 
of prayer. 93 Probably he did not go "as far" as a John of the Cross or a 
Teresa of Avila. But there is no denying that he was a man of prayer and a 
contemplative and that his teaching has helped many people over the 
centuries. The purpose of this thesis is not to assess the spiritual 
experience of Baker, however: it is, rather, to investigate the Christian 
anthropology that underlies Holy Wisdom. The preliminary discussion of his 
life serves to give perspective to that investigation. 
III BAKER'S DISCIPLES 
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h) Baker's followers 
We have already seen something of the warmth felt towards Baker by 
his disciples and first exponents: Prichard speaks of "my affection to Fa. 
Baker" and of his benefiting from Baker's teaching. '° Salvin describes in 
personal terms the effect on him of meeting Baker: "he touched the very 
intime of my soul and imprinted thereon ... the whole substance of his 
advice. ' He concludes his biography: Baker was "of a nature affable, 
courteous and faithfully constant to his friends ... and every way grateful 
and acceptable to all people that knew him. "9° Baker must have had many 
friends and followers both within the EBC and beyond. The community of 
Cambrai remained solidly loyal to "our venerable and deare Father Baker. "' 
Many came to him for advice, including students of the English seminary and 
Franciscan friars. 98 Indeed, the seminary offered him a home when his 
Benedictine superiors were planning to send him away from Douai. 99 
Teenaged students at St Gregory's became his spiritual disciples. ' 00 Another 
student, apparently unacquainted with Fr Baker, took him a rose; the 
encounter brought about the young man's conversion. 10' 
These incidents are related by '13akerists", 1 O2 but there is no reason 
to doubt the substantial honesty of these men and women. It is clear that 
Baker had a devoted following, and that following could, at times, be 
indiscreet in its enthusiasm. ' °-' It is clear too that Baker's attractiveness 
arose from both his spiritual authority and his calm receptiveness. He 
seems to have been less intrusive and more "laid-back" than many spiritual 
directors of the period. This, of course, is not to deny his eccentricity and 
idiorhythmic life-style. 
After this brief glance at Baker's contemporary spiritual influence, 
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we must now discuss the man who wculd perhaps be his most important 
follower, Fr Serenus Cressy, the creator of Sancta Sophia. 
i) Seren us Cressy 
Sancta Sophia or Holy Wisdom was the work of Serenus Cressy. 
Although its content is Baker's, its systematic nature and its form are 
CCressy's. We thus need to consider Cressy and his relationship with Baker. 
In this section I shall present the main events of his life, glance at his 
link with the Great Tew circle and conclude with some comments on his 
literary style. The purpose of the thesis is to consider the anthropology of 
Holy Wisdom and that is essentially Baker's. Thus, my comments on his editor 
will be summary and largely derivative. 
Hugh Paulinus Cressy, Serenus in religion, was a Yorkshireman, born in 
1605, the son of Hugh Cressy, a counsellor of Lincoln's Inn. ' 0 He was 
educated locally before being sent to Oxford in 1619. Four years later he 
graduated BA and subsequently MA. A fellowship of Merton followed in 1627 
and, having received Anglican orders, he became chaplain to Thomas, Lord 
Wentworth. Later he was chaplain to Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland whom he 
accompanied to Ireland in 1638, where he was made dean of Leighlin. He 
returned with his patron to England in 1639 and was made a canon of 
Windsor. In the mid 1640s he toured Europe as guardian to Charles Berkeley, 
afterwards Lord Falmouth. As a result of inquiring into the beliefs and 
practices of the Roman Church, he renounced his protestantism in Rome in 
1646. Returning to Paris, he studied at the Sorbonne under Henry Holden and 
the following year published his Exomologesis, an account of his conversion. 
After considering joining the Carthusians of Nieuport, he decided to 
opt for the Benedictines so as to have the opportunity of defending 
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Catholicism with his writings. He entered the noviciate at St Gregory's, 
Douai, and was professed in 1649. He led the monastic life on the continent 
till the late 1650s; this period included a spell as chaplain to the English 
Benedictine nuns of Paris who included among their number two of the 
sisters of Lucius Cary. During this continental period he completed Sancta 
Sophia, which was published at Douai in 1657. Sent on the English mission, 
he was a chaplain to Queen Catherine of Braganza, residing at Somerset 
House and publishing several apologetic, historical and devotional works. In 
these years his former Anglican acquaintances found him reserved and almost 
melancholic, due, it is suggested, to "his solely giving himself up to 
religion, the refinedness of his soul, and the avoiding of all matters 
relating to humane and profane learning, as vanities. "' °b He died at the 
recusant household of Richard Caryll at East Grinstead on August 10th 1674. 
In the years prior to his conversion to Catholicism, Cressy mixed on 
equal terms with the most intellectually able of his time. He was a member 
of the Great Tew circle of Lucius Cary which included such men as Edward 
Hyde, Gilbert Sheldon, George Morley, Henry Hammond and William 
Chillingworth all of whom would become important figures in the political 
or ecclesiastical life of the country. Other members were Thomas Hobbes, 
John Suckling the poet and possibly Ben Jonson. The circle was characterized 
by an open-mindedness and an intellectual liveliness. A recent assessment of 
the Great Tew Circle describes it as "a remarkably coherent group of men 
with clear and consistent ideas" which included a critical royalism, an 
unclerical Arminianism and a philosophical rationalism. ' °6 
According to Trevor-Roper, Cressy "lost the hope which had once 
sustained the Great Tew fraternity; "' 01 he could not cope with the 
scepticism and uncertainties which surrounded the Church of England and 
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"like many other weak brethren, he crept into the warmer boss m of the 
Church of Rome. "' °8 Lunn, more sympathetically, suggests that Cressy was 
fleeing from "the effects of unfettered reason. "' O3 Despite his abhorrence 
of Cressy's "odious alteration", Hyde, now earl of Clarendon, still described 
him many years later as "an old friend ... with whom I have been acquainted 
nearly fifty years. "" ° Nevertheless Cressy's sharp repudiation of Great Tew 
in 1672 drew a bitter reaction from Clarendon: he spoke of "the melancholic 
and irresolution in his nature (which) prevailed with him to bid farewell to 
his own reason. "' '' 
Trevor-Roper sees Cressy's conversion to Rome as an apostasy, but 
gives no attention to Cressy's contemplative leanings which would find scope 
only in the teachings of Fr Baker. Unlike other converts (such as Lucius 
Cary's younger brothers Henry and Patrick), Cressy would stay faithful to 
his new religion and not be drawn back by the prospect of preferment within 
the Established Church. Trevor-Roper's view betrays a lack of sympathy for 
what mattered most to Cressy and Baker. ' 12 1 would adopt the balanced view 
and see Cressy not as a weak apostate nor as a great contemplative but as 
a man trying to follow his conscience into a way of life most suited to his 
personality. 
Before leaving Baker's editor we should glance at his literary 
abilities and output. ' 13 Cressy's work falls into three main categories: 
controversial, narrative or biographical and historical. His apologia, the 
Exomologesis (1647), has been characterized as showing "a cumbrous 
prolixity: when preparing the ground for argument his prose spreads into a 
thicket of qualifying clauses amid which his meaning can be all too easily 
lost. "' '° There is, however, an improvement in clarity in his later works. 
But still, "though his work becomes much livelier after 1660 his fondness 
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for parenthetical qualification often leads him into irregular constructions 
and confusing arrangements. "' 's Steuert's conclusion on Cressy's style is 
that his works remained disorderly and unwieldy with long and complex 
sentences. But there is "a candour and earnestness ... which preserves them 
from mediocrity. "' 16 
So Baker had a not unworthy editor in Serenus Cressy. Starting his 
adult life among an intellectually brilliant circle, the intimate associate 
of the politically and ecclesiastically influential, he would move from his 
position within the establishment into a path to conversion that would 
never be entirely understood or appreciated by his former friends. Thus 
there would remain an ambivalence in their attitude towards him. Yet he 
would give "currency to the public image of the courtly Benedictine"' " and 
would feature as such in Joseph Shorthouse's novel, John Inglesant, a 19th 
century apologia for Anglicanism. ' 18 
Cressy became a well-known writer and was chosen to produce the 
digest of Baker's spiritual teaching. His credentials were excellent: his 
Exomologesis had earned him a high reputation among Catholics and, despite 
the stylistic matters mentioned above, he had a sharp mind and sober 
judgment. ' 19 In addition he was highly sympathetic to Baker's spiritual 
teaching. Of all the lives of Baker, his, the only one known throughout the 
years since its composition, was written "most methodically" 1: 20 and with a 
less overt sense of personal commitment than the others. It was his 
interest in contemplative matters that preserved for posterity some of the 
works of the medieval mystics. ' 21 So successful was his project of editing 
Baker that despite his eradicating the repetitiveness, systematizing the 
unruliness and smoothing the homeliness of Baker's own style, the theology, 
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philosophy and anthropology are Baker's. Thus, we may allow the ed-Itor to 
fade away, as he would certainly have wished. 
j) Concl usi on 
If a critical study of Holy Wisdom requires justification, then the 
present chapter will have provided some. Neither Baker nor Cressy were 
marginal figures. They came from the educated and influential classes of 
Elizabethan and Jacobean Britain; they retained links with those classes, 
even after conversion to Catholicism. In addition, their experience of 
Catholic Europe gave them a breadth of vision so that there was no real 
danger of their being narrowly insular or nationalistic. Their historical 
interests saw them drawing on English medieval texts and MSS and 
transmitting the writings of the 14th century mystics. Thus they are 
important men, not just in recusant circles. From a purely historical point 
of view, there is value in a close study of the book by which they are 
known to posterity. 
My primary interest is not the historical, however: the present 
chapter has set the scene, provided the context and presented Baker as a 
man of his time. But Baker is more than that: David Lunn calls him "a free 
spirit, a universal figure, who belongs to all ages and all creeds. "' 22 If 
this judgement is rather sweeping, it encapsulates a truth. Baker's life has 
influenced succeeding generations of God-seekers, but more influential has 
been the digest of his teaching. Thus to Holy Wisdom we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 2 
"THIS IS OUR VENERABLE AUTHOR'S DOCTRINE"' 
HOLY WISDOM 
a) Introduction 
Having set the historical and biographical scene, my purpose in the 
present chapter is to consider Holy Wisdom from an external point of view. 
A close textual analysis will be conducted later in chapters 4,5 and 6. The 
present chapter is divided into three main parts. Part I deals with the 
emergence of Holy Wisdom, its structure and its subsequent history; part II 
looks at various critical responses to the work; part III deals with its 
relevance and sources. Part III is particularly important because it 
supports my claim that Holy Wisdom deserves a detailed critical 
investigation. 
I THE EMERGENCE AND HISTORY OF THE TEXT 
b) Baker's writings 
The years of Baker's literary creativity fall into two periods 
corresponding to his residence at Cambrai (1628-1633) and at Douai (1633- 
1638). 2 The treatises of the Cambrai period tend to be generally short and 
are a "loosely connected series of 'advices' for (the nuns') spiritual 
course. 13 They are constructed by a method of addition. The Douai treatises, 
on the other hand, are long and more carefully planned. The difference is to 
be explained in terms of Baker's situation in each of these two periods. At 
Cambrai he was actively directing a community of nuns and responding to 
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needs as they arose. At Douai, although directing individuals, he was 
writing from a more theoretical standpoint. The common theme of Baker's 
treatises is the practice of prayer. 
All scholars of the manuscripts agree on the weaknesses of his style: 
it is characterized by "the utmost prolixity and discursiveness", 
"repetition" and a "character of tediousness. "' "It has to be emphasized 
that Baker was at times exceedingly tortuous, tediously repetitive and 
sometimes unintelligible. It is not unusual to find sentences of over 150 
words in length. "' 'Baker was not exactly a master of English prose. 16 It 
appears that he was quite aware of his stylistic shortcomings and his 
lawyer's tendency to qualify and requalify: when asked by a friend to 
clarify a passage he replied that "to be prolix was his fault in all his 
writings" and that he wished he could have been briefer. ' In his treatise 
on the Rule he admits: "I know I am oft times long and tedious, if not 
superfluous in some of my discourse: but it is my manner and I can do no 
better. ' Nevertheless, there is also a "homeliness ... salted with English 
proverbs"9 and in the early treatises he is capable of "a terse and direct 
English. "' ° McCann sums up: "In the most general terms, it may be said that 
the Cambray treatises are unsuitable for publication mainly on the score of 
their form, the Douay treatises on the score of their style. "' ' 
Many Baker manuscripts are extant. In 1933 McCann provided a 
descriptive list of the known MSS. ' 2 They contain mainly spiritual and 
ascetical works but include also biography, history and translations. In that 
year he knew of 190 MSS, but by 1958 had uncovered the existence of 
another ten. ' 3 In his 1974 statement on the state of Baker studies, McCann's 
successor, Placid Speerritt, described a further ten that had been found 
since 1958.1 ° Nor is that the end of the tally: the Osborn Collection of 
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Yale University Library acquired a Baker MS in 1975/5 and a "hitherto 
unnoticed autograph MS" was bought by Downside Abbey in 1983.16 
In view of the piecemeal discovery of Baker MSS and the fact that 
several, including autographs and the early biographies of Baker by Prichard 
and Salvin, have turned up only in the present century, it would be 
unreasonable to believe that the collection is complete. The French 
Revolution inflicted suffering on the English religious communities on the 
continent and saw the disappearance of many of their books and MSS. The 
original MSS at Cambrai, which Abbess Catherine Gascoigne had guarded with 
such tenacity in the 17th century, were lost when the community fled to 
England in the last years of the 18th. Fortunately, they survive in early 
copies. 
The bulk of Baker's work survives. There are some autographs, but 
most of the MSS are copies made by 17th century disciples. It would be 
possible to produce a critical edition of Baker's work, but the enterprise 
would be vast in extent and the product would have little popular as 
opposed to scholarly appeal. The lack of such an edition makes a systematic 
discussion of Baker's theology and spirituality difficult if not impossible. 
Nevertheless, besides the special case of Holy Wisdom, several 
writings of Baker have been published. 17 An investigation of 
these reveals 
a close agreement with Holy Wisdom in matters 
theological, anthropological 
and spiritual. These works include Baker's autobiography and 
Rythms, the 
autobiographical sections of his Secretum 
Sive Mysticum, ' e his commentary 
on the Cloud of Unknowing, his life of Dame 
Gertrude More, "Of Finding God 
within the Soul" and The Substance of the 
Rule of St Bennet. ' 9 There are 
also collections of affective prayers by 
Baker, some wrongly attributed to 




Wisdom. 21 All these, however, represent a very small proportion of his total 
output. 
These writings are not directly relevant to my purposes in this 
thesis, except insofar as forty of them were digested by Serenus Cressy to 
produce Holy Wisdom. 22 It would be a task of value to explore in detail 
Cressy's editorial process. A small amount of work on this has been done. 23 
But again, such a task is not directly relevant to my purpose, which is to 
criticize Holy Wisdom as we have it. A glance at its roots in Baker's own 
literary achievement serves to provide a necessary context. 
c) The genesis of Holy Wisdom 
As we have seen, Baker was a controversial figure in his lifetime. His 
very presence polarized opinions. He was quite clearly a gifted spiritual 
director and a man of prayer who engendered great warmth and affection on 
the part of his disciples and friends. On the other hand, he was eccentric 
in his way of living. A glance through the biographies by his disciples 
reveals many chapters of special pleading and explanation. He stopped saying 
daily mass; -2 A he did not eat in the refectory nor wear the monastic 
habit. 2s The singularity of an isolated individual in a community may be 
treated with bemused tolerance. But when such an individual becomes the 
centre of a group of followers, that person may become vaguely threatening. 
Baker's biographers suggest that he had no intention of forming factions; 
his followers were, nevertheless, labelled "Bakerists" by their opponents. 26 
There is no doubt that during his lifetime, Baker was considered subversive. 
His writings contained ideas that might have been held in suspicion 
by the authorities: there was an emphasis on interior prayer of the will 
which ran counter to the prevailing tendency to use discursive meditation. 
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There was his teaching on divine inspiration, which Knowles calls "perhaps 
the most original part of his work. "2' A suspicious mind might have seen 
this as tending to subvert the authority of external superiors. There was a 
lack of emphasis on the sacraments. 29 Already his teaching had come under 
critical scrutiny in his clash with Fr Francis Hull. He submitted his 
writings for judgement in 1629 and they were warmly approved by Frs 
Leander Jones and Rudesind Barlow. 29 They were again vindicated at the 
general chapter of 1633.30 
After his death the early biographies began to appear and his 
disciples started to copy his manuscripts. In 1649 Placid Gascoigne, 
brother of the abbess of Cambrai, was elected president of the Congregation. 
He was sympathetic to Baker. Under his direction the general chapter of 
1653 commissioned Fr Serenus Cressy to produce a digest. 31 This digest was 
to be examined by the incoming president, Fr Claude White, and several 
others. In fact, it was not published until 1657, under the presidency of 
White's successor, Fr Laurence Reyner. 
There must still have been doubts as to the orthodoxy of Baker's 
writings. In 1655 White attempted to gain possession of the Cambrai MSS. He 
was vigorously resisted by Abbess Catherine Gascoigne. She writes 
desperately to Fr Augustine Conyers on March 3rd 1655: "The books are 
declared to containe poysonous, pernicious and diabolicall doctrine, myself 
in a damnable way running to perdition ... 132 It seems that Rudesind Barlow 
was involved in this attempt. A letter from the chaplain at Cambrai, Fr 
William Walgrave, states: "Our old grandsir is crafty and crewell, God 
forgive him. He it is that is secretly the motor and promotor of all these 
turbulent affayres to effect his owene designs. "ý33 Ironically, Barlow had 
been a supporter of Baker on the latter's arrival in Douai in 1624, had sent 
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him to Cambrai as spiritual director of the nuns and had approved his 
writings in 1633. But relations had soured and some of Baker's later MSS 
had attacked him. 34 Lunn suggests that what the Benedictine superiors were 
really resisting was a contemplative movement within the Congregation that 
threatened the English mission. 35 The unanimous backing of the digest 
project was "a clever move by Barlow and his associates to come to terms 
with the cultus, and make it safe, by producing an authorised version of 
Baker's teaching. 136 Fortunately for the Bakerists, White died in 1655, 
Barlow in 1656, the Cambrai MSS were not handed over and Sancta Sophia was 
published in 1657. 
d) The structure of Holy Wisdom 
The first edition of Sancta Sophie or Directions for the Prayer of 
Contemplation &c was published in two volumes by John Patte and Thomas 
Fievet at Douai in 1657. The title page claims that the work was "extracted 
out of more then XL treatises written by the late Ven. Father F. Augustin 
Baker ... and methodically digested by the R. F. Serenus Cressy. " It opens 
with an address to Fr Laurence Reyner and the superiors of the 
Congregation, dated July 21st 1657 and commending the work to their favour. 
In this address Cressy admits that "the paines herein taken will appeare to 
be not very ordinary, to any one that shall consider how difficult a matter 
it is out of such a world of Treatises (written ... without any eye or 
designe in the Authour of affording materials for an entire Body of 
Spirituality) to frame such a Body not at all defective, and with parts not 
unproportionab1e. 137 And he says later that his effort in the task was 
partly due to gratitude, because Baker's teaching had drawn him to both the 
Catholic Church and the Benedictine life. 
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There follows an imprimatur in Latin, dated May 4th 1657 and given 
by President Reyner and nihil obstats by Frs Benedict Stapleton and Leander 
a S. Augustino. Then there are approbations by two regius professors of 
theology in the University of Douai, by the episcopal censor of books and by 
a professor of theology at the English seminary at Douai. Lastly and most 
touchingly, Cressy prints a personal letter from Abbess Catherine Gascoigne, 
Baker's courageous defender. She acknowledges the working and reworking 
that Cressy has done "to give the more full satisfaction in rendering your 
abridgement most entirely conformable to his writings in the very 
expression, as much as might be. " She concludes: "since not any that hath 
read your booke, and is versed in the authours workes; have found any 
objections to make, either of anything wanting or differing from him: but 
all acknowledge that you have most faithfully, clearely and substantially 
delivered his doctrine. "" 
After these commendations, Cressy addresses a preface to the reader 
in which he deals with possible objections to the publication of the work. 
Then the actual text begins. It is divided into three treatises. Volume 1 
contains the first, 235 pages in length, entitled "Of an internal life in 
general" and the second, 220 pages, "Of mortification". Volume 2 opens with 
a short letter of commendation to the abbess and community of Cambrai and 
continues with the third treatise, 304 pages in length, entitled "Of prayer". 
This is followed by an advertisement to the reader apologizing for the 
absence of certain appendices that had been promised. Instead, Cressy prints 
approbations of many of Baker's MS treatises, given by Frs Leander Jones 
and Rudesind Barlow and dated 1629,1630 and 1634. These are followed by a 
memorial written by Jones and forming perhaps the earliest discussion of 




exercises, short prayers, ejaculations and considerations to help "immediate 
acts and affections of the will". Cressy concludes the work with a brief 
index. 
e) The subsequent history 
We have already seen, in the previous sections, something of how the 
work was received. Lunn, who likes to bring forward the eccentricities of 
the characters he is discussing, 39 is anxious to underline the differences 
between Holy Wisdom and Baker's own writings. For him Baker is a hero of 
individualism in the restrictive environment of monastic conformity-" 
Nevertheless, he acknowledges that Catherine Gascoigne herself, "ye chief 
spiritual daughter of R. F. Aug. Baker, "d' was fully satisfied with the work, 
as were the other Bakerists. a2 Placid Spearritt accords with the abbess 
while holding that the digest is "not an adequate source for studying the 
more controverted elements of his doctrine. '13 But for posterity, Baker's 
spiritual doctrine is contained in Holy Wisdom, however different the form 
might be from that of his own writings. 
Holy Wisdom was duly published in 1657, but remnants of doubt about 
his teaching must have remained. In 1676 Catherine Gascoigne asked the 
president, Benedict Stapylton, for "a new confirmation of ye works of Fa. 
Baker. 1d° Stapylton complied and acknowledged "ye great advantages wch have 
accrued both to yr happy community & ye whole Congrn by ye practise of yt 
doctrine. 1145 He states that the authorized "collection or epitome ... was 
also confirmed by ye Gral Chapter, held at Paris in ye year 1657. "46 Weldon 
tells us that "many devout & learn'd writers as well French, as others have 
made large citations out of Fa. Baker's books. 1d7 
The Quietist controversy, associated with such men and women as 
48 
Holy Wisdom 
Molinos (c 164,0-97), Madame Guyon (1648-1717) and F6nelon (1651-1715), 
emerged well after Baker's death. Quietism was condemned in the person of 
Molinos by Innocent XI in 1687.413 Although Baker's teaching cannot be seen 
as incipient Quietism, the condemnation cast a shadow on contemplation. " 
Thus his popularity waned in the 18th century when apostolic work took the 
fore in the EBC. SO 
The spirituality of the English Benedictines in the 18th century has 
been ably discussed by Geoffrey Scotts' He acknowledges the general 
decline in Bekerism while pointing out, for example, the establishment of 
educational bursaries at the English Benedictine monastery of Lambspring 
which carried the condition that the beneficiaries should be schooled in 
Bakerism; S2 this practice had fallen into disuse by 1728, however. " 
Benedictine spirituality in that century seems to have been somewhat 
eclectic. 
Holy Wisdom itself was not reprinted until 1857 when a New York 
edition was published by Edward Dunigan and Brother. The short preface to 
this edition quotes the English Benedictine Bishop Ullathorne (1806-89) who 
says of the work "nothing is more clear, simple, solid, or profound. "64 The 
unnamed editor refers also to "the respect with which our older ascetical 
writers cite it. "ss This edition gave only the text and omitted the 
commendations, prefaces and acts of the 1657. An English edition appeared 
in 1876, edited by Dom Norbert Sweeney. sb This was a full version of the 
1657 edition. 
The closing decades of the 19th century saw a surge of interest in 
Baker, particularly at Belmont, the common noviciate house. This even 
included the copying of Baker MSS. 57 The period saw the publication of 




version. In this the name Holy Wisdom is used for the first time. The most 
recent version is that of Gerard Sitwell which includes merely the text 
with an introduction. S9 
II RESPONSES TO HCL Y WISlCX 
f) Previous work on Baker 
Previous work on Baker falls into four main types. Firstly, there is 
the apologetic. This is characterized by Leander Jones, Cressy and, in the 
19th century, Bishop Cuthbert Hedley. None of these writers is entirely 
systematic. The essential purpose of each is to defend the more 
controversial aspects of Baker's writing (their defences are explicitly 
associated with Holy Wisdom) and hence the theological discussion is 
piecemeal. 
Secondly, there is discussion of Baker from the point of view of 
mystical theology. Representatives of this approach include David Knowles 
and E. I. Watkin. Once again they focus on particular aspects of the 
teaching and tone of Holy Wisdom. Thirdly, there is an approach that is 
carefully and cautiously textual and which tends to focus on the MSS. 
Exponents of this include Justin McCann and Placid Speerritt. Finally there 
is the work that is primarily historical. This would characterize the 
writing of David Lunn. 
The only full-scale monograph on Baker, that of Anthony Low, tends to 
be expository rather than critical. He sketches the historical and literary 
background and discusses the main themes of Baker's published writings. 
Needless to say, my pigeon-holing of the Baker critics oversimplifies 
matters: there is considerable overlap. Knowles, for instance, as one might 
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expect, shows sensitivity to the historical setting; Hedley dwells on 
mystical themes; McCann has written much on the history. Although some of 
these writers are critical of Baker, Lunn's claim that "most experts on 
Baker are ... tigerish Bakerites"6° is not entirely without foundation. All 
start from an appreciation, if not reverence, for the master. All feel that 
he is worth recommending to would-be seekers of the contemplative way. 
Some have already glanced at themes that I shall develop more 
systematically in this thesis, particularly those associated with the 
community dimension. 61 No writer to date, however, has addressed him or 
herself to a critique of the Christian anthropology of Holy Wisdom, even 
less of the Baker MSS. Most, indeed, take for granted in their own comments 
the anthropology which Baker is assuming. 
There is not space to discuss everyone who has written about Baker. 
Several of the writings are popularizing and adulatory; 62 others dwell on a 
narrow or specific point. --: 3. What I will do is to survey briefly a selection 
of the most important discussions of Baker, ones that focus on the teaching 
of Holy Wisdom in general. 
The purpose of this survey is three-fold: firstly, to underline the 
relevance of Holy Wisdom. From its publication up to the present time, it 
has been viewed with seriousness and recommended as valuable spiritual 
teaching. Secondly, to emphasize its position within orthodox Catholic 
spirituality: all critics agree that it is neither suspect nor marginal; its 
teachings are shared by many others and it may therefore be taken as 
representative. Thirdly, to identify the levels at which it has been 
criticized. All this will lend support to my claim that Holy Wisdom is an 
important text, well worth detailed critical study, and will clarify the 
originality of my own critical approach. 
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My selection will include Baker's contemporaries, Leander Jones and 
Serenus Cressy (c 1635 and 1657 respectively), Cuthbert Hedley (1876), David 
Knowles (1927 and 1961) and Anthony Low (1970). Important Baker scholars 
such as McCann and Spearritt, and the EBC historian Lunn, are omitted 
because of their predominantly historical or textual slant. 
g) 17th century responses: Leander Jones and Serenus Cressy 
Fr Leander Jones, one of the most attractive figures of the early 
days of the EBC and its first president-general, wrote a sympathetic 
memorial in response to several of Baker's spiritual treatises-" This was 
produced shortly before 1635 and printed by Cressy at the end of Holy 
Wisdom. 65 
Jones' anthropological stance is very much the same as Baker's: "In 
this life our frail and weak body hindereth our soul; 166 he plainly favours 
"a spiritualizing of the soul by adhering to God, and transcending all 
creatures. 167 The feminine pronoun is used for the soul: "if the director 
perceive a soul to be so wary, that she is perpetually careful of progress 
in spirit ... 1619 Jones discusses several of Baker's themes that he considers 
to be potentially controversial. He mentions the role of conventual duties, 
especially the office, confession and the problems of scrupulosity, the 
examination of conscience, meditation on the Passion, passive contemplation, 
the work of God being immediate rather than in the powers of the soul and, 
finally, the role of a spiritual director. I will discuss most of these 
issues in chapter 6. The fact that Baker's contemporary felt the need to 
defend him by stating a more nuanced view of his teaching in these areas, 
indicates that his views were open to interpretations less than acceptable 
to the expectations of his contemporaries. In other words, although Jones 
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defends as thoroughly orthodox Baker's teaching on the communal dimension 
of the human person, he acknowledges that it is open to misunderstanding. I 
will argue in chapter 6 that Baker's understanding of this dimension is less 
than adequate from my incarnational stance. Jones' unease anticipates, to 
some extent, my more extensive critique. 
On the other hand, with regard to the theory of the person as an 
individual, Jones takes for granted the assumptions that underlie Baker's 
teaching. Thus Baker's views in this important area may be taken as 
generally representative. 
Cressy, as we might expect, is unequivocally in favour of Baker's 
teaching and he recommends Holy Wisdom in an extended preface, presumably 
written in 1657.69 He refers to the book's "immaculate doctrine"70 and at 
one point invokes the authority of Castaniza's Spiritual Conflict. " He too 
uses feminine language for the soul and assumes the same anthropological 
position. 72 The objections he handles are those associated with Baker's 
teaching on inspirations. He argues that even certain learned Jesuits have 
written independently on affective prayer in a vein similar to that of Baker 
and concludes that "here ... is no manner of covert indirect meaning or 
design ... to broach any bold new-fangled inventions. "73 
In conclusion, Baker's contemporaries found his understanding of the 
human person as an individual entirely unexceptionable. Were his teaching on 
this subject at all eccentric, they would certainly have attempted to deal 
with it. His views on the social life of the Christian, dealing with themes 
such as community prayer and obedience, provided the area that needed some 
commentary and explanation. But even here Jones and Cressy were satisfied 
that Baker wes entirely orthodox. It is important for my purposes that 
Baker's contemporaries should, at the end of the day, find his teaching unex 
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ceptionable and, indeed, worthy of warm commendation. Thus an attack on 
Baker's anthropology is an attack on a view-point that his contemporaries 
take for granted. 
h) A 19th century response: Cuthbert Medley 
In 1876, Cuthbert Hedley'd wrote a long review article on the newly 
published edition of Holy Wisdom, edited by Norbert Sweeney. 75 It was 
Hedley's contention that "the very aim of the teaching of Father Baker and 
of his school (is) that 'extraordinary' prayer should be the ordinary state 
for Christian souls. 176 He argued that Baker's teaching on prayer "is ... 
completely in accord with the classic fathers and mystical writers. "" 
Hedley agrees with the fundamentals of Baker's anthropology and with 
the spiritualizing tone of Holy Wisdom: "our fellow creatures are our 
greatest distractions; 178 we must move beyond the sensual imagination to 
"purer and more serene images" and "the steady view of spiritual beauty. 179 
He makes little or no comment on the social aspects of Baker's teaching but 
considers his supposed undervaluing of the understanding, 9° the 
imaginations' and "the sacred humanity of Our Lord. 1e2 Hedley attempts to 
give a view more nuanced than Baker's, but at the end of the day, he is in 
agreement with Baker. He concludes his defence by arguing that Baker must 
not be seen as an ur-Molinist. e3 For him Holy Wisdom "is at once the most 
considerable and the most excellent survival of an epoch which was 
distinguished by a revival of spirituality of a very marked character. ' ' 
Hedley's defence of Baker is lucid, scholarly and sensitive to issues 
of concern. While there are comments that suggest integration of the human 
person - he talks at one point, for instance, of the unity of the soul's 
activitya", - his own position is similar to Baker's. Like Jones and Cressy, 
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Hedley, writing over two centuries later, accepts that in his anthropology 
Baker is entirely unexceptionable. 
i) A 20th century response: David Knowles 
David Knowles, a great historian of medieval monasticism as well as a 
writer on mystical topics, dealt with Baker in two books, separated by a 
period of thirty-four years. 06 The earlier work points out the way in which 
Baker sums up fundamental strands of spiritual tradition: Baker "was 
saturated with the thought of his predecessors, and his teaching 
comprehends and supplements theirs to an extraordinary degree". 97 Knowles 
points out with distaste Baker's unusual monastic observance and finds in 
this some explanation for his unsatisfactory attitude to the social side of 
Christian life. He finds three aspects of Holy Wisdom as being "pre- 
eminently valuable": BB internal inspirations, mortification and the prayer of 
forced acts. But his overall impression is that Holy Wisdom is "entirely 
colourless" with an "entire absence of warmth1A9 and that Baker himself has 
"a cold outlook. "" 
The later work re-emphasizes the important position of Holy Wisdom 
in the tradition and gives a detailed list of the various spiritual strands 
that meet in Baker. "' Knowles is dubious as to whether Baker was a true 
mystic and concludes "it is hard to see how ... we can give a clear and 
affirmative answer to the quest ion. 192 Once again he singles out 
mortification, divine inspiration and the first 
degrees of mental prayer as 
worthy of further comment. But, as before, 
Baker is seen as giving "an 
impression of queerness"; he is "a man with whimsies and corners, a 
humourless man. 193 Despite the critical tone towards some aspects, however, 
Knowles is generally favourable and concludes that Holy Wisdom "is indeed a 
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book of power. "-, A 
Knowles' impression of Baker the man is jaundiced, as should be clear 
in the light of what I have said in the previous chapter. To call Baker 
"humourless" is entirely unfair and perhaps says more about Knowles than 
about Baker. Knowles' three concluding criticisms of Holy Wisdom are that it 
is too long, that it is too dour and sunless and that it shows confusion 
over the degrees of the spiritual life. The first criticism is trivial and 
the second inaccurate. If the third has some elements of truth - Holy 
Wisdom does, for instance, skip over the prayer of quiet" - it is still 
characterized by a certain narrowness of judgment. For Knowles, Baker is 
inadequate because he does not exactly reproduce the teaching of John of 
the Cross. Yet we might argue that there is something doctrinaire, perhaps 
even arbitrary, in making the Carmelite the central criterion for acceptable 
teaching on the higher reaches of prayer. 
Baker's early commentators had already appreciated that his views on 
the social side of the Christian life had a controversial element. Knowles, 
rightly, raises the subject again. But, like his predecessors, he has nothing 
to say against the anthropological stance of his subject. When all is said 
and done, Knowles too is arguing from within a framework of traditional 
anthropological assumptions, and even from that perspective his portrayal of 
Baker is impressionistic and insufficiently sensitive to the actual text of 
Holy Wisdom. 
J) A second 20th century response: Anthony Low 
Anthony Low's book Augustine Baker, wes the first and is so far the 
only full-length monograph to appear on the subject. 
96 He situates Baker in 
his literary and historical context, but deals purely with Holy Wisdom and 
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the other published works. His response to Baker is entirely favourable and 
he finds virtually nothing to criticize in the master's writing. For him 
Baker shows "the mark of a genius ... his ability to rise above the 
preoccupations of his time and culture, to produce something new or to 
revive something forgotten. 191 Nevertheless, "none of Baker's ideas about 
spirituality or mysticism are novel or unorthodox. 19A For Low as for 
Knowles, Baker is the heir of a rich tradition: he is neither marginal nor 
eccentric. He lies "in the central tradition of English mysticism199 and is 
also the "beneficiary and agent" of the many spiritual works appearing on 
the continent in the 16th and early 17th centuries-7O° 
Low's concern is to expound and defend rather than to criticize: he 
considers Baker's use of the scholastic commonplaces of faculty psychology. 
But his own line mirrors that of Baker: he is happy to talk the language of 
the "spiritualizing process". ' 0' Low too, like all his predecessors, takes 
for granted the admissibility of what we might now call a standard 
anthropology of the spiritual life. Like Jones and Cressy he is aware of 
possible problems with Baker's teaching on the social dimension and, like 
them, he resolves such problems to his satisfaction. He has no doubts about 
the relevance and value of Baker for men and women of today. ' O2 He could 
be considered one of Lunn's "tigerish Bakerites". 
k) Responses to Baker: conclusion 
This brief survey of some of the critical responses to Baker yields 
several conclusions. Most importantly, none of the commentators sees any 
problems with the basic understanding of the human person which underlies 
Holy Wisdom. This is not surprising because all of them write from within 
the same tradition as Baker. They are not submitting the tradition itself to 
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critical assessment. This might encourage us to doubt the objectivity of 
their judgments; but such doubt would be ill-founded. The tone of each is 
marked by honesty and a sensitivity to the ways in which the ordinary 
reader might react to Baker. The fact that the conclusions are generally 
favourable does not undermine the objectivity of the critical judgment. 
Furthermore, they do handle what they consider to be the primary area of 
controversy, namely, the social dimension of the human person. On this 
subject they conclude, with varying emphasis, that Baker is orthodox 
although the way he puts things could be open to misunderstanding. 
Two further points emerge: all commentators on Baker, from Jones in 
the 1630s to Luke Bell in 1989 are agreed that his teaching is relevant for 
their contemporaries. None attempts to defend him behind the shield of 
datedness. Secondly, all are agreed that he represents a focusing of various 
strands of patristic, monastic, medieval and 16th century teaching on 
spirituality. He is the heir of the past, the absorber of the present and 
the endower of the future. 
These last two points; Baker's relevance and his representative 
character, are particularly important for my purposes in this thesis. People 
of the present time believe that his teaching is of value for men and women 
of today. In the next section of the present chapter I shall consider his 
status as a spiritual teacher for the modern world. Holy Wisdom is neither 
a period piece nor a highly abstruse subject on which to write a thesis. 
A critique of Holy Wisdom as a solitary, albeit influential piece of 
writing would, I suggest, find justification. But Baker's teaching is also 
representative: it has grown out of a wide reading of Christian spiritual 
writers, particularly within Western Catholicism. I shall look at this in 
more detail in section m) of the present chapter. An attack on Baker will 
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inevitably have wider repercussions. My critique of him will, ipso facto, 
criticize all those who share his anthropological stance. 
III RELEVANCE AND SOURCES 
1) The relevance of Holy Wisdom 
My rapid survey of the fate of the book over the three hundred and 
thirty years of its history indicates that, despite fluctuating fortunes, it 
has continued to be read. Again with variations, it has been valued 
throughout by English Benedictines. But it has also had admirers from other 
backgrounds. ' O3 John Worthington discusses it in a letter to the Cambridge 
Platonist, Henry More (1614-87). The Quaker Robert Barclay (1648-90) read 
it, as did Lady Abigail Fairfax (d 1710). In our own century, Evelyn 
Underhill valued the work. ' °d For E. I. Watkin, writing in 1953, the 
principles of Bakerism "can and should be the foundation of the spiritual 
education of Catholic children ... I know no wiser or safer school of 
prayer. "' os For David Knowles in 1961, Holy Wisdom is "indeed a book of 
power ... which will guide all for a part of 
their way, and may suf f ice to 
some for a very great part of their lives. "' O6 For David Lunn, Baker is "a 
free spirit, a universal figure, who belongs to all ages and all creeds. "' 07 
If these are scholars and academics, an influential and popular spiritual 
guide of today, John Main, would claim to find his method of prayer in Holy 
Wisdom and would successfully recommend the book to modern spiritual 
disciples. ' 013 
There are Bakerites around today and not only in the monasteries of 
the English Benedictine Congregation. It is no exaggeration to say that if 
there is a uniquely EBC approach to personal prayer, it is that of Baker. 
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Holy Wisdom is probably one of the few systematic spiritual treatises from 
the 17th century that is still read with profit today. As McCann writes: 
"the fourteenth century in England ... produced original spiritual writings 
of the first quality. If we look for any parallel ... in post-reformation 
Catholicism, we find one book, and one book only, Father Baker's Sancta 
Sophia, which can be set beside (them). "' 19 Thus, as I said in the 
introduction to the thesis, we are dealing with something that is, for many, 
a living document. It is, therefore, profitable to investigate the work and 
justifiable to submit it to a modern critique. 
m) Baker's sources 
Although the majority of authors who have written about Baker make 
reference to his sources, no one has, as yet, undertaken the long and 
complex task of showing exactly how such sources influence him. I do not 
have space in this thesis for such a task. I rest my claim that Baker is 
representative on two pieces of external evidence and one of internal. The 
first is that all previous scholars working on Baker are unanimously agreed 
that he is the heir to the medieval English mystics as well as blending 
together several other main-line strands such as the monastic and the 
various influences of the contemporary scene. My reading of Holy Wisdom 
does not suggest that such an agreement is ill-founded. There are many 
echoes of earlier writers; for instance, the emphasis on will takes up an 
important theme of the Cloud of Unknowing. 
The second piece of external evidence is the list of translations and 
commentaries that Baker undertook. "° These include, among the medieval 
English mystics, the Remedy against Temptations of Richard Rolle, the Cloud 
of Unknowing and the Epistle of Privy Counsel, Hilton's Scale of Perfection 
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and Letter to a Devout Man; among more ancient writers, sayings and lives 
of the Fathers and an exposition of the Rule of St Benedict; among medieval 
continental authors, sermons of Tauler and various translations from Thomas 
A Kempis; among contemporaries, writings of Louis of Blois (Blosius), the 
Theologia Mystica of Van Herp (Harphius), Constantine Barbanson's Secret 
Paths of Divine Love, Bonilla's A Short Treatise of the Quiet of the Soul, 
Benet Fitch's The Rule of Perfection and the statement of the Jesuit 
Balthazar Alvarez concerning his prayer. All these authors are quoted or 
referred to several times in the course of Holy Wisdom. 
The final piece of evidence is my detailed index of persons quoted or 
mentioned in Holy Wisdom, the first such index to be drawn up. A glance at 
this will indicate the extent and frequency with which authorities are 
quoted. ' '' Although Baker occasionally differs from or modifies his sources, 
his teaching usually concurs with theirs. 
Thus I would argue again the central point about the repercussions 
of my thesis: that an attack on Baker does more than criticize Holy Wisdom. 
It questions the admissibility of some fundamental anthropological 
assumptions held by several Christian spiritual writers. But the extent to 
which the various levels of attack apply beyond Baker to his sources will 
vary. Thus, as we have seen, it might be argued that Baker's social teaching 
is not fully representative: if that is the case, then the argument of 
chapter 6 will not have such wide repercussions as that of chapter 5, where 
the anthropology criticized underlies a great many spiritual writers. 
n) General conclusion 
In this chapter I have described and discussed Holy Wisdom. I have 




suggested, further, that it finds resonances in other Christian spiritual 
writers. This is not to claim that it is entirely unexceptionable. In his 
understanding of the human person as an individual, Baker is representative. 
His anthropology is shared by many spiritual writers up to modern times. It 
is this anthropology that I will submit to criticism in chapters 4 and 5. 
His understanding of the social dimension, although entirely orthodox and 
certainly not marginal, was more controversial for both his contemporaries 
and later writers. Thus the attack developed in chapter 6 will have slightly 
narrower repercussions than that of chapters 4 and 5. 
Before I begin my detailed critique of Holy Wisdom, it is necessary 
to establish the principles on the basis of which I shall criticize it. These 
principles, as I have already indicated, are those of an incarnational 
theology. Thus we must now step back from Holy Wisdom and, in the next 
chapter, consider some of the requirements of an adequate incarnational 
theology. 
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C HA PTER3 
"A VIEW OF THE HUMANITY OF OUR LORD"' 
TOWARDS AN INCARNATIONAL THEOLOGY 
a) Introduction 
The main concern of this thesis is to carry out a detailed critical 
investigation of the Christian anthropology of Holy Wisdom. By 
"anthropology" I mean the way in which the human person is understood and 
described. Augustine Baker has no systematic anthropology, although an 
understanding of the human person is taken for granted. My method will be 
to draw out his implications; in this I shall be particularly sensitive to 
the pattern of language and imagery employed in Holy Wisdom. I shall 
examine also his more specific anthropological statements. 
This critical investigation will require criteria. If the anthropology 
of Holy Wisdom is to be criticized, it must be from the point of view of a 
clearly articulated position: this position must derive from the Church's 
theological tradition and be responsive to the understanding of Christians 
of today. My stance is that of incarnational theology and in the present 
chapter I shall attempt to outline an incarnational theology that will 
provide a rule against which Holy Wisdom is to be measured. 
It is necessary to emphasize here that there is no single 
incarnational theology. Within the progress of Christian history there have 
been many different attempts to articulate the implications of the 
incarnation both for dogmatic theology and for ascetical. Again, the notion 
of a broad spiritual tradition of which Baker is representative is both 
inaccurate and over-simplified. Perhaps the Roman Catholic perspective 
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which, for so long, was characterized by an apparently clear and monolithic 
understanding of Christian tradition, has tended to encourage an over- 
simplified view of the development of spirituality. 
When I say that Baker is representative, I mean that he is influenced 
by several important currents of spirituality and that he has many 
anthropological assumptions in common with theirs. He is firmly within the 
Catholic tradition in the sense that Holy Wisdom has never been suspected 
of unorthodoxy but, on the contrary, has been warmly recommended. 
Admittedly, there are other ways of looking at the spiritual life: even 
against the background of 14th century English spirituality with which 
Baker was familiar, differing anthropological attitudes can be detected - 
between, for instance, the Cloud and Richard Rolle, or Walter Hilton and 
Julian of Norwich. The point I am making is that I am aware of the 
complexity of both incarnational theological ideas and of the many strands 
of spiritual tradition. Nevertheless, in a work of this scope some 
simplifications have inevitably to be made. 
In broad outline my incarnat ional perspective will be derived from 
that found in the second Vatican Council's constitution on the church in the 
modern world, Gaudium et Spes. The teachings of Vatican II are both 
authoritative and influential on the way Christians of today experience and 
articulate their faith. In the previous chapter I argued why it is justified 
to submit Baker to a "modern" critique; I shall recapitulate that argument 
at the end of this chapter. 
In the present context, my purpose is not simply to expound the 
teachings of Vatican II: the theology of today grows out of what has gone 
before. I shall survey some Greek and Hebrew understandings of the human 
person, paying particular attention to the body/soul relationship. I shall 
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then glance at the New Testament before briefly considering two important 
figures: St Benedict, a central authority for Baker, and St Thomas Aquinas, 
representing the high scholastic period and influential on the development 
of Catholic theology; Holy Wisdom invokes the authority- of Aquinas on 
several occasions. In part III I shall present a s, immary of the anthropology 
of Gaudium et Spes, consider the themes of creation, incarnation, church and 
sacraments, and look at two anthropological implications, namely integration 
and the value of the emotions. The chapter will conclude with a summary of 
the basic position from which Baker will be asses.; ed. 
As I said in the previous chapter, I am concerned primarily with 
assessing Baker's Holy Wisdom and through that, the Christian anthropology 
that he assumes. Thus my purpose is not to produce a defence of 
incarnational theology over against other forms of theology. Although 
showing that the former does derive from scripture and tradition, I shall, 
to some extent, be assuming its validity as a starting point. "How does Holy 
Wisdom (and the anthropology that it represents) fare before the tribunal 
of incarnational theology? " is the question with which I am primarily 
interested. I shall not be so concerned with another question, "To what 
extent is incarnational theology a valid starting point for such a 
critique? "2 
This said, it should be clear that my. outline of incarnational 
theology is intended to be provisional rather than comprehensive. Its 
purpose is to provide a tool with which to work on Baker. 
I SETTING THE SCENE 
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b) Theology and spirituality 
At the heart of theology there seems to be a series of dichotomies 
or polarities. These include transcendence and immanence, God and the 
created world, the divine and the human, spirit and matter, soul and body. 
This list is not exhaustive. A consideration of such distinctions is 
inevitable when dealing with important themes of theology - whether 
creation or incarnation, whether sacramentalism in the broadest sense with 
its implications for understanding the material world, or the specific 
liturgical sacraments of the Christian order. There have been attempts to 
integrate the apparently irreconcilable members of these pairs, presumably 
springing from the belief that wholeness or unity is somehow more true or 
desirable or fundamental than division. Although monism of one form or 
another has never lacked its supporters, these attempts have been more 
energetic in theological discussion of the present century. There is for 
instance Henri de Lubac's Surnaturel (1946) where he reconsiders the 
relationship between the natural and the supernatural, and Grace Jantzen's 
God's World, God's Body (1984) in which she attempts to bring God and the 
world together in a way that avoids none the less the extreme of pantheism. 
It might be asked what is the relevance of such distinctions and 
integrations to spirituality or to the Christian life in general. My 
contention is that they are highly relevant. The Christian life is concerned 
with the relationship of man or woman to God and to the world; spirituality 
is particularly concerned with the relationship of the human person to God 
as expressed in prayer, asceticism and liturgy. Because it is the same God 
that underlies all human activities, the theology of spirituality must be in 
harmony with theology in general. The dogmatic truth that God became man 
will have repercussions in the theory and practice of spirituality. This may 
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seem obvious but Christians have not always integrated their theory and 
their practice. =' It is possible, for example, to believe in a theological 
doctrine of incarnation and yet to live by a spirituality the theory of 
which is in conflict with the implications of incarnation. This, presumably, 
is what certain Docetic, Marcionite and Gnostic sects did. ° Their 
spirituality, if investigated, would reveal roots in a syncretistic Platonism 
or an Oriental dualism with a pessimistic view of matter. These examples, of 
course, are "heretics"; but it could be argued that a similar failure of 
integration occurs in some influential spiritual writers who are not 
heretical. In Thomas A Kempis' Imitation of Christ, for instance, book 4 
deals over eighteen chapters with the Blessed Sacrament; yet there are 
several references in earlier parts of the work which suggest a negative 
attitude to the body. s My point is tentative and I do not wish to labour it. 
I am aware of the danger of over-simplification: incarnation itself, as I 
have emphasized, is open to various interpretations. But in the teaching of 
Church councils a positive understanding appears to emerge, made precise in 
controversy, sharpened by the challenge of heresy and encapsulated in the 
creeds. ' 
Augustine Baker is a writer on spirituality and what I shall be 
investigating in this thesis is the extent to which his teachings are in 
harmony with some basic themes of Christian theology. I shall be interested 
in how far he draws inspiration, albeit unconscious or mediated, from 
philosophical positions that are in conflict with such 
theology. In 
particular I shall consider his Christian anthropology, 
the way in which he 
understands the human person, particularly 
in the context of the 
fundamental anthropological distinction of body and soul. 
One's view of this distinction and the respective values one places 
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on body and soul can influence the way one sees the world. Consider two 
caricatures representing two extreme positions: the first is to see human 
beings as exiles or aliens in a vale of tears. Their purpose is to prepare 
themselves for the bliss of heaven which will be achi: eved after death. This 
point of view emphasizes the body/soul and related d'stinctions. It tends to 
feel that Christianity is primarily concerned with t. -le "spiritual life". Its 
attitude towards the material world and the body is negative or at best 
neutral. The soul is seen as the essential pers. -)n. 1 Such would be the 
position of Gnostics and Manichaeans. Although thee-2 labels refer to groups 
in the early centuries of the Church, the mood they encompass is perennial: 
it springs from a fundamental pessimism abcºlt the world and its 
potentiality. 
The other caricature rejects the notion of an other-worldly heaven 
and sees human fulfilment, if obtainable at all, as a function of this 
present life. One is reminded of the Corinthians whose experience of the 
Spirit was such that they were either sceptical or indifferent as to the 
possibility of life after death. At its extreme limits this position would 
merge into pantheism or even materialism. It would more easily place a high 
value on matter and the body than the first point of view. 
As I have said, the two positions outlined are caricatures; in 
practice few people if any would adopt either extreme. 
But caricatures, like 
cartoons, are valuable because they clearly indicate particular aspects or 
tendencies in their subjects, and they do this by over-emphasis. The beliefs 
of human beings, however, cannot be neatly categorized; 
the balanced 
Christian is the one who can steer between the extremes, who can live by an 
eschatology which is at once realized and 
futuristic, and therefore biblical. 
It can be seen that one's anthropology lies at the heart of one's 
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attitude to spirituality and to life as a whole; it does affect the way in 
which one lives, prays, hopes and acts. Thus a critical appraisal of Baker 
and the spirituality he represents must address itself to the level of his 
Christian anthropology. 
II HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
c) Greek understandings of the human per-son 
I will now offer a brief consideration of the two main sets of views 
which gave rise to the Christian understanding of the human person; these 
were the Greek philosophical and the Hebraic scriptural. They underlie the 
work of Augustine Baker as they do that of most Christian spiritual 
writers. We must understand them before we can criticize him. 
In his discussion of the body/soul distinction Karl Barth identifies 
three main positions: there is the abstractly dualistic conception which is 
also "unfortunately ... the traditional Christian view; '"a 
there is a 
materialistic monism which holds that the body is the real thing and the 
soul pure appearance (though how a soul could be appearance is not easy to 
see); finally, there is a spiritualistic monism which sees the body as a 
shadow of the spiritual reality of the soul. Needless to say these three 
positions are not exhaustive: they help us to take our bearings. All three 
have been held from ancient times although, due to the prestige of Plato in 
western thought, dualism has tended to predominate, albeit in forms 
considerably different from that in which Plato himself expounded it. 
The acceptance of life after death, perhaps as ancient as the human 
race itself, was the spur that forwarded consideration of how human beings 




the body, a physical object that at death would cease to function and would 
decay, and an invisible "spiritual" reality was an obvious way of explaining 
survival. The shadowy teachings of the Orphic and Pythagorean sects with 
their suggestions encapsulated in the formula awpa mjta that the soul's 
sojourn in the body is a punishment for sin, or that the soul has no 
organic relationship to the body and longs to escape, led naturally into the 
dualism of the Platonic dialogues. ' Not that all Plato's predecessors shared 
the Orphic/Pythagorean views: the Homeric writings for example suggest that 
the soul is like a puff of smoke which, on separation from the body at 
death, is blown to nothing by the wind. 10 This is one of the views that 
Plato glances at in Phaedo" and is vaguely similar to the Hebrew 
understanding of the insubstantial fate of the nephesh. 
But Plato is the master of western philosophy and it is to his 
dualism that we turn. The Phaedo presents a series of arguments for the 
immortality of the soul which it sees as deathless, imperishable' 2 and akin 
to the divine. ' 9 The body is spoken of in unmitigatedly negative terms: it 
is despised by the soul; ' 4 the soul's union with it is "an evil admixture"; ' & 
it is a hindrance to the soul's quest; ' 6 it fetters the soul; " the soul is 
chained up in it. ' a Now it is true that Plato's understanding of the soul as 
incomposite' 9 changes in the Republic, Phaedrus and Tlmaeus, where he 
develops a tripartite view. Nevertheless his attitude to the body remains at 
best neutral. The body/soul distinction is a natural consequence of his 
epistemological and metaphysical dualism. If the Forms constitute reality, 
are the true objects of knowledge, are only dimly perceived in the shifting 
world of the senses and in fact inform the material world, it is natural 
that souls, akin to the Forms and therefore able to apprehend them, should 
be superior to bodies. Even if the body is beautiful, 2° albeit with a 
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derivative beauty, in symmetry with the soul" and even in sympathy with 
it, 2s the soul is older, 23 superior to, 2 and has more truth and reality 
than the body. 2& Plato's philosophical views may nave changed over the 
course of his life: that does not concern us here. But one of his important 
legacies was a definite and evaluative body/soul distinction. 
In succeeding centuries differing views appeared: the old Stoa, for 
example, held a material soul united to a material body. Its later 
distinction between the ruling principle or 'rfycpovtxov and the body 
witnessed an increasing Platonist influence. 2' The Epicureans too thought of 
the soul as a material substance. 27 More influential on Christian thought, 
however, were the neo-Platonist ideas of such thinkers as Plotinus. 
Although he "seemed ashamed of being in the body, 128 his was an attitude of 
"austere, detached tolerance for what after all is an image or reflection of 
our true self and good on its own lowest level. "29 
A. H. Armstrong suggests that the kinship between the Platonist 
systems and Christianity arose through their common interest in life after 
death, an interest not shared in the same way by the Stoics and 
Epicureans. 3° But concern with a better life in some spiritual state will 
inevitably influence one's view of the present. The position of such masters 
as Plato and Plotinus has its attractions. Let us consider it for a moment 
in the most favourable light, because it has supported so much Christian 
spirituality. The mood which characterizes it is not uncommon among those 
drawn to prayer and contemplation. There is the sense of limitation in this 
present life, the feeling, perhaps increasing with age, that possibilities 
are less than one at first imagined. There are experiences of 
beauty and 
wonder, always transient, which set off the longing for a greater 
beauty. 
The shifting world of the senses provided so many tantalizing hints: it was 
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a natural enough move to describe the longing as eros and the hints as 
signs of an ideal world where beauty and goodness or simply the One abide, 
ready deities for unveiled contemplation or union. 
The problem is that dissatisfaction with the limited, shifting world 
of the senses can easily give rise to an evaluation of that world which 
treats it with contempt or at least with cool neutrality. Gnostics, 
Docetists, Manichaeans and other heretical sects were, in varying ways, 
party to this contempt. 31 They forced the Church to clarify and define what 
was often tacit and vague. But, as I mentioned in the previous section, some 
orthodox spiritual writers, in propounding a theory and practice of 
asceticism and prayer, may not always have been able to escape a mood 
which the official teaching condemned. 
d) Hebrew understandings of the human person 
When we turn to the Old Testament witness we find a somewhat 
different picture. The Old Testament itself is, of course, a library of books 
written over a period of several hundred years. Already by the time of 
Christ Hellenism had exerted its influence and some books, Wisdom for 
instance, were considerably Hellenized in inspiration and tone. But the pre- 
Hellenistic scriptures present a remarkably clear and consistent view of the 
human person. 
This view saw the human being not as a duality of body and soul but 
as a unity that could be spoken of under different aspects. Probably it was 
strongly influenced by the lack of any clear understanding of an individual 
after-life. Human happiness was in this world. The Torah was God's gift to 
lead men and women to fullness of life here and now. The hope of 
immortality was that one's name would be carried on by one's sons and that 
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the community or nation would endure and prosper. 
Work done in recent years on the anthropology of the Old Testament 
is conveniently summed up by H. W. Wolff. '- The Hebrew word nephesh is 
often translated yrvyq in the Septuagint and soul in English, but the Greek 
and the English do not really convey the correct sense. Nephesh was 
originally a bodily word, perhaps meaning throat and therefore related to 
the vital human activities of breathing and eating. It stands for the living 
being as needy and dependent, drawing his or her life from the Creator. 
Wolff lists seven loosely connected ways in which nephesh is used. 33 Two 
examples are as a pronoun for the individual and as simply standing for 
person. 
A second word, basar, can be translated flesh. It sometimes means the 
visible body, sometimes the human person as weak or frail or as in relation 
to others. More than a third of its occurrences relate to animals, showing 
that it pertains to something that human beings and animals have in 
common. 34 Although the relationship between nephesh and basar may seem to 
be parallel to that between soul and body, we must avoid taking the 
parallel too far and in particular evaluating nephesh vis-ä-vis baser. 
Although the latter may be more directly connected with the physical body, 
the former too includes a definite sense of the bodily person. 
A third word, leb is translated heart: it is the seat of reason, of 
feeling and of desire; it can mean mind or understanding. The word rush 
means breath or life; it could be translated spirit. It is not something 
humans have by right but is a given. It is essentially a quality or power 
of God which he bestows on his creatures. 
From this summary certain points emerge: all the words which describe 
the human being are originally bodily words; there are no words for body 
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and soul in the Greek sense. The human person is a unity seen through his 
or her diff erent ways of being and acting. Any survival of the nephesh 
after death is at best shadowy and uncertain. It was only in the post-exilic 
period that a Hellenistic sense of the body/soul distinction began to 
appear; neve rtheless authentic Jud aism continued with a body/soul union. At 
the risk of over-simplification we might say that for the Greek, immortality 
consisted in liberation of the soul from the body; for the Jew in the 
resurrection of the body and the reunion of the human person. "What to 
Philo would have seemed the greatest imaginable evil was to the pharisees 
the highest conceivable good. "3t5 Where the Jewish apocalyptists of the 
inter-testamental period may have used nephesh many times for a 
disembodied soul in a way unknown in the Old Testament, they still could 
not "ultimately express the surviving personality in terms of soul only, but 
must add thereto the conception of a bodily resurrection. ""b 
From a process that had already begun before the New Testament 
period, namely the entwining of these two anthropological strands, the Greek 
and the Hebrew, the Christian tradition was to emerge. In the next section, 
I shall glance at the New Testament witness to complete this consideration 
of the main roots of the Christian tradition. 
e) The human person in the New Testament 
Although the New Testament was written in Greek, its use of 
anthropological terms such as o, ua and #vXr does not reflect Greek 
philosophical distinctions. Such terms seem to translate Hebraic concepts. 
This, of course, is an over-simplification of a complex pattern of mutual 
influence. The New Testament itself does not possess a consistent or 
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systematic anthropology: only in the Pauline writings do we find anything 
approaching one. 37 Indeed, because "the word (awua) has true content only 
in Paul, "36 I shall restrict this anthropological discussion to Paul and 
shall deal primarily with c pa. 
I propose here only to offer a brief summary of the Pauline position. 
With regard to owpa it seems to be the case that "one does not find the 
Hellenistic view in which the soul alone constitutes the true human ego, 
whereas the body is indifferent or an obstacle. "39 Indeed, as Conzelmann 
says, quoting Bultmann, "Rule of thumb: it is not, 'I have a awpa, ' but, 'I am 
Qwpa, or, am in the body. 1°O Usages that apparently contradict this 
understanding, such as o pa T% 'apap rtaS (Rom 6: 6) and oaµa rov Oavarov 
(Rom 7: 24) are dealt with in relation to oapC or flesh: "a is is man as the 
one who can fall, and in fact has fallen, victim to sin and death. acrpt is 
man as the one who has fallen. "41 Eapý has a neutral sense, but sometimes 
becomes a symbol for the lower nature or sin, although the latter does not 
necessarily have any physical meaning. d2 With regard to {Vuxq, "it is 
important to note that the Greek doctrine of the soul does not appear at 
any pofnt. N43 
This is not the place to present an exhaustive discussion of Paul's 
anthropological terms: instead, I would make two observations in conclusion. 
Firstly, none of his terms is used with exactly the same meaning in every 
context; the same word may carry a range of different shades of meaning. 
But secondly, as Whiteley puts it: 
Each individual man is a unity. He is not, of course, a 'simple 
substance' and in rare cases the Apostle's anthropology tends to 
be 'loose-knit' but in most places it is close-knit, and therefore, 




f) The Witness of St Benedict 
My brief survey of the anthropology of the scriptures reveals that 
they favour a predominantly unitary view of the human person. There is 
little or no sense of the Greek philosophical evaluation which exalts the 
soul and the spiritual at the expense of the body and the material. Moving 
on in Christian history to the 6th century, I will now consider whether the 
Rule of St Benedict may be viewed as incarnational and will glance at the 
anthropology which underlies what is one of the most frequently quoted 
authorities for Holy Wisdom. 
The Rule is a practical book: Benedict calls it "a little rule for 
beginners". 46 It is concerned largely with specific instructions about how 
to live in community. It can be divided into two main parts: the first, the 
prologue and chapters 1-7, deals with spiritual doctrine; the rest, chapters 
8-73, presents specific regulations. "r- In this present section, there is no 
room to carry out a detailed analysis of it so I shall restrict myself to 
two areas: firstly, Benedict's use of the language of body and soul; 
secondly, his attitude to what Baker calls "mental prayer". 
Benedict uses the word "body" (corpus) only thirteen times. 47 On one 
occasion it means the community of the monastery (... soclari corporl 
monasterifl. 48 In several others it is part of a scriptural reference: 
"discipline your body"; "remember Ananias and Sapphira who incurred bodily 
death"; "monks may not have free disposal even of their own bodies and 
wills" and "he will not have even his own body at his disposal. "19 The body 
plays a positive part in the process of the ascetical life: with "a complete 
prostration of the body, Christ is to be adored"; a monk should show 
"humility in his bearing" (ipso Corpore). 61 He is lenient towards bodily 
weaknesses: support "with great patience one another's weaknesses of 
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body, "s 1 On one occasion, using the image of the ladder, he suggests a 
symmetry between soul and body: "Now the ladder erected is our life on 
earth; ... we may call our body and soul the sides of this ladder, into which 
our divine vocation has fitted the various steps of humility. "52 
"Soul" (anima) occurs twenty times. 53 Most of these are used in the 
expression "care of souls" or similar phrases. s° Others occur in scriptural 
references: "... you will free his soul from death"; "sicut ablactaturn super 
matrem suam, ita retribues in animam meam. '6b Once or twice the word is a 
circumlocution for "person": "he has undertaken the care of the sick" - 
infirmarum curam ... animarum. 66 In general the word is used in a neutral 
way and without the anthropological weight that Baker will place on it. " 
This detailed discussion of Benedict's use of these key 
anthropological words suggests that he has no evaluative dualism which 
prefers the soul. Indeed his attitude to both soul and body is favourable: 
he does not labour a distinction between them and each plays a positive 
part in the process of monastic living. 
This impression is supported by a glance at the understanding of 
prayer in the Rule. The reader who searches for a developed theology of 
personal prayer seeks in vain. rPa Although Benedict speaks much of awe and 
fear of the Lord, of tears of compunction, of praise, b9 there are very few 
places where he discusses private prayer. In the chapter on the observance 
of Lent he recommends that "we will add to the usual measure of our 
service something by way of private prayer" (ch 49: 5, p 253); in the chapter 
on the oratory, he speaks of "a brother who may wish to pray alone" and 
says "if at other times someone chooses to pray privately, he may simply go 
in and pray, not in a loud voice, but with tears and heartfelt devot ion. "GO 
This is not to deny that a spirit of prayer pervades the ule: apart from 
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the Divine Office, several hours a day were to be spent in lectio divine. 
the prayerful pondering of the scriptures. But if tie monk is to turn his 
mind to God often, this is with a view to an over311 conversion of life. 
There is little sense of "mental prayer" as Baker woL1d have it. 
In other words, Benedict seems to be talking : )f an integrated way of 
living where there is no clear distinction betwe. n the bodily and the 
spiritual. He does use language that will recur in Holy Wisdom - the 
imagery of conflict in the Prologue, for instance, - but Baker will use it 
in a different way. 61 What is prominent in the Rue is the warm give and 
take of community life, an emphasis on mutual charity, on love for the 
abbot, on obedience to one other; the person of Christ features 
significantly, culminating in his embodiment in guests, the sick and, 
centrally, in the abbot. --2- Baker's contrasting attitude to several of these 
themes will be taken up in the following chapters. Enough has been said 
here to indicate that the overall tone of the Rule is incarnational. There 
is not space in this thesis to trace the way in which Baker uses Benedict, 
although that would provide the subject of a valuable study. In brief he 
seems to read the Rule in an idiosyncratic way, suggesting that its prime 
purpose is "to bringe a Soule ... to a Perfect Union wem' God; "6-3 its 
practices are summarized as "Mortification16' and it is largely interested 
in "Mentall Prater". It will become clear in the following chapters that the 
core of Baker's anthropological assumptions, individual and social, is not 
drawn from Benedict. 
g) The Witness of Thomas Aquinas 
In the following chapters I refer on a number of occasions to 
Aquinas, a figure of great importance for the Catholic tradition. Several of 
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the assumptions that Baker makes are compared or contrasted with the 
anthropology of Aquinas. At this stage I wish merely to state some of the 
fundamental principles of Aquinas' view of the human person. 
That the human being is composed of soul and body is taken for 
granted, but what is of interest is the relationship between them. The 
human person is "a compound whose substance is both spiritual and 
corporeal. ' Aquinas considers "whether the soul is the man": on the 
grounds that the activity of sensing belongs not to the soul but to the 
whole person, "it is plain that man is no mere soul, but a compound of soul 
and body. " He explicitly rejects the Platonic view "of man as a soul using a 
body. "6e As Aquinas' editor comments, "'A soul using a body': the slogan, as 
it were, for an 'angelism' Thomas was seeking to replace with something 
more in accord with the doctrine of the Incarnation. "67 Both body and soul 
are essential to the human person: "it is not the soul, properly speaking, 
that belongs to the species, but rather the composite of soul and body. "6a 
For Aquinas, it is the testimony of human consciousness which leads him to 
his central notion: "the intellective soul is ... the form of the body. "9 "It 
belongs to the very essence of the soul to be united to a body, just as it 
belongs to a light body to float upwards. 17° Aquinas' editor claims that his 
treatise on the human person attempted to put away the rhetoric of anti- 
bodily dualism. " 
Aquinas' discussion is subtle and nuanced and thus open to possible 
misunderstanding. His linguistic usage proves that he cannot avoid words 
("body" and "soul") which might be taken as implying a dualism, yet he is 
not talking so much about "two things but two sides of one single thing, e 
men. "' Thus he has an anthropology which is in harmony with the 
implications of the incarnation: a human being is a human being and that is 
80 
Incarnational Theology 
the best that he or she can be; an angel is an entirely different thing and 
there is no way that a human being can or should attempt to emulate an 
angel. Unfortunately, as we shall see, Baker did not follow the full 
implications of such incarnational theology. 
The purpose of this and of the previous s. ction has not been to 
present a systematic exposition of the anthropolo3y of Benedict and of 
Aquinas: I have merely considered some crucial themes that will come up 
again in the detailed analysis of Holy Wisdom. The point here is that Baker 
does not fare well against two of his own important influences. 
III INCARNATIONAL THEOLOGY 
h) Introduction 
In the previous sections I looked at the anthropology of classical 
philosophy, the bible and two important precursors of Baker. I wish to claim 
that a sound Christian understanding of the human person must place equal 
value on the bodily and the spiritual aspects of the single person. Although 
it may be necessary to use language suggesting a dualism, the primary 
datum is the integrity of the human person. This represents a key notion of 
Gaudium et Spes. 
In this part of the present chapter I shall start with a summary of 
some of the central anthropological ideas of Gaudium et Spes. My purpose in 
the thesis is not to expound that document in detail, although its spirit 
pervades what I have to say. Then I shall look briefly at three specific 
theological areas: creation, incarnation and church and sacraments. I have 
been selective and my treatment of each is by no means exhaustive. After 
this I will draw out two illustrative anthropological conclusions, namely, 
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the importance of integration and the value of the emotions. The chapter 
will end with a summary of the position from which I intend to approach 
Holy Wisdom. 
1) The Witness of Gaudium et Spes73 
Gaudium et Spes, the longest document produced by the second Vatican 
Council, looked beyond issues relevant merely to Christians; it was 
addressed to "the whole of humanity as well. $077A While acknowledging the 
reality of sin, it had been initiated, nevertheless, with a highly positive 
sense of the value of human nature: the apostolic constitution of Pope 
John XXIII, Humanae Salutis, issued on December 25th 1961, stated that the 
Church's aim was to lead human beings "to discover in themselves their own 
nature, their own dignity, their own end. "75 
The central position of an integrated anthropology is clearly stated 
in the opening sections of Gaudium et Spes: "It is man ... who is the key to 
this discussion, man considered whole and entire, with body and soul, heart 
and conscience, mind and will. "', Charles Moeller describes this Christian 
anthropology as "the nucleus" of the Constitution. " 
Joseph Ratzinger, commenting on article 12, noted the general 
approval accorded to the choosing of "a dynamic account of man ... 
essentially based on biblical data. '78 1 have already stated the danger of 
over- simplifying the influences that were brought to bear on the various 
Christian understandings of the human person: nevertheless, here we may see 
a broad favouring of an integrated biblical account, such as I described in 
sections d) and e) of the present chapter. The history of chapter 1 of 
Gaudium et Spes makes clear the explicit opting by the Council fathers for 
the integrated view. There was at first a suggestion that two articles be 
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written, the first on the dignity of the human body and the second on the 
dignity of the human soul and particularly of the human intellect. But, in 
the words of Ratzinger: 
This division was suppressed and the whole constitution of man was included in article 14 in order to oppose as much as possible any kind of dualism and to emphasize human unity even in this external 
way. 79 
Article 14 opens with the words "corpore et anima unus. " 
This discussion sets the fundamental orientation of the pastoral 
constitution. The incarnational emphasis is repeated elsewhere, in the 
constitution Sacrosanctum Conclilum on the liturgy, for instance. Gaudium et 
Spes talks also of the dignity of the intellect and of conscience; it does 
not, of course, cease to use language that may, in places, suggest dualism. 
Indeed, as I mentioned in the section on Aquinas, such language is 
unavoidable. But the central point is that the Council is concerned with "a 
theology of the unity of man as spirit in body and body in spirit. "O° Thus 
the whole person is valued and "nothing that is genuinely human fails to 
find an echo in their (the followers of Christ) hearts. ' 
If the first chapter of Gaudium et Spes is concerned with an 
integrated understanding of the human person as an individual, the second 
deals with the human community. Here emphasis is placed on the fact that 
"man by his very nature stands completely in need of life in society. "02 
Related to this is the soteriological perspective, that human beings will be 
saved in Christ as a community. " McDonagh sums up the document's 
understanding of the relationship between personal and social: 
The first two chapters ... seek to integrate the irreducible personal 
quality of each human being as created in the image of God with the 
equally constitutive social dimension of the human in relationship 
and structure. e` 
Just as, for the Council, the human person is grounded in God's image and 
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Christ's body, so too is community. A6 This aspect of Vatican II's theology 
will inform what I have to say in chapter 6. 
In the following sections I shall discuss b iefly three themes that 
underlie the kind of theology and consequent nthropology that I am 
advocating: these themes are creation, incarr 3t ion and church and 
sacraments. 
j) Creation 
It has been suggested that the opening of the fourth Gospel 
deliberately alludes to the opening of Genesis; 196 here is a creation story, 
and for John the instrument of creation is the Aoyos, the Word through whom 
all things were made. H' There is obviously a relationship between the Word 
and the Old Testament figure of Wisdom: e1B "When he marked out the 
foundations of the earth, then I was beside him, like a master-craftsman, " 
says personified Wisdom. e9 "She pervades and penetrates all things. "9O The 
Word, like Wisdom, is the blue-print of God's creative power. Aoyos can 
carry several senses apart from word: it can mean reasoning, rationale, or 
even blue-print. Thus we might say that creation as a whole is verbiform; 
it partakes of the goodness and holiness of the Word. The goodness of 
creation is clearly proclaimed from the beginning of Genesis: "and God saw 
that it was good" runs like a refrain through the days of creation. For 
Paul, the whole of creation and not merely humankind will be brought to 
glory: "the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and 
obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God. "91 Lest there be any 
doubt as to the goodness of material creation and so that the total 
sovereignty of God be maintained, the fathers insisted, contrary to the 
Platonic tradition, that God had created ex nihilo. From the end of the 2nd 
84 
Incarnational Theology 
century this doctrine was generally accepted and it was affirmed as 
consonant with Catholic tradition at the fourth Lateran Council in 121592 
and at the first Vatican Council in 1870.93 This theme is affirmed too by 
the second Vatican Council. The opening section of the first article of 
chapter 1 of Gaudium et Spes concludes with the words: "So God, as we read 
again in the Bible, saw 'all things that he had made, and they were very 
good. ß'. 9a 
Holy Wisdom opens with an affirmation of this truth: "It was only 
infinite goodness that moved Almighty God to create the world of 
nothing. "95 Vatican I's summing up of the Christian doctrine of creation 
emphasizes three basic theses: the world depends totally on the creative 
activity of God; God created entirely freely; the ultimate purpose of the 
world is to share fully in God's goodness. 96 So this doctrine proclaims the 
goodness of material creation and a fortiori of the bodily make-up of the 
human person. 
k) Incarnation 
In De Resurrectione Carnis, Tertullian writes: "For the Father had 
already spoken to the Son in these words, 'Let us make man unto our own 
image and likeness. ' And God made man (the same thing of course as 
'formed'): unto the image of God ('of Christ' it means) made he him. 197 This 
is a richly suggestive idea for an understanding of incarnation, and it is 
one that is taken up by Karl Rahner, a theologian profoundly involved in the 
thinking of Vatican II, who writes: 
When as Christians we ask what bodily man is - if we want to give a 
final answer, not a provisional one - the only answer we can give 
is, 'And the Word became flesh. ' The aapt is what comes into being 
when the Xoyor, becomes something which it is not already in itself, 
in its divine nature. 99 
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The idea is repeated elsewhere in his writings: 
The climax of salvation history is not the detachment from the 
world of man as spirit in order to come to God, but the descending 
and irreversible entrance of God into the world, the coming of the divine koyoq in the flesh, the taking on of the material so that it 
itself becomes a permanent reality of God in which God in his AoyoS 
expresses himsel f to us for ever. 100 
What Tertullian and Rahner seem to be suggesting is that the Word 
did not become a human being like us, but that we are human beings insofar 
as we are made in the image of him; he is the paradigm of humanity. To be 
made in the image and likeness of God means to be made as models of God's 
instantiation of himself in the material world. The question, "How can 
Christ be fully human when he knew no sin, since all humans sin? " becomes a 
non-question. Christ alone is "fully human"; insofar as we sin we are 
failing to be fully human. Thomas V. Morris cogently argues a similar point 
but from a different angle: he draws a distinction between "commonality and 
kind-essentiality"' 01 and applies it against A. D. Smith's attempt to show 
the logical incoherence of the incarnation. 102 Sinfulness would be an 
example of human commonality, but not of kind-essentiality. 
This understanding of the human person is developed in Gaudium et 
Sees, which makes specific reference to De Resurrectione Garnis. Adam, the 
first man is a type of the one who is to come; Christ himself is "the 
perfect man" and through him, "human nature has been raised in us also to a 
dignity beyond compare. "' 03 
The primacy of soteriology in any theological pursuit arises 
presumably from an application of the principle of sufficient reason to the 
fact of God's revelation of himself. The material creation and the human 
being, the former climaxing in the latter, the verbiform in the Christiform, 
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are destined for and capable of glory because of their essential 
relationship with the Word incarnate. As Karl Barth puts it in a suggestive 
phrase, "since the constitution of man is from God, it is a saving fact. "' °° 
The bodily, incarnate nature of the human person is not only good: it is 
necessary for salvation. As Rahner has it: "The bodily nature of man is 
necessarily a factor in man's spiritual becoming; "' °S and, in the words of 
Tertullian, caro salutis est cardo; 10' Tertullian retains a body/soul 
distinction but argues that salvation comes through the sacraments which 
can be received only by the flesh, thus "it is the flesh that makes possible 
the soul's election by God. "1O7 Thus, the anthropological limitations of a 
spirituality that fails to integrate the body in its scheme are made clear. 
1) Church and sacraments 
Incarnation must not simply be seen as a remedy for the Felix culpa 
of human sinfulness; it was God's eternal purpose and is both the ground 
and the climax of creation. It is the mode of God's self-revelation. Human 
nature in the abstract became human person in the concrete. "The Word 
became flesh and dwelt amongst us. " As in all human beings the body of 
Christ was the locus of his acting, communicating and suffering; it was the 
source of his personality. Indeed it is difficult to see how the concepts of 
personality and individuality can have any meaning apart from bodiliness. ' Oe 
Conciliar doctrine of the early Church was at great pains to reject any 
teachings that violated the full bodily integrity of Jesus. 
It was in his bodiliness that Jesus "for us men and for our salvation 
... was crucified ... suffered death and was buried. ' O9 The flesh was in a 
particular way salutis cardo. " ° But after the ascension the incarnation 
continues: Christ continues to act, communicate and suffer, to heal, forgive 
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and sanctify in his body the Church. This is the essence of the Pauline 
theology of the body of Christ. In the earlier letters, 1 Corinthians and 
Romans, the body is taken as a metaphor of the community of Christians. 
"You are the body of Christ and individually members of 1t. " '', Christians 
belong to the body of Christ; they are morally united in their common 
acknowledgement of Christ. 
In the later epistles of the Pauline tradition, Colossians and 
Ephesians, there seems to be a shift in the understanding of the body of 
Christ. A consideration of Tillich's distinction between sign and symbol 
throws light on this shift. Tillich writes: 
... while the sign bears no necessary relation to that to which it 
points, the symbol participates in the reality of that for which it 
stands ... The religious symbol ... can be a true symbol only if it 
participates in the power of the divine to which it points. ' 1-2 
In 1 Corinithians and Romans it is as though Christ is the body politic of 
which the Christian is a member; in the later epistles the body becomes far 
more clearly a symbol in the Tillichian sense. Now Christ is "the head of 
the body the church"; ' 1: 3 we are not talking of a mere metaphor; the church 
is now the Sacrament of Christ. The positive understanding of body is 
underlined in the marriage image of Christ's love for the Church, an 
understanding which contrasts strongly with the view taken in 1 Corinthians 
7114 
The notion of sacrament springs from the understanding of creation 
as holy because of its being verbiform. Its holiness focuses in the human 
being, the icon of Christ; Jesus Christ himself is the fruition of the human 
race and the Sacrament of God as well as the eternal Form (to use Platonic 
language) in which individual men and women participate. As Christ is the 
Sacrament of God, so the church, his body, is the Sacrament of Christ. In 
88 
Incarnational Theology 
the Catholic tradition his body is believed to act, communicate and suffer 
in many ways, but centrally through the sacraa ants of baptism and 
eucharist. Baptism is the incorporation of an indiv_3ua1 into the body of 
Christ through a physical acting out of the mystery of death, burial and 
resurrection; unfortunately, the Roman Catholic Church, for instance, has 
reduced the explicit bodiliness of this ritual by retying on a mere trickle 
of water over the forehead of the candidate. In the eucharist the bread is 
the body of Christ and the wine is the blood of Christ because the 
celebrating community is already the body of Christ; the eucharist expresses 
and strengthens that identity. The other sacraments of the Catholic 
dispensation, ordination or service, marriage, anointing or healing, penance 
or reconciliation and confirmation or strengthening, all spring from 
bodiliness and all pertain to the bodily life of human beings: they cannot 
be disembodied or removed from their context in material creation. 
This positive view of church and sacraments runs throughout the 
teaching of the Vatican Council. The constitution on the Church, Lumen 
Gentium, for instance, includes in its opening words the following: "the 
Church, in Christ, is in the nature of sacrament -a sign and instrument, 
that is, of communion with God and of unity among all men. "" 6 
m) Implications: integration 
In part II of the present chapter I considered the understanding of 
the human person from an historical perspective. I drew out the basic 
contrast between dualistic and integrated views and suggested 
that an 
integrated or "wholistic" model of the human person is more in accord with 
the scriptural witness. It is also, as I showed 
in section i), one that is 
favoured by the second Vatican Council. In sections J) - 1) 1 looked at some 
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of the fundamental doctrines of Christian theology, and related them to the 
teaching of the Council. In the present section --) and in section n) I shall 
glance at two anthropological implications of the general stance of this 
chapter. These are offered by way of example and are not exhaustive. The 
first is integration. 
It is clear that current understandings of the human person tend to 
emphasize integration or wholeness. This, as I have shown, is the view put 
forward in the teaching of the second Vatican Council. Gaudium et Spes 
presents the human person as a unity, an integrated being, moving from the 
disintegration and conflict occasioned by sin to a completeness. 16 Central 
too, is the social dimension: "by his innermost nature man is a social 
being. "' 17 
If the conciliar teaching gives an authoritative basis to the 
principle of integration, the wholistic insight pervades much recent 
Christian writing. My intention here is not to offer a list of proof-texts, 
but to provide examples of the principle. Wolfhart Pannenberg, for instance, 
holds that "'person' signifies the human being in its wholeness. " 'A 
Catholic discussion of sexual morality makes the assumption that it is 
dealing with the "whole person; "1"3 "wholesome human sexuality is that 
which fosters a creative growth toward integration. "' 20 Behind this lies 
"the wholistic view of person expressed in the documents of Vatican 11. "1 21 
The wholistic view is supported from the standpoint of relevant 
sciences: Joseph Engelberg, a physiologist, says that "each of us is 
continually preoccupied with forging the many fragments of experience into 
a wholeness ... an integrative aspect is essential to our personal life. 
"' 22 
Thomas A. Kane, a psychotherapist, speaking of "psycho theology" says "this 
view of the human person is an acknowledgement of the integration of the 
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human and divine ... which serves as the inspiring vision ... shared by all 
Christians. "' 23 Summing up the prominence of the w; . olist 
is stance, Edmund 
Hill claims that "two types of self-experience have dominated the European 
Christian tradition; 112' these are the unitary self-experience and the 
dissociated self-experience. "For some time now our culture has been 
shifting back to a dominance of the 'unitary self-experience'. This shift is 
catching up with Christians too. "' 25 
As I have said, my purpose in this thesis is not to attempt a 
systematic defence of a "wholistic" viewpoint. But such a viewpoint does 
seem to reflect the way Christians of today understand their lives; it is in 
harmony with the Rule of St Benedict and with the implications of a 
Thomistic anthropology. It follows from the principles established in the 
previous sections of the present chapter, and finds an authoritative place 
in the teachings of the Vatican Council. The wholistic principle will 
underlie much of my criticism of Baker. 
n) Implications: the emotions 
A second and narrower implication of this kind of incarnationslism 
has to do with the emotions. I take the "emotions" to cover what have often 
in the past been called "affections" or "passions". How these 
feature in 
Baker's spiritual teaching will be dealt with in chapter 4, section 
V. For 
the moment I wish merely to observe their importance 
for an integrated 
understanding of the human person. Strong feelings are an 
inescapable part 
of being human; thus they find a place within 
the context of incarnational 
theology. Robert Murray bids us "to remember St Thomas's wise reflexion 
that, because we are men and not angels, a human act accompanied 
by a 
natural reaction ("passio") 
is not more imperfect but more perfect for man, 
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because more truly human. "' 26 Such emotions may well need to be understood 
and controlled, but they cannot and indeed should not be expurgated from 
human life. From a scriptural viewpoint, Anthony Wieczorek argues that 
strong emotions and passions are part of prayer: the God of the scriptures 
is a passionate God and "our emotions are occasions of grace, provided we 
let our God work through them. "127 Negative feelings too can foster human 
growth; nevertheless, "though Christianity embraces an "embodied" way to 
God, we often minimize our own incarnation. "' 20 For Pannenberg, "passion can 
also be a response to a call of God ... in the concrete situations of the 
world of human life, a response to a call that elevates individuals above 
the everyday and renders them capable of extraordinary dedication. "' 2,3 
This view that all parts of embodied humanity are valuable and all 
enable people to develop as Christians is a corollary of the incarnational 
theology I have been advocating. That emotions need control is clear enough, 
but the tendency has been present in Christianity to view them as somehow 
unworthy: for Clement of Alexandria, in contrast to the Greek philosophers 
who taught their disciples to resist passion, "our ideal is not to 
experience desire at alL""3° Clement may not be particularly representative 
and such a view may be rather carelessly stated, but, as we shall see in 
the following chapters, it wields its influence in Baker's writings. 
o) Conclusion 
It has not been my purpose in this chapter to develop an exhaustive 
or systematic incarnational theology and I make no claim that my discussion 
Jr. uncontentious. Nor have I drawn out all the anthropological implications 
of such a theology. Further implications will emerge 
in the following 




from which I will criticize Baker; that position derives from the theology 
of the second Vatican Council, but is anticipated in some respects in 
precursors upon whose authority Baker draws. 
My broad conclusions may be summarized as follows: 
a) The material world is good. In the words of Gaudium et Spes, "the 
world which ... is the whole human family seen in the context of 
everything which envelopes it ... in the Christian vision has been 
created and is sustained by the love of its maker. "' 3' ) 
b) Because of the Word, human persons in their embodiment are like 
God. 1 32 
c) The body is the cardo salutis. 
d) Embodiment lies at the heart of the theology of the church and 
sacraments. 
e) The human person is to be seen in a wholistic way, where bodily 
and spiritual aspects are in harmony. 
f) The person is, "by his innermost nature ... a social being. " 33 
A fundamental assumption of incarnational theology is that embodiment 
is the locus of human personhood. Such an assumption entails several things. 
For example, the senses and sensuality have an essential part to play in 
being human and the human imagination and understanding are valuable 
faculties. Any move in the direction of angelism is to be resisted because 
it downgrades embodiment. All these and other issues will be dealt with in 
detail in the following chapters. As I have said, my purpose here is to lay 
a theoretical foundation to the detailed discussion of Baker's anthropology, 
not to develop a complete set of criteria. In general, each section in the 
ensuing chapters will trace an incarnational position on the issue under 
question and then draw out Baker's assumptions from the perspective of that 
position. The picture that will gradually emerge will be of the deficiency 
of Baker's Christian anthropology when assessed by incarnational criteria. 




What I am claiming Is that a spirituality that undervalues 
embodiment is a spirituality that is questionable. Rahner makes the remark 
that "whenever the fathers become philosopher-s, i. e. Platonists, it is 
noticeable that they find it difficult to include the body in the victory of 
the spirit. "134 The Platonist traditi on had produced great contemplatives 
and mystics; it offered clear and practical ascetical principles. The 
attractions of a ready-made spiritual system were evident; but did Christian 
spiritual writers really manage at the end of the day to baptize Plato? 
Some did, but others succeeded less well. The purpose of this thesis is to 
see how Baker will fare. 
It might be argued that it is not permissible to criticize a writer 
of the 17th century from the perspective of the 20th. I considered this 
objection in the last chapter, but I would here repeat two points suggested 
there: firstly, exponents of Baker would not be satisfied to see him as a 
mere period-piece; they would claim that his spiritual teaching is relevant 
to the lives of men and women of today. If they are to defend that claim 
then they must allow him to come before the jury of the theological 
insights of today, because no one will want a spirituality that clashes with 
their basic understanding of God and the world. Baker must make sense in 
the context of this modern approach. 
Secondly, I would view theology as an organic whole. No doubt there 
are shifts in emphasis reflecting changes in the social and historical 
conditions, but one thing grows from another. All theologians will wish 
to 
ground their thought in the scriptural witness; all theologians, to one 
extent or another, will be aware of and sensitive to what has gone before. 
I have attempted to ground my observations in the theology of the second 
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Vatican Council, and have looked at some influences on the way, influences 
whose authority Baker invoked. It is before this tribunal that Baker must 
appear. In the following chapters I shall occasionally, for convenience, use 
the phrase "incarnational theology" tout court. It will in all cases refer to 
the kind of incarnationalism that I have developed in this chapter. 
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C HAP TER 4 
"WRESTLINGS AND AGONIES"' 
THE CONFLICT MODEL 
a) Introduction 
In applying to Holy Wisdom criteria generated by the incarnational 
theology developed in the previous chapter, we will need to be sensitive to 
the pattern of language and imagery that Baker uses. Even a cursory reading 
of the text will reveal the extent to which language suggesting conflict is 
used. Yet incarnational theology starts from the unity of the one person 
Jesus Christ; the salvation for which we long will be of the whole person 
in his or her diversity of bodily, emotional and spiritual factors. I have 
argued for the importance of integration and wholeness in such a theology. 
In the present chapter I shall be investigating a key idea of Baker's 
Christian anthropology and the ways in which it falls short of the 
requirements of incarnational theology. 
Part I will set the scene with a brief consideration of models in 
general and of conflict imagery in Christian theology. Part II will deal 
with aspects of the human person which Baker holds to be, at least 
potentially, inimical to the development of the spiritual life. Part III will 
investigate elements in the conflict which may be seen as originating 
outside the human person. Part IV will take a more general look at the 
imagery of Holy Wisdom and will consider the claims of another model, that 
of journey. The conclusion will affirm the primacy of the conflict model for 
Baker and will urge its difficulties in the light of incarnational theology. 
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I PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
b) The concept of model & the model of conflict 
Much of our language is metaphorical by which I mean that rather 
than speaking directly we speak by way of comparison so that the particular 
associations of one object or state of affairs are used to highlight 
another. Janet Martin Soskice offers as a working definition of metaphor 
"that figure of speech whereby we speak about one thing in terms which are 
seen to be suggestive of another"2 and Sallie McFague suggests that "a 
metaphor is seeing one thing as something else, pretending "this" is "that" 
because we do not know how to think or talk about "this", so we use "that" 
as a way of saying something about it. "3 It would be impossible to 
communicate as evocatively and subtly without the use of metaphor. Related 
to metaphor is the concept of model. ° Its use in natural science is well 
established. '- A state of affairs that cannot be conceptualized directly is 
described using a model, certain features of which elucidate the state of 
affairs in question. 
In theology, a discipline whose subject matter is both the human and 
the divine, the use of models is at least as relevant as in science. The 
bible, which, according to the Christian, is a uniquely inspired revelation 
of God and his workings, constantly talks in metaphorical language. The 
Christian tradition, striving as it does to express the experience of God in 
Christ, has constant recourse to models.,, - 
Of course, not all models "disclose", to use the language of Ian 
Ramsey, 7 with equal effectiveness. Some are better than others. Avery 
Dulles, in the final chapter of his Models of the Church offers a list of 
criteria by which models can be assessed. y The criteria he suggests include 
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basis in scripture and in the Christian tradition, tendency to foster the 
virtues and values generally admired by Christians, correspondence with the 
religious experience of people of today, theological fruitfulness. Although 
some of what he says is imprecise it is clear enough what he is getting at: 
the model must accord with the tradition and tend on the whole to make 
people more committed to Christ and all that that entails. 
I shall demonstrate that in Holy Wisdom there is extensive use of 
language suggesting a conflict model. Baker sees the Christian life as 
warfare being waged simultaneously on several fronts. The most serious and 
challenging of these is the battle within the human person: here the pairs 
of adversaries are described in a number of related though different ways, 
such as spirit and senses, inner person and outer person, and corrupt 
nature and the power of the Holy Spirit working through the superior 
faculties of the soul. Another is the conflict between the "internal liver", 
as Baker calls the person set on a life of prayer, and the malign activity 
of the devil operating directly or mediated through the opponents on other 
fronts. Yet a third level is the opposition between the individual person 
striving to live a profound personal life of prayer and mortification and 
the external human and social factors that inhibit this. These include 
unhelpful superiors and calls to take responsible positions in the context 
of the monastic community and its pastoral commitments. This third level of 
social relationships will be investigated in chapter 6. 
I shall argue that the conflict model underlies much of what Baker 
says. But first, we will need briefly to consider the use of this model in 
scripture and tradition before examining the ways in which Baker uses it. 
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c) Conflict in the Old and New Testaments 
Basis in scripture is an important criterion for a sound theological 
model. In the present section I shall consider how conflict is used in the 
scriptures. 
The blood-thirsty nature of many of the texts of the Old Testament 
invariably raises questions for a modern Christian: *9 how does such violence 
fit in with a religion that bids its followers to love their enemies and to 
turn the other cheek? A notable passage is Joshua 6: 21, "Then they utterly 
destroyed all in the city, both men and women, young and old, oxen, sheep 
and asses, with the edge of the sword. " As an historical document, there may 
be no problem. The theory of the Holy War, however alien to 20th century 
Western liberals, has a clear rationale. ' ° The custom of the ban in war, 
exercised in this passage, had various purposes: it was a sign of 
unqualified devotion to God; the wrath of God himself was in operation for 
his people and the killing was an act of worship. ' ' Eichrodt suggests that 
the ban contradicted the moral tendencies discernible elsewhere within the 
Yahweh covenant and was purely for purposes of national order. '2 As time 
went on it was relaxed and less importance was attached to war-like 
virtues. 13 Of course, Palestine's geopolitical situation made that region 
particularly susceptible to conflict: the country is the sole land-bridge 
linking Eurasia with Africa: 
Any nation aspiring to establish an independent national state on 
the Palestinian land-bridge ... was 
destined to live under nearly 
constant concentric pressure from near and far, and only constant 
military preparedness could guarantee its survival. ' 
As a religious text for the spiritual edification of Christians, 
Joshua 6: 21 is not so simple. Sometimes the difficulty is ducked by avoiding 
texts such as this which deal with violence and aggression; ' 6 in the 
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revised Roman Office, the three "cursing" psalms are omitted altogether, 
presumably because they are considered to be unhelpful to the religious 
aspirations of modern Christians. Some people are unhappy with this 
selectivity, arguing that all parts of the Old Testament are equally 
inspired and are relevant to salvation and that we must struggle to come to 
terms with them. ' 6 
For whatever reasons, the history of God's chosen people is one of 
conflict: the struggle to establish the nation in a particularly sensitive 
region, the effort to maintain national security and prosperity in the face 
of many threats from outside, the fight to safeguard religious purity in a 
broad context of alien idolatry. As the centuries passed, destruction and 
exile were followed by re-establishment and further persecution; the 
fanatical resistance of the Maccabees occurred less than two hundred years 
before the birth of Jesus; the ill-fated rebellion of Bar-cochba a hundred 
years after his death. " 
The spiritual experience of a nation, no less than of an individual, 
arises out of its historical circumstances, so it is hardly surprising that 
the language of conflict is so prevalent in the Old Testament texts. This is 
not to deny that there is language of great tenderness1e and lyrical love 
poetry19 as well. The scriptures of the Old Testament were the foundation 
documents of Christianity so it was inevitable that their language and 
imagery would have a central influence on the way the Christian experience 
was articulated. 
It would be untrue to say that early Christians failed to appreciate 
some of the difficulties associated with the language of conflict. The 
challenge of such men as Marcion (d. c. 160) who entirely rejected the Old 
Testament as unworthy of the gospel of love, 20 forced the main-line 
100 
The Conflict Model 
Christians to face these difficulties. However, there was a method of 
exegesis at their disposal that would to all intents and purposes solve the 
problem for many centuries to come. 
This method, allegorizing, was already in use in the interpretation of 
pagan literature11 and in Jewish biblical exegesis. 22 Christian authors such 
as Clement of Alexandria began to use it, but it found a master in Origen 
(c. 185-253). 23 J. W. Trigg hardly exaggerates when he comments: "it was 
Origen who, more than anyone else, made allegory the dominant method of 
biblical interpretation down to the end of the Middle Ages. "21 This method 
would have a profound effect on the development of Christian spirituality; 2E 
we will see that Baker will use it. 26 
Even if allegory was "the dominant method" of exegesis, there were 
other levels of meaning: Origen spoke of the "bodily" (literal) and the 
"psychic" (perhaps moral). 27 Modern scripture commentary has tended to put 
the main emphasis on the historico-critical or literal meaning and to reject 
allegory as subjective and arbitrary. Nevertheless, those who use scripture 
homiletically, even today, will draw out moral and sometimes allegorical 
meanings. If the scripture is indeed inspired by the Holy Spirit and 
pertinent to salvation, then it would be appropriate for the preacher too to 
be inspired to draw out meanings relevant to the listeners. 
This brief survey of the presence of conflict and the use of conflict 
language in the Old Testament and after suggests the following conclusion: 
whatever method of exegesis is used, this remains a language with which one 
will articulate one's Christian experience so it will have a formative 
influence on Christian theology and spirituality. In other words we might 
claim that there cannot be a genuinely biblical spirituality that does not 
use conflict imagery. 
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While the Old Testament is the background to the Christian 
experience, the New is the first articulation of that experience and the 
privileged basis of the various theological traditions. The New Testament is 
not much concerned with political or social conflict: in general a 
favourable or at least tolerant attitude is taken towards civil authority 
and social relations. 2e Nevertheless, there is the need to cope with 
persecution29 and the commitment to Christ may well sever normal 
relationships. 3° The Christian experience is essentially one of personal 
transformation, albeit within the context of the community of believers. It 
is on this level that we find a considerable use of conflict imagery. 
It is not possible here to develop an exhaustive survey so I shall 
restrict myself to a consideration of one or two passages from St Paul. As 
I showed in the previous chapter Paul has a unitary view of a human being 
although he does not see the human as a "simple substance". 31 "Flesh" or 
Qcrpk is sometimes a neutral physical word as in 1 Cor 15: 39; at other times 
it means "lower nature" or "sin", as in Gal 5: 24. The fact that the same 
word is used, however, must not lead us to think that sin and physicality 
are related. Indeed, even in English, possibly under biblical influence, the 
word "flesh" can carry either sense. 32 Again, as I indicated before, the 
word "body" or uwpa, although sometimes the biological body, is more often 
the self: the human being does not have a opa but is ao pa. When the 
word is used in a pejorative sense, as in "body of sin" (Rom 6: 6), Paul 
means the human being under the sway of some power like sin or the 
f lesh. 33 
For Paul there is a fundamental conflict within the human being 
between the inclination to sin, made particularly vivid through using the 
concrete word "flesh" and the power of the Spirit, working in the good will. 
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"I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing that I hate, " he says; and 
he continues, "I can will what is right but I cannot do it". 34 
It is clear that Paul "did not draw up a scientific anthropology. "-'s 
He did not always use his terms with great precision; nevertheless, what 
seems to emerge is that his was a fundamentally Hebraic anthropology. 3E He 
will use the fall to explain the conflict within the human person, but that 
conflict is a fact of his theology and a fact of human experience. 
So the scriptures present us with a unitary view of human persons, 
but in the Old Testament their social dealings, and in St Paul their inner 
procedures are characterised by conflict. We will need to consider whether 
Baker takes conflict to the extent where he violates the essential unity. 
d) Conflict and concupiscence 
Before moving on to Holy Wisdom itself I wish to comment here on the 
role of concupiscence in the inner conflict. This will help to give a 
perspective to the conflict model as employed by Baker. 
It is a fact of experience that all human beings have a fundamental 
selfishness that is manifested in several ways. The origin of this is a 
matter of contention; some would claim that it is entirely the result of 
environmental influence on what is at root a tabula rasa. Others would see 
it as arising in the human bio-physiological make-up, an expression of an 
urge for self-preservation or survival. The Judaeo-Christian myth of the 
fall and its consequences, be they the "evil imagination137 or original sin, 
is an attempt to ground this fact of human experience in a theological 
context. 
For Luther, concupiscence was to be identified with original sin. 3e 
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The remission of sin in baptism was merely a non-imputation: "... peccatum, 
quod Deus remit tit per suam non-imputationem ex misericordia omnibus, qui 
ipsum agnoscunt et confitentur et odiunt et ab eo sanari petunt. "39 The 
Catholic tradition as defined by the Council of Trent would disagree: '75fanc 
concupiscentiam ... sancta Synodus declarat, Ecclesiam catholicam numquam 
in t ellexisse, pecca t um appelleri, quod vere et proprie in rene t is pecca t um 
sit, sed quia ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat. "'O Concupiscence 
springs from original sin and inclines to actual sin, but is not itself sin. 
Perhaps like the "id" of Freud" or the "libido" of Jung'-' or the yeger harn 
of Genesis43 it is a neutral force that needs strong direction and control. 
In the strict sense, according to Thomas Aquinas, "concupiscen tia ... 
est in appetitu sensitivo. 1144 It is divided into actual and habitual 
concupiscence. The former is the disordered movement of the sensitive 
appetite; the latter is the appetite itself as source of such movements. The 
movements themselves are good; it is their disordered condition which is 
bad. 
Sometimes concupiscence has been rather narrowly linked with sexual 
desires: perhaps disordered sexual desires are a particularly clear 
manifestation of concupiscence at work. But it is broader than this, and 
indeed broader than merely sensual appetite. The distinction between a 
sensitive and a spiritual appetite, as Karl Rahner points out following St 
Thomas, needs to be taken with great caution; they are powers of one and 
the same human being. Rahner writes: 
On the one hand the sensitive cognitive faculty will have to be 
seen as itself arising from the spiritual ground ... and thus as 
completely mastered by the spirit right from the start. On the 
other hand the spiritual cognitive faculty, because it must allow 
sensibility to arise from itself as the presupposition of its on 
realization, will itself have to be seen right from the start as 
a sensitized spirituality. °s 
104 
The Conflict Model 
Concupiscence on the sensual level is simply "Ja manifestation ou 1e signe, 
sur le plan corporel, dune attitude spirituelle qui porte 1a raison et Ja 
volonte A se revolter contre D1eu. 
"46 
The doctrine of concupiscence in the Catholic tradition has no 
implications whatsoever as to a conflict between senses or spirit; its 
biblical roots are in a belief in the unity of the human person. " In the 
context of the Christian life there is a conflict between perverse urges 
that resist the growth towards union with God and "the desiderlum naturale 
which includes the permanent affinity of the finite spirit with regard to 
the absolute God, and of the human will with regard to the absolute 
good "°a 
Concupiscence thus understood seems to accord with the fact of 
conflict within the human person and with the wholistic anthropology of the 
scriptures. Baker, however, as we shall see, will represent a rather 
different slant: for him parts of the human person will be in conflict with 
other parts. The locus of conflict will be shifted so that elements such as 
the affections and the senses will be seen as opponents. The outcome of 
this will be a failure to appreciate the incarnate unity of the human 
person. In the following sections I will investigate in detail the model of 
conflict as used in Holy Wisdom. 
II CONFLICT WITHIN THE PERSON 
e) A civil war? 
The first area of conflict that we need to investigate is within the 
human person. We have already seen that people are prone to sin and may 
struggle within themselves to do what is right. But what Holy Wisdom seems 
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to suggest is that aspects of the human person are themselves inimical to 
spiritual development. I have commented on the importance of the emotions 
in human life; 49 in this part of the present chapter I will consider how 
Baker views their contribution to the inner conflict. I will also discuss his 
understanding of images and the imagination, senses and sensuality, and 
nature. From the perspective of incarnational theology, all of these are to 
be viewed positively. Baker's discussion, however, as I shall show, will 
suggest a rather different point of view. 
f) Affections and passions 
The words "affection" and "passion" occur frequently throughout Holy 
Wisdom and with particular frequency in the first and second treatises, "Of 
an internal life in general" and "On mortification". In the third treatise, 
"On prayer", "affection" takes on an additional technical meaning with 
reference to a particular kind of prayer. In this latter context it loses 
entirely any pejorative overtones. In the present section I will consider 
Baker's understanding of affections and passions and the extent to which he 
sees them as militating against the progress of the spiritual life. 
It must be remembered from the start that Baker is not putting 
forward a philosophical analysis, although Holy Wisdom itself is fairly 
systematic in its presentation. To examine matters "scholastically", he says 
with regard to sacramental grace, "is not my intent" (76). Thus, despite his 
legal training, we must not expect the kind of linguistic precision we might 
look for in a philosophical document. It is not clear in how technical a 
sense he is using the words "affection" and "passion". Presumably they are 
English translations of Latin scholastic terms. 
Affections start in tandem with the will, both being neutral 
106 
The Conflict Model 
faculties. 'La partle affective de 1 'Ame, " says P. Pourrat, "se meut vers ce 
qui est connu comme bon et se dc tourne de ce qul semble meuveis. 'r `_' The 
affections move towards what is perceived as good and away from what is 
perceived as bad. Baker agrees that this is their purpose. By "eternally 
loving, admiring, and enjoying" (3) God's perfections they contribute to the 
eternal beatitude of the human being. They are an innocent gift that must 
be given to God: Baker talks of "blind affections of the will pouring 
themselves upon God" (12, cf 192). All affections are to be concentrated on 
God (206). In prayer, "the affections and holy desires" are to be given "free 
scope" (49); indeed, "want of affection" is "the ground and cause of ... 
pernicious tepidity" (27). There is a sense of delight, almost of reckless 
abandon, in his consideration of affections when applied to God. 
As a result of the fall, however, "the divine love by which their 
wills and affections adhered continually to God" was lost (4). Nevertheless, 
the fundamental purpose of the affections remains "to adhere and be united 
to God" (13). This brings us to the crucial point, and one which the 
incarnational theologian can share: the vitiation at the fall has turned the 
affections from their natural end: conflict will arise in the context of the 
struggle to redirect them. If Baker allows himself the occasional frolic 
with the paradisal state of the affections, his sombre warnings of the 
post-lapsarian dangers constitute the prevailing mood of Holy Wisdom. 
So far so good: the question arises as to whether Baker retains a 
neutral understanding of the affections. By and large he does: the object of 
any spiritual militarism on his part is "inordinate affections", an 
expression that occurs many times (e. g. 75,105,166,180,182,207); by this 
he means affections that are not directed to their proper end. He uses 
other expressions to mean roughly the same thing, for example, "corrupt 
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affections" (22). 
But Baker seems to have little or no sense of creation as a mediation 
of God's presence: affections directed to anything other than God are bad. 
At one point he goes as far as to say "all adhesion to creatures by 
affection, whether such affection be great or small, is accordingly sinful, 
more or less" (168). He admits that affection to creatures might be "in 
order to Him" but, "if being deprived of anything or persons whatsoever ... 
we find a trouble or sorrow in our minds for the loss or suffering of the 
thing itself, such trouble ... argues that our affection was sinful" (168). 
Stern words: but is he really so negative about the objects of 
affections? Any form of sensual affection to the world is bad (157), settled 
affection to creatures is bad (131), sensual affection even to meat is bad 
(67). He considers the Platonic view that corporal beauty might be a 
preliminary motive to a higher love, but concludes that it is too dangerous: 
"Therefore the necessary care of ourselves requires that we should not so 
much as look steadily and fixedly on the temptation of beauty, much less 
favour the attraction of it" (227). 
It seems probable that he is often using "affection" in a semi- 
technical sense. Nevertheless, our modern understanding is also included: he 
talks of natural affection as between husband and wife or between parent 
and child (221) or the "partial affection" of some superiors (146); on 
several occasions of the "melting tendernesses of affection" to which women 
are more prone than men (107). He holds, with Augustine, that the affection 
between husband and wife is necessary but entirely without merit unless 
explicitly grounded in divine charity. The partial affection of superiors is 
viewed pejoratively and the "tendernesses" of women are less noble than the 
less sense-based experiences of men. 
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If affections in their nature, as opposed to in their object, are 
allowed an inherent goodness, the passions are unequivocally bad. We need 
to consider what exactly Baker means by the passions. When Thomas Aquinas 
uses the words passiones animae or simply passion es, he has something 
definite in mind that the English word "passions" does not accurately 
render. Eric D'Arcy argues that though not perfect, the word "emotions" is a 
better translation than "passions", although the latter was used by 
philosophers of Baker's period such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John 
Locke (1632-1704). x' In the Thomistic sense "passions in themselves are 
value-neutral, convertible to good or to evil, according as they are capable 
of according with reason or not according with it; 152 they are "motions of 
the sensitive appetite"63 and they can even enhance the goodness of an 
action if reason chooses to call in their assistance. " This Thomistic 
understanding of passions suggests that they are simply strong emotions, in 
themselves neutral. However, Holy Wisdom never uses "passions" in anything 
other than a negative sense. 
There is something of the philosophy of the Stoics in Baker's 
approach to them. For the Stoics, the passions (ratr7) are a disease. ss If 
this is accepted then the ideal of their complete elimination is something 
at which to aim. One does not compromise with a disease: the aim is 
'a, ra9sia, the state of being passionless, rather than the more moderate 
ptrpzonc9Eta, moderation in passion, advocated by the Peripatetics and the 
Platonists. If, with Zeno, we define ira9q as "excessive and immoderate 
impulses"'-4: - then we might perhaps see some value in the ideal of 'mra9Fta, 
but when we discover that the passions included not only anger and lust but 
also pity, `' then we might begin to wonder what exactly the Stoics are 
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attempting to suppress: all feelings or emotions? For Baker too, passions 
include "fear, anger, grief", but also "tenderness, compassion, and kindness" 
(85). 
The difference between advocates of 'ana9sia and of psrpcoira9sza is 
not irrelevant to my present purposes: for the Stoics a ira9os was an 
irrational impulse and therefore to be eliminated. For the others, it was a 
strong emotion and therefore to be controlled. The Thomistic sense, as we 
might expect, seems to accord with the Peripatetic and Platonist 
understanding. 
Now Baker seems to hover between the two senses so that he appears 
to take a Stoic attitude towards a Peripatetic understanding of "passion". 
Thus strong feelings in themselves become suspect. He certainly views 
'aata8 to as an ideal: "True peace of mind ... is the supreme state in an 
internal life"; (it is) "an immutability, indifference and insensibility as to 
ourselves and to all creatures and events"(205). 
He often considers the passions as a pair with the affections (eg 
164,207,237). The sort of language he uses for dealing with them suggests 
that he views them as large, fierce dogs that he has been cursed with and 
cannot get rid of: they are to be kept from the mind (70) and subdued (71); 
they are the enemies of divine inspirations (98); dominion is to be 
maintained over them (178) because they are constantly engaging in secret 
risings (166); they are to be repressed (182); a continual guard is to be 
kept over them to prevent their breaking forth (322, cf 205). It is all 
reminiscent of the struggle of a military dictatorship to keep down its 
internal critics. 
Baker does at one point consider coming to terms with the passions: 
the passage concerned has a modern ring. Let it first be said that this is 
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not Baker's natural response to dealing with them: that is made quite clear 
from his opening remark: "I find that some good spiritual authors do 
counsel a quite contrary proceeding, as a remedy and means to subdue 
passions"(178). They advise that the passions be brought explicitly into the 
conscious mind and then combated directly "by considerations of the example 
of our Lord, and His precept of charity to enemies, of the dangerous effects 
of revenge, and the blessed rewards of patience, etc" (178). Total 
repression is reserved only for the most dangerous passion of sensual 
impurity. Baker's conclusion on this method of bringing things into the open 
is that it may work for perfect souls but that the imperfect should "get 
the mastery over (the passions) by flying from them, and, if they can, 
forgetting them" (178). He will continue to prefer suppression to 
expression. 
His negative view of passions is reinforced by his imagery: even if 
they are prevented from breaking forth into outward expressions or actions, 
like some poisonous plant "the evil root remains still alive" (181, cf 20). 
Remembering that love is the root of all passions and affections (237), he 
considers "the mortally poisonous effects of self-love ... that secret self- 
love which lurks in the inmost centre of our souls" (237), like some 
sinister disease. We must "scour and purify the spirit itself from the rust 
of inordinate affections" (237), a chemical image of corrosion. Finally, like 
some noisome vapour that blocks out the light, "the mists of passion" are 
to be dispelled (54); this image will recur (eg 86,176,295) and perhaps 
harks back to the Stoic view of the passions as diseases. The passions are 
"violent" (81), "unquiet" (44,70,212). Even if they prompt good actions 
they are to be resisted: mortification arising from an impulse of passion is 
to be suspected (190). 
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Before concluding we need to glance at the use of affections in 
the context of prayer: Baker defines prayer as "an affectuous actuation of 
an intellective soul towards God ... " (299); it is a process of fixing the 
affections on God (305). The will and the affections are linked and carried 
higher into God (363,375). Amorous affections are closely related to pious 
desires (399). Affective prayer occurs where words and where meditation on 
images are left behind and where "our hearts", here identified with our 
affections (312), reach out to God. In these contexts in the third treatise, 
the affections are entirely liberated from the passions and are as valuable 
to the person as the heart or the will (cf 332,361,451 etc). 
We are now in a position to draw some conclusions from this 
consideration of Baker's understanding of affections and passions, and these 
conclusions will not be entirely in his favour vis-A-vis a Christian 
anthropology of the kind I am advocating. The sense of conflict runs 
throughout his discussion as a dominant theme. If he acknowledges the 
neutrality of the affections and sees them as allied to the will, most of 
his discussion, apart from the technical use in the context of prayer, is 
given to the problem of controlling their unruly nature. God is their 
rightful object, but Baker has hardly any sense of God as mediated in 
creation. In other words there is no real attempt to integrate the ordinary 
day to day exercise of affections with the affections as applied to God. 
The exercise of affections in human relationships becomes suspect. (The 
spiritualizing motive behind this will be looked at in more detail in 
chapters 5 and 6). Admittedly, Christians must never promote a "preliminary 
concern" to ultimacy, E° but Baker's extreme caution and fear suggests a 
shying away from the full implications of the fact that human beings are 
bodily and living in a material world. 
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Baker's frequent use of "affection" and "passion", particularly 
together, suggests that he does not simply see them as different ways of 
having the same feelings. If ordinary affections can be antagonistic in the 
spiritual life, when we come to the passions Holy Wisdom is even more 
unsatisfactory. If, as I have suggested, Baker is using the word in a sense 
not entirely removed from that of Aquinas (his examples of passions suggest 
that he may be), he lacks, nevertheless, the latter's fairly positive 
assessment. Indeed, Baker has barely a single positive statement to make 
about them. A Christian anthropology that accords with the incarnational 
theology I have advocated will need to integrate them. 
Baker's problem is that he takes the inner conflict too far: potential 
allies are made the objects of attack. 
g) Images and the imagination 
Having considered the ways in which the affections and passions are 
seen in the context of the conflict model, we must now move to another area 
of conflict within the human person. In the first and second treatises 
especially, images and the imagination are closely and frequently associated 
with passions and inordinate affections. In chapter 5, section p) I shall 
consider the imagination and its role as one of the inferior or sensible 
faculties of the soul (334); here it is necessary to discuss its 
participation in the conflict. 
The imagination (occasionally "the fancy" (eg 363,467)) is a power of 
the soul which gives rise to images; an image, in the Thomistic 
understanding, is "the habitual sense trace of an experience, but includes 
also artificial signs, such as words, in the imagination. "" Although images 
will have a positive role in the early stages of prayer, they and the 
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imagination which produces them are dangerous potent tal enemies. 
Frequently they are associated with affections and passions when 
affections and passions are used in a strongly pejorative sense: it is 
desirable to be "naked and empty of all strange affections, images and 
distractions" (10); along with "all affections to creatures", "all images" 
must be excluded (15). The process of exclusion or driving out is 
emphasized (eg 75,95,192). Images are closely linked with passions: they 
are "mists" that must be dispelled (54), they can be distracting (70,95, 
199), often "vain" <311) or "seducing" (353); they stir up the unruliness of 
sensuality and passion (178,203). Like their associates they must be 
"transcended" (12,71,424, cf 112,314). 
Images are explicitly involved in egging on the unruliness of 
passions and affections and there are many other references where Baker 
urges their pernicious quality and the dangers they present. The imagination 
has a dangerous predominancy over the other faculties (364) which it stirs 
up adversely (388); it is an area of the human person over which the devil 
has a particular sway (12,122,248,364,467). 
What we need to note here is the substantial role of images and the 
imagination in the conflict. As with affections and passions, a potential 
ally is treated with hostility. In the later chapter we will see how his 
attitude is linked with his views on the place of the body and bodily 
experience and with his spiritualizing tendency. 
h) The senses and sensuality 
The words "senses", "sensual", "sensuality", "sensible" and "sensitive" 
occur frequently in the course of Holy Wisdom. The senses are first of all 
the five: sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell. Baker calls these the 
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external senses and acknowledges their epistemological function: "man ... 
receives all his knowledge first from his senses" (451). Although with the 
schools he accepts that "with the state of a soul joined to a mortal body" 
there has to be some use of the internal senses (see below) or sensible 
images (453) he envisages a better condition where we approach "to a 
contemplation of God without sensible forms" (451,453). "Sensible" usually 
means perceivable by the senses and carries no particular pejorative 
overtone. Sometimes it simply means "aware" (as in "sensible of dangers", 
30). The external senses themselves are neutral, but their objects can 
present problems: "It is not seeing or tasting etc that are to be mortified, 
but the inordinate affections to those objects which delight the eyes or 
taste etc" (207). 
In contrast to the five external senses, there are the internal 
senses. Baker does not expound these in any detail. In particular there 
seems to be no indication of a doctrine of "spiritual senses". 60 He probably 
identifies the internal senses with the "sensitive faculties" which he lists 
as "imagination, memory and appetite" (334). Of these imagination is given 
the first place (467,481). We have already looked at imagination as an 
element in the conflict and will deal with it again in chapter 5. Its main 
function is to present sensible images to the mind. Appetite is rarely 
mentioned in Holy Wisdom. At one point Baker distinguishes "the natural 
appetite" which is neutral, "the sensual appetite" which desires pleasure 
and therefore must be curbed, and "the rational appetite" which opts 
"not as 
sensuality would have it" (230f). We see here again an element of conflict. 
If Baker has very little to say about appetite, he has even less to say 
about memory which has neither the same prominence nor the same meaning as 
in St Augustine. " 
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Baker has quite a lot to say about sensible devotion: it is seen as 
positive but limited in its value. Often the life of prayer will start with 
a God-given "tender, sensible devotion" (20); God can communicate his 
inspiration in sensible devotion (96); such devotion is a gift of God which 
is neither to be treated with scorn nor over-prized (325). Baker refers to 
the view of HarphiusE2 that there is "a languishing love" which, he 
supposes, represents the highest degree of sensible devotion, but he cannot 
take it quite as seriously as Harphius does. Nevertheless, we have here a 
rare instance of his trying to explain a "spiritual" experience using terms 
taken from human relationships: "it is exercised about the heart much after 
the same manner that a violent but chaste love is oft exercised between 
absent persons of different sexes" (439). 1 suppose Baker is referring to 
something similar to the mood of Orsino at the beginning of Twelfth Night, 
a mood characterized by a feeling of longing and restlessness. 
Baker offers several reasons for his firm belief that sensible 
devotion can be nothing more than preliminary. Firstly, "sensible motions" 
are inconstant, irregular and disorderly (90); he talks of "an unstableness 
in the internal senses" (23). Secondly, sensible affections are linked with 
particular personality types: "the tender-hearted" (385) and women, for 
instance; they are a symptom of "natural complexion" and "corporal temper" 
(330); so they are not a general sign of holiness. Indeed, Holy Wisdom tells 
the cautionary tale of the tyrannous William Prince of Juliers who had 
exquisite divine visitations on the night of the Nativity such that "he 
would be content to purchase with the loss of half his dominions such 
another consolation"; unfortunately, after his death he ended up in the 
torments of hell (326). Thirdly, the senses, internal and external, can be 
easily manipulated by the devil who "may have some influence in such 
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devotion and subsequent resolutions" (96). 1 will deal with Baker's 
understanding of the role of the devil later, 63 but even if we take it 
merely as a symbol of self-deception ("the father of lies"), then we can see 
that there is in this area of devotion a certain scope for the self-induced. 
Fourthly, sensible devotions are delightful. Baker uses the image of honey: 
a soul is easily tempted "to glut herself with the honey of it" (81) or to 
entertain "a too gluttonous delectation in sensible sweetnesses" (326). As a 
result of this there is an inclination to remain in them rather than to 
move on to purer prayer. But the fifth reason is the fundamental one: the 
more abstracted from the body and the senses prayer is, the more spiritual 
it is; and the more spiritual it is, the more "angelical and divine" it is 
(12). And, as I shall show later, 64 Baker would really be happier if we were 
angels rather than humans. 
He does at least give some place to the senses, internal and 
external, in his scheme of progress in prayer. He distinguishes two ways in 
which sensible devotion relates to the spirit: in imperfect souls devotion 
starts in sensitive nature, mounts up to the spirit and produces "melting 
affections" to God and especially to the humanity of Christ; in the perfect, 
however, it starts in the spirit and descends to "inferior sensitive nature" 
in which it produces similar effects (325). He talks, rather rhetorically, of 
the external senses being drawn into the internal and there annihilated, the 
internal drawn into the superior powers of the soul and there annihilated, 
and these powers themselves "drawn into that which is called their unity" 
(452). The basic scheme of progress is clear: sensible devotion, relying on 
mental images or warm feelings, is inferior and must be gradually 
superseded (350); there should be a gradual rise "to the top of sensitive 
nature, where it is joined or combined with the superior spiritual will" 
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(385). The less the prayer uses the senses, the mcre "pure, clear and 
secure" it is (443). At the end the highest contemplation "does so exceed 
all voluntary operation of the soul's faculties, that it usually causes an 
alienation and suspension of all the senses, as we! - external as internal" 
(479). 
Ascetical writers have traditionally seen the spiritual life as 
involving a progress from lower to higher and, as I have indicated, Baker is 
no exception. This may be a valuable model in that any personal relationship 
of importance should grow, but there is not much lateral thinking here, 
where the different faculties of the human person, sense or spirit or will 
might complement each other in the developing relationship with God. Rather, 
there is a fairly severe hierarchy. It starts with a fundamentally 
unfavourable attitude to sense experience; once again Baker is 
overwhelmingly aware of the dangers of sensuality. Admittedly, in one or 
two places he accepts that it is impossible for affection arising from 
sensitive nature to be rooted out (perhaps with the tacit implication that 
it would be rather nice if it could be), "neither is there any fault at all 
in it" (168), but the text has a preponderance of the same old verbs of 
transcending (71), suppressing (203), restraining and bridling (231). The 
sensual appetite is like a greedy beast: with "too much greediness" it 
pursues "the contentments necessary and proper to it"; it runs on blindly 
before; we must "call it back" (170). All sense pleasures must be abandoned 
(184); sensuality is unruly (203); its inclinations must be crossed (175); 
even the sensual pleasure of eating is suspect (230). 'The conflict between 
reason and sense" is made explicit: "the combat does not cease" (203). If 
the senses find a place in his ladder of prayer, albeit a humble and 
inferior one, in his vision of the general Christian life they are viewed 
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rather negatively. 
It might be argued that a hierarchical model such as Baker's could 
accord with the incarnat ional principle of integration in that each lower 
stage is taken up into the next one in the approach to the point of unity. 
If he occasionally suggests this (eg 452), the prevailing tone and the 
pattern of language creates a rather different impression. Conflict rather 
than integration is the persistent mood. I will consider the "point of unity" 
in more detail in chapter 5, section n). 
In his understanding of the senses and sens 1ality, we are back in a 
fundamental dualism, in this instance between sense3 and spirit. ES There are 
definite Platonic resonances here, and I will consider Baker's explicit 
Platonism in a later chapter. 66 But Baker is perhaps not unusual in his 
insistence on the inferiority of the senses. One author has drawn a 
distinction between sensuality and sensuousness, the former referring to 
the selfish use of material things (things of the senses) including other 
persons, the latter referring to the delight and wonder in human 
bodiliness. 67 Sensuousness, on this interpretation, accords with 
incarnational theology. Baker, however, is constantly aware of the dangers 
of the senses, so a conflict is implied between the bodily and the 
spiritual. This issue will be taken up in greater detail in the next chapter. 
1) Nature and the fall 
In accordance with Catholic theology, Holy Wisdom ascribes the 
difficulties in human nature to the effects of the fall. According to this 
traditional theology, in the state of unfallen nature Adam was possessed of 
gifts natural, praeternatural and supernatural. 68 Holy Wisdom opens with a 
brief though eulogistic description of the unfallen condition: Adam lived in 
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a state of contemplation loving God purely, without distraction; creatures 
and the senses served merely to intensify this intimate union with God (4, 
cf 168,170). But as a result of "a wilful contempt and transgression of 
that one most easy command" our first parents were stripped of the 
supernatural and weakened in the natural gifts. Now there is no force left 
in "corrupt nature" ... "to raise their love towards God" (4). 
The Christian traditions of East and West developed rather different 
understandings of the consequences of the fall for human nature. In general 
the East had a more optimistic view while the West, largely influenced by 
Augustine and his reaction to Pelagianism, developed its particular 
understanding of original sin and the corruption of the human race which, 
in Augustinian terms, is a massa damnata. 6-9 Baker shares the rather 
pessimistic view and the expression "corrupt nature" runs like a leitmotif 
through Holy Wisdom. 
His consideration of nature, however, is not unmitigatedly negative. 
He acknowledges that there remains in all souls a natural propension to 
seek God (8), that natural and supernatural forces may assist in the 
pursuance of the spiritual life (30) and that God rarely if ever works 
contrary to "natural complexions" (55). If there is no clear guidance from 
God then natural reason is to be followed (67,93). Here, however, Baker 
firmly retains a strong gap between natural reason and the divine 
inspiration. Finally, he argues that nature ought to be allowed moderate 
refreshment for the sake of the soul (67, cf 81). Very occasionally he 
commiserates with nature for its frailty (167). 
But apart from these few instances the ruling tone is one of 
conflict. Two particularly evocative images occur several times each: the 
first is of nature as a swamp. "If a soul do not continually strive to get 
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out of nature, she will plunge herself deeper and deeper into it" (24. ); if a 
person avoids the daily quest for perfection he will "more and more deeply 
plunge himself in corrupt nature (127, cf 367). The second image is that 
of nature the temptress: souls must not hearken to her "subtle insinuations" 
(93); corrupt nature is so subtle that she always insinuates her own 
interests (180); nature will subtly invent excuses to draw people from 
prayer (414). We should note here the identification of nature and evil with 
the feminine. " Peter Brown refers several times to the linking, in the 
early tradition, of the feminine with the body, nature, the formless, unruly, 
inferior and seductive, and of the masculine to the soul, the divine, the 
ordering and the superior. " 
A suggestive personification of nature runs throughout the book. She 
is allied with the devil in a campaign to prevent people from finding God 
(eg 26,56,165,259); her methods are both direct assault and treacherous 
insinuation. She is the power that stands in opposition to grace or the 
Divine Spirit (eg 39,70,324). We must combat her in all her perverse, 
crooked and impure desires (21) because the spirit of nature is subtle, 
insinuating and poisonous (41); she seeks her satisfaction by secret ways 
(62); she is the source of seducing images and vicious affections (353). 
Once again the course of action that Baker recommends for dealing 
with this threat is one of transcending and fleeing: we must raise 
ourselves out of nature into the region of the spirit (18,19,26,165,182, 
337,386). But the combative element is also present: we must enter the 
combat with discreet fervour (28, cf 177); we will gradually gain ground by 
mortification (91); we must force inferior nature to comply (289); we cannot 
always subdue it (333). 
The imagery that presents nature as deceptive, pernicious, impure and 
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impulsive runs relentlessly through Holy Wisdom. Nature is the source of all 
selfishness, greed and fear and it is to be crossed and opposed in all its 
desires and manifestations. Often, bare nature is qualified as "sensitive" or 
"inferior" or "corrupt", but in other places the noun alone is used. As far 
as I can see Baker does not have any particular technical sense in mind for 
the different expressions but uses them interchangeably. In Holy Wisdom the 
image of nature is the most frequently used articulation of the enemy in 
the spiritual combat. 
The cumulative effect of Baker's language is a powerful one. The 
Church taught that due to the fall the human race is "wounded in its 
naturals": some of the phraseology of official declarations suggests the 
idea of sickness. This includes "arbitriurn voluntatis in primo homine 
infirmatum"7- and even "totumque Adam ... secundum corpus et animam in 
deterius commutatum fuisse. "73 Human nature has indeed been twisted, 
wounded or weakened and once or twice Baker uses the language of sickness: 
vocal prayer is not quite enough to cure corrupt nature (140); infirm 
nature looks for novelty (151); frailty characterises our nature (167). Such 
language has a more positive and sympathetic ring to it: our nature is not 
an out and out enemy to be viewed with uncompromising hatred and disgust, 
but an invalid to be nursed back to health by the ministrations of grace 
and the Holy Spirit. However, he chooses not to exploit these nuances and 
instead centres on the language of conflict. Whether he intended it or not, 
we are left at the end of Holy Wisdom with an extremely pessimistic sense 
of the potentiality of human nature. And all this, it must be remembered, is 
after the incarnation. 
III CONRJCT AND FACTORS FROM WTTHO(fT 
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ýý Creatures and the world 
In part II of the present chapter we considered ways in which the 
conflict model is used to describe what is going on within the human 
person. Elements that are essential parts of the bodily human person and 
that might be expected to have a positive or benign effect in bringing the 
whole person into closer union with God are presented in a way that makes 
them primarily mischievous and inimical. In the present part III we will 
look at forces that come to the arena from without. 
Creatures, as the very name suggests, are made by God and may serve 
a positive function: "Creatures and all offices towards them served as steps 
to raise Adam to a more sublime and more intimate union with God" (4). Thus 
in themselves they are good: "For every creature of God is good, and 
nothing to be rejected which is received with giving of thanks" (315). Holy 
Wisdom retains a sense of this positive quality although it is only 
expressed sporadically. Creatures are good only in so far as they are 
understood as an extension of God's creative power. We may love them, or, 
more accurately, we may love God in them: the ideal for the soul in prayer 
is that "she never sees (creatures) as in themselves, but only in relation 
to God ... and loves God in them" (279). This ideal was realised by Christ: 
"in all other creatures He saw nothing but God, to whom He humbled Himself 
in all" (275). So we too must submit ourselves to all creatures for God's 
sake (272) and love creatures in proportion to their virtues, the most 
lovable creature being "the blessed humanity of our Lord, and next thereto 
His heavenly Virgin Mother" (225). 
Unfortunately, while this view may underlie what Baker has to say 
about creatures, these few references constitute the full extent of his 
explicit statement of it. He is far more concerned with the dangers 
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presented by creatures, and, as with the affections and passions, the choice 
of imagery builds up a dominant impression of conflict. 
The words "transcend" and "forget", often taken together, run through 
his comments on creatures. He may have picked up this idea from The Cloud 
of Unknowing, a work to which he refers several times. The condition where 
all creatures are removed "is worthily called the cloud of unknowing and 
the cloud of forgetting by the author of that sublime treatise so-called" 
(464). 74 All creatures are to be transcended and forgotten (16,95,120, 
166,182,215,242,356,444). He enhances his claim with related verbs: 
abstract (10,112), remove (75), rise above (195), pass over (205), withdraw 
(95,451), exclude (403). 
This cluster of escape images is supported by one of offence images: 
affections to creatures are to be extinguished (7), transitory things are to 
be loathed (272) or drowned (182), creatures including the self are to be 
annihilated (299). The self is linked with creatures as deserving hatred 
(18,164,213,465,480,486). The reason is given using images of disgust: 
the self is a filthy and wretched creature (33); "our unprofitableness, 
vileness, and misery ... is to be the object of our aversion and hatred" 
(164); glancing on creatures results in "contamination and tincture" (182); 
their images leave a stain on the soul (242); the understanding is 
"bepainted" with images of creatures (464). 
Baker believes that creatures are illusory as a source of lasting 
happiness (279) and outside of God have only "not-being" (275). His reaction 
to them is overwhelmingly negative. He barely pays even lip service to the 
sacramental understanding of creation as a verbiform embodiment of God's 
love. A proponent of incarnational theology may well agree that there are 
dangers associated with undue attachment to "creatures" such as material 
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possessions and food; other persons and the self, however, are made in the 
image of God. If one takes a doctrine of immanence seriously then they are 
not merely a means, and a dangerous one at that, to some sort of angelic 
condition. In the sacramental understanding of marriage, for example, each 
partner is, for the other, a real encounter with the divine love embodied. 
Obviously, the partner is not God; but nor is he or she simply a means, 
something to be transcended and forgotten. In Baker's defence, it must be 
remembered that he is writing for nuns and monks: nevertheless, as I 
suggested in the previous chapter, the Benedictine vows, an extension of the 
baptismal commitment, express a way of life where God is to be encountered 
in abbot or abbess and community, in a quasi-sacramental way. 
Associated with the notion of creatures is that of the world. Baker 
refers to the world several times but it is not one of his central ideas. 
The several senses of the word in modern English are already present in the 
New Testament: the Greek xoo oS can mean universe, the earth, the inhabited 
world, the theatre of salvation history (all neutral concepts) or "the sum 
of the divine creation which has been shattered by the fall, which stands 
under the judgment of God. 107S Any pejorative sense has a very specific 
meaning. Our modern word "worldly" has picked up something of the negative 
sense. The question we must address to Holy Wisdom is whether 
the narrow 
pejorative sense invades the neutral context. 
By and large Baker uses 
"world" as a personification of worldliness: for him day 
to day business is 
to be avoided as far as possible because it is a 
distraction from the life 
of prayer. The word "vanity" recurs (16,21,34) as a 
description of worldly 
matters. "Withdraw ... from worldly conversation" 
(111) is a consistent theme 
(cf 16,34,58,116). 
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Often the world stands in contrast with life in the monastery. ý4hat 
goes on outside the monastery must be of no interest to the religious: 
"abstraction from all intercourse either with the business or news of the 
world" is a desirable aim (68). The world is painted in bleak colours: 
quoting an image taken from St Paulinus he describes it as "a dry, scorched 
and barren wilderness" (130). Renunciation (418). contempt (419), indeed 
horror (195) are the recommended reactions. Baker may be over-stating the 
case for rhetorical effect, and he may be writing primarily for religious, 
but it is difficult to escape the sense of dualism that he creates between 
the desirable spiritual world of withdrawal and mental prayer and the 
undesirable material world of "ordinary" life. 
k) The devil 
The devil was more prominent in theological discourse in the past 
than he is today. I shall use the masculine pronoun for reasons of tradition 
rather than of sexism. The development of the idea of "the satan", the 
adversary, in Hebrew thought's led to the prominence of the demonic in the 
New Testament and belief in a personalized spirit of evil is evident in the 
writings of the fathers. " There seem to be two main ways of understanding 
the devil. The first is to see him as a personalized spiritual being; the 
second as a personification of evil. The actual existence of evil in human 
life no one would seriously deny. I suspect that modern Christians who 
would be agnostic about Satan as a personal being are using something akin 
to Occam's razor: human sinfulness is enough to explain evil without having 
to resort to the devil. In the early monastic writings, however, the concept 
of monasticism as a combat against personalized powers of evil was 
prominent. 70 The demonic did not replace human vice but worked with it. ' 
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St Benedict's emphasis on the demonic is relatively small, although he does 
mention the workings of the devil in four places. eO 
Official Church teaching on the subject seems to be the outcome of 
applying a kind of theological logic to the bare bones of the scriptural 
witness: the devil is a creature, e' was created good but fell through a 
free decisionE' and is not the cause of human sin except through the 
method of persuasion. " I dwell on this subject because Baker shares with 
his contemporaries and predecessors a firm belief in a personal devil; the 
devil appears frequently in the pages of Holy Wisdom. 
He is a strongly personal force, prominent in the fall: Adam was 
"seduced" by our common enemy and destined for "fire and brimstone" (5), or, 
more precisely, his wife was seduced by the devil and Adam listened to her 
(40 ). The devil works by "illusions" (22) and "suggestions" (45,165,259, 
389,424); his action is a seduction (122,464); he sets snares (115,165, 
245,473). The images of deception are prominent: he sometimes counterfeits 
a good angel (94) and has a hand in sensible devotions (174,463,468). But 
if his action is normally subtle, he can assault directly (196,300) and is 
moved only by malice and fury (26,464). There is constant war with the 
devil, particularly over prayer (300,314). 
All this may suggest that he is an external enemy. In fact he is 
frequently paired with corrupt nature (56,165,259,449) and he has 
particular power over the body. This last point is important, 
because it 
suggests a demeaning of the body in comparison to the soul. 
"A spiritual 
faculty is exempted from the devil's influences, who has great dominion over 
our corporeal powers" (364, cf 327). He stirs up 
the senses (388,467) and 
works largely by planting seducing images in the 
imagination (122,248,388, 
467); only when creatures are transcended is his power to fasten a 
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temptation foiled (444). Baker's answer to the devil's hostility is twc-fold: 
escape from the world, because the religious life gives greater exemption 
from the demonic snares than does life in the world (115), and a drawing 
into the spirit (122). 
In Holy Wisdom, the devil functions as a forceful combatant in the 
spiritual conflict. If he is external in the sense of not being an essential 
part of the human person, he nevertheless has great power and faithful 
allies within and the primary locus of his action is nature, the senses, 
internal and external, and among the internal, particularly the imagination. 
The implication seems to be that the less spiritual part of the human 
person is more susceptible to the power of the devil. This suggests an 
implicit lowering of the value of bodiliness. 
1) Grace and the Holy Spirit 
Thus far I have been considering the enemies in the spiritual 
conflict; it is now time to look at the other side. Here the main forces are 
grace and the Holy Spirit. In contrast to the gloomy sense of treachery, 
attrition and open conflict that has characterized the themes I have 
discussed already, Baker's appreciation of the power of grace and the Spirit 
is warm and optimistic. Indeed the Holy Spirit plays a remarkably prominent 
part in Holy Wisdom. Statistical evidence needs to be assessed with caution, 
but it is suggestive. The relative lengths of the three treatises of Holy 
Wisdom are as follows: Treatise 1, "Of an Internal Life in General", 157 
pages; Treatise 2, "Of the First Instrument of Perfection, viz. 
Mortification", 133 pages; Treatise 3, "Of Prayer", 193 pages. The first has 
about 18 direct references to Christ and 44 to the Holy Spirit. The second 
has 14 to Christ and 8 to the Spirit. The third has 36 to Christ and 31 to 
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the Spirit. The grand total is 68 to Christ and 83 to the Holy Spirit. The 
greater emphasis on the Spirit is certainly not shared with other spiritual 
works with which Baker was familiar. For example, according to the index of 
the Classics of Western Spirituality edition of The Cloud of Unknowing there 
are 52 direct or indirect references to Christ in that work, but only 4 to 
the Holy Spirit. 
In Holy Wisdom, the grace of creation ("primitive grace" or "grace of 
innocency" (6)) has only limited strength; but the grace of Christ, the grace 
of re-creation, is "medicinal, omnipotent and regenerating" (6f). The image 
of healing is taken up here. Baker's doctrine of grace is thoroughly in 
accord with the teaching of the Council of Trent. Grace is something that is 
given by measure (8,30,42,228) and which cooperates with the "good 
propensions" (8,329) which it "promotes ... and increases" (9). Grace is a 
free gift (23,106,295), but there is a mysterious mutuality between it and 
human effort. Mortification and internal prayer can procure greater grace 
(176,183,204,262,294,300,317,337), yet these, for their effectiveness, 
depend on grace (42,188,295). Baker distinguishes the ordinary grace of 
Christians (42) from the special graces given to contemplatives (eg 356, 
459). Ordinary grace helps people to carry out the ordinary virtuous and 
spiritual duties of the Christian life, advancing them in holiness. The 
graces of contemplatives lead to higher degrees of prayer and union. 
The image of grace as a combatant is rare: grace supports reason in 
resisting sensuality, and the combat does not cease (203); a great measure 
of grace is required in subduing inferior passions (228). It is never 
personified in the way that its opponents are: it is seen as the essential 
nourishment and energy, but not as the fighter. A personification allied to 
strong physical verbs is usually more evocative than an abstract way of 
129 
The Conflict Model 
talking: in Holy Wisdom the language of grace does not grip the imaginat,. cn 
as powerfully as the language of corrupt nature or of disordered passions. 
But perhaps this does not matter: for Baker the language of grace is 
subsidiary to two stronger concepts which are closely connected to it and 
partially overlap it. These are light and the Holy Spirit. Light carries the 
strength of one of the physical senses; it is ironic that an attitude which 
derogates the senses should be parasitic upon them if it is to articulate 
itself at all. The Spirit is not merely a personification of divine power, 
but, according to traditional Christian theology, as much "real person" as 
the Father or the Son. 
In Holy Wisdom, the Spirit is very often directly associated with 
light: in fact possibly half the references to the Spirit include the idea of 
light. This is appropriate because the primary function of the Spirit for 
Baker is guidance: the image of the Spirit as the guide on the spiritual 
journey runs throughout the book. He is "a light to direct securely all 
their steps, and to order all their workings ... the which 
by the guidance of 
God's Holy Spirit do cause a farther advancement of them to a yet more 
intimate union" (15); some people are experienced in "the true internal ways 
of God's Spirit leading to contemplation" (73); we are urged to the 
"obligation to attend and follow the internal guidance of God's Spirit" 
(129); souls "are immediately guided by God's Holy Spirit in His internal 
ways" (352); a soul will be "guided and illuminated by 
God's Holy Spirit" 
(476). The examples could be multiplied. Allied to this is the image of the 
Spirit as teacher (58,75,431) or as director and master 
(46,70,82,163, 
308). 
Some of the central scriptural images are used: the Spirit is the 
real motive force of prayer, "the cause or principle" of 
internal prayer 
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(314), ; raying "with groans which cannot be expressed" (338,429);, 34 he is 
poured into our hearts as love (16,210). 9& He becomes the new divine 
principle and nature within us (165,210). 96 He is communicated in word and 
sacrament (6,40). 
Thus far, Baker's doctrine of the action of the Holy Spirit in the 
spiritual life is in sound accord with Catholic tradition; none of what he 
says violates the integrity of the human person; his images are of growth 
and transformation by love and light. But there are two further issues we 
need to examine. The first is the means by which the Spirit enlightens and 
guides the human person: is this means quasi-magical, relying on some sort 
of celestial impulse? Or does he work through incarnate human experience? 
The second is the occurrence of conflict imagery. 
Baker identifies two main ways by which the Spirit guides a human 
being in the spiritual life: the first is by "inspirations, lights, impulses, 
or calls ... such as are immediately communicated 
to the soul alone; the 
second is by the same, communicated "mediately with the concurrence of some 
other person or thing" (45). Within the second category fall the external 
director (1,2,2) and spiritual books (1,2,3); spiritual books in particular 
were very influential in Baker's own development. 87 The action of the Spirit 
through other people, through reading and so on is readily understood: these 
are "bodily" means of communicating to bodily persons. They could 
be said to 
have a quasi-sacramental function. The claim to direct inspiration, on 
the 
other hand, has mainly been viewed with suspicion within the 
Roman Church 
and, indeed, in other communions. Baker's teaching, it has 
been pointed out, 
"emphasizes freedom, inspiration and inward religion; "ea but how far does it 
touch on the magical? By magical, I mean involving direct interventions 
apparently unmediated by bodily means. 
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I feel that Holy Wisdom does possess a hint of a solution to this 
objection. Unfortunately, Baker barely develops it. This is the notion of the 
Spirit transforming the human person (165) so that there is an integration 
of action or decision between grace and nature which are no longer two 
things mixed together but, in the language of chemistry, a compound rather 
than a mixture. Words such as "possession" (356) or "impulse" (60,93,462) 
do not really help in describing this integration because they carry the 
sense of intrusion from without. 
Baker brings the Holy Spirit into the conflict model in several places 
in Holy Wisdom. But the main image is taken not from warfare but from the 
debating chamber. In Shakespeare's plays we see conscience and the fiend, 
perched one at each ear, attempting to win the human subject to one course 
of action or its opposite. 89 In Holy Wisdom, the two internal guides are the 
spirit of corrupt nature and the Divine Spirit (39). The latter attempts to 
lead us to renounce nature and sense (40). The theme of the divine teacher 
and the false teacher is picked up again (70) and is mentioned twice in the 
treatise on prayer (416,470). Once or twice strong conflict words are used: 
the Spirit gives strength to subdue self-love (10); "immortified" 
(unmortified) souls resist his action (346). But these are extemely rare. 
For Baker "stillness, serenity, and tranquillity" proceed from the Divine 
Spirit, not "impetuosity and violence" (204); the state of life according to 
the Spirit is "peace, serenity, and repose" (490). Consistent with this 
belief, the imagery of violence is avoided and a strong sense of power 
through gentleness is built up. Therefore, quite apart from the explicit 
content of Holy Wisdom, the message is powerfully reinforced at a less 
conscious level by the skilful use of language. 
Baker speaks positively and indeed movingly about grace and the Holy 
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Spirit. Nevertheless, these are factors that aparoach human nature from 
without. Obviously Christianity will never identify the Holy Spirit with 
human nature; the God/humanity dualism will ramain. But in Holy Wisdom 
grace as a second gift9O remains distinct from nature, almost as a sort of 
mysterious substance. 
m) Active and contemplative 
I will conclude this consideration of external factors in the conflict 
with a glance at the relationship between the active and the contemplative 
lives. 
The distinction between the active and contemplative lives dates from 
classical times. 91 In the Christian tradition the distinction became the 
locus of a value judgement and was linked with the story of Martha and 
Mary. 92 I have already mentioned The Cloud of Unknowing as an important 
influence on Baker's thought and it is clear that that work considers the 
distinction over several chapters and maintains the superiority of the 
contemplative. =ý3 Baker's Secretum Sive Mysticum and commentary on the Cloud 
follow the same line. 9 In Holy Wisdom, however, the effect is somewhat 
mitigated although it is clear that he views the contemplative as "of the 
two the more perfect" (12). His reason is rooted in a body/spirit dualism: 
the contemplative state is "more spiritual, more abstracted from the body 
and its sensual faculties, and consequently more angelical and divine" (12). 
Despite this his discussion of the differences between the active and 
contemplative lives in the chapter entitled "of natural propensions to 
devotion" (I 1 2) is characterized by a degree of common sense: he realizes 
that the type of devotion appropriate will depend on the natural disposition 
of the individual and that grace will work on this: some are predominantly 
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contemplative, some active and others "of a mixed disposition" (ii). It is 
necessary to do what is most fitting. Nevertheless, Baker is writing for 
"persons that aspire to perfection in a contemplative life" (13); he picks up 
the traditional interpretation of the Martha and Mary story (12) and 
proceeds with the fundamental assumption of contemplative superiority: Mary 
has most definitely chosen optimam partem (16). This is linked with purity 
of intention (cf 171,215,218). We have seen his attitude towards 
creatures: contemplation is related to this as a state where the soul 
"transcends all creatures and their images" (120). 
There is no real sense of conflict between the active and 
contemplative lives, although people naturally drawn to contemplation will 
find active responsibilities a particular burden. Only very occasionally does 
he mention misunderstandings or even hostility between the contemplative 
spirit and the active superior who does not really understand the former 
(148f). In one or two instances the antagonism felt by active souls towards 
contemplatives which features prominently in the Cloud-15 is lightly referred 
to: "Those that are inexperienced may, and often do, call this a state of 
idleness and unprofitable cessation, as Martha complained against her sister 
Mary" (455). -"r- We know that Baker had difficulties with his actively 
inclined superiors; 97 occasionally the tension is made explicit (eg 142); but 
if there was any stronger sense of this in his own writings, it has been 
smoothed away in Holy Wisdom by the editing hand of Cressy. 
A parallel contrast between the inner and the outer or the internal 
and the external is mentioned a number of times: an "internal contemplative 
life" is highly favoured and described by adjectives such as "pure" and 
'profound" (eg 82). External behaviour can be positive (59) but can more 
easily become hypocrisy than internal Baker is making a sound point on the 
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principle of integrity, that the outer conduct and the inner disposition 
must be harnessed together, but there is always a vague sense of the 
contrast between the bodily and the spiritual: that "inner behaviour" is 
somehow different as well as being more meritorious or graceful or perfect 
than the corporal works of mercy. 
IV THE IMAGERY OF HOLY WLS OK 
n) The conflict language of Holy Wisdom 
It should be clear from what has been said in the present chapter 
that Baker makes considerable use of language suggesting conflict in many 
of its forms and that the conflict takes place primarily within the arena of 
the human person. Odd phrases suggesting such conflict run throughout the 
book, and sometimes there are extended passages where this is the primary 
metaphor. It would supplement my comments thus far to quote two longer 
passages. The first is from 1,1,4 (21) and the words and phrases to note are 
in upper case: 
(The erroneous belief that recent converts to the spiritual life are 
not making progress] proceeds from a preconceived mistake, that 
because in times of light and devotion the soul finds herself 
carried with much fervour to God, and perceives but SMALL 
CONTRADICTIONS AND REBELLIONS in inferior nature, therefore she is 
very forward in the way of perfection. Whereas it is far otherwise; 
for nature is not so easily CONQUERED as she imagines ... Many 
changes she must expect ... and presently after, 
it may be, FIERCER 
COMBATS than before ... 
Yea, it will likely happen to such souls, that even the formerly 
well-known grosser defects in them will seem to increase, and to 
grow MORE HARD TO BE QUELLED after they have been competently 
ADVANCED in internal ways; and the reason is, because, having set 
themselves to COMBAT corrupt nature in all her PERVERSE, CROOKED 
impure desires, and being sequestered from the vanities of the 
world, they find themselves in continual WRESTLINGS AND AGONIES ... 
But if they would take courage ... they would 
find that such VIOLENT 
temptations are an assured sign that they are in a secure and happy 
way, and that when God sees it is best for them, they shall come off 
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from such COMBATS with VICTORY and comfort. 
This long quotation is from one page of a chapter entitled "Of the 
necessity of a strong resolution" which might be expected to make use of 
such imagery. The second is from a single paragraph in a chapter entitled 
"of tranquillity of mind" (11,1,8, p 206): 
Such TROUBLE is small and scarce considerable; for notwithstanding 
it, the superior soul partakes nothing of it, but REIGNS in that 
upper region of light and peace, and from thence LOOKS DOWN upon 
sensuality, either as a thing DIVIDED from itself, in whose 
imperfections and DISORDERS she is nothing concerned, being as it 
were safe locked up from them in A STRONG TOWER, or else she 
SUPPRESSES all such motions in their first BREAKING OUT, in virtue 
of that DOMINION which ... she hath gained over them. 
In these examples it is not the individual words that matter so much: 
taken in isolation, several of them may be neutral or applicable in several 
other metaphorical contexts. What I wish to point out is their cumulative 
effect on the reader who, even if not particularly sensitive to metaphor, 
may well absorb a subliminal impression. This impression is not one of the 
essential unity of the human person: what is evoked is a sense of dis- 
integration and conflict. In the final section of the present chapter I will 
make some remarks about the way in which Baker's use of conflict relates to 
the use of conflict by other spiritual writers. 
o) The Journey model 
I have concentrated exclusively on the model of conflict. It may be 
asked whether this is the only model of the spiritual life used in Holy 
Wisdom. We need to look at another that finds a prominent place, although 
its use complements rather than undermines the conflict model. 
The spiritual life can only be described using metaphors; the person 
engaged in this life is, for instance, "getting closer" to God (a spatial 
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metaphor that has become, in non-religious parlance, an expression for 
increasing intimacy), or "growing" in holiness (an organic metaphor). What 
these metaphors are attempting to describe is a change in the quality of 
the relationship between God and the person. Possibly the most common such 
metaphor in the Christian tradition is that of journey (and its related 
ideas of pilgrimage, quest, search, movement or progress). This is hardly 
surprising in view of the fact that for bodily human beings a most obvious 
change is that from place A to place B. 
The use of travel imagery is so common that it almost escapes notice. 
This is partly because some of the words, "progress" for example, are 
already used metaphorically in a secular context. Baker's conflict imagery is 
striking; his journey imagery far less so. Certain words are used with great 
frequency: "souls that first enter into the interior ways of the spirit, or 
that have made no great progress in them ... " (20). "Ways" occurs frequently 
(eg 23,39,96,110,384) as does "progress" (eg 233,293,350). Other words 
that are already metaphorical include "advancement" (probably the most 
common, eg 176,190,285,329,400,412,437) and "arrival" (281,294,492). 
More interesting are the places where Baker is overt in his use of a 
journey model and where he qualifies ordinary journey words. Examples of 
the former include his long parable of the pilgrim, several pages lifted 
from Hilton's Scale of Perfection (I, 1,6). 9e The style is markedly 
different from that of the rest of Holy Wisdom and the allegory clear: "the 
parable of a devout pilgrim desirous to travel to Jerusalem (which he 
interprets the vision of peace or contemplation)" (31). "He that runs, if he 
be able to hold on, will sooner come to his journey's end than he that 
contents himself with an ordinary travelling pace" (190). The soul is "to 
run speedily and lightly in the course of virtues" (296). Describing how 
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different souls can reach the same end from different starting points, he 
writes "several ways or paths ... from distant places lead to a cit, ý .. (and) 
at last fall into and make one common highway" (481). The end is 
represented by a physical place, several times "the top of the mountain" 
(293, cf 492). The images of running and the mountain are, or course, 
scriptural, but Baker has probably got them via the Rule of St Benedict. " 
In one place Baker is explicit about the use of this model: "It is 
generally the custom of those that write treatises of spiritual doctrine to 
begin with a division of the several stations or ascents ... in the spiritual 
progress" (350). In several places he elaborates the bare metaphor: "a very 
long tedious way" (19), "the length of the way" (23), "contrary ways ... 
endless labyrinths" (39), "secret paths" (97). 1 00 
In itself this model of journeying fits perfectly well with 
incarnational theology. It has a different application from the conflict 
model. Journeying describes the fact of change in the spiritual life; 
conflict the manner in which that change has to come about. The two models 
are sometimes brought together: the way to perfection is long and tedious 
because of the opposition of nature (19); there are "two internal guides in 
all Christians" vying as to the direction of the journey (39); "inordinate 
affections" will prevent the soul's ascending to the top of the mountain 
(293); the soul "by resisting stronger temptations ... doth make greater 
strides and paces" (293); souls have to "resolutely break through all 
difficulties and continue ... to the great advancement of 
their spirit" (329); 
"she hath struggled through terrible oppositions of the devil and corrupt 
nature" but still keeps her way (449). 
There are occasional references to longing (eg in III, 4,2 "of the 
prayer of aspirations") and to healing (very rare). Journeying, however, is 
¼ 
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far more frequently used. What is significant is that these models do not 
detract from the effect of the conflict model which remains the strongest 
and most overt and, as we have seen, gives a particular flavour to the 
Journey. 
p) Summary and conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to develop a detailed 
consideration of Baker's use of the conflict model. After preliminary 
comments on the notion of model, I traced the occurrence of conflict in the 
scriptures and glanced at its presence in Christian tradition. It is a 
prevalent model used in complex ways; it is scriptural and traditional and 
must be accommodated within the framework of incarnational theology. It 
finds a particularly prominent place in strands of spiritual tradition which 
inspired Baker. For example, commenting on the theory of early monasticism, 
Garcia Colombds writes: "According to St Jerome, to become a monk is 
equivalent to entering a battle, ad praelium festinare. 'Great is the battle 
of the monks, ' admits St John Chrysostom. For Cassian, the monastic life 
largely consists in a long spiritual combat. St Pachomius constantly 
exhorted his disciples to fight unwearyingly. "' O1 The main opponents in the 
militia spiritualis are Satan and the demons, but the battle is also against 
vices. ' °2 Military metaphors are frequent in the Rule of St Benedict. ' °3 
Conflict imagery is found in much spiritual writing through the centuries 
and one 16th century writer who influenced Baker goes so far as to call his 
work The Spiritual Conflict-l" Even the modern liturgy of the Roman rite 
makes use of the model: the collect for Ash Wednesday reads, "Support us, 
Lord, as with this lenten fast we begin our Christian warfare, so that in 
doing battle against the spirit of evil we may be armed with the weapon of 
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self-denial. " 
My objections are not to the model itself: the idea of fighting one's 
own evil and selfishness may well be a challenging and inspiring way of 
looking at spiritual and personal development. But what I am questioning is 
the manner in which conflict is used by Baker and his spiritual precursors. 
In parts II and III of this chapter I discussed the exact locus of conflict 
for Baker. In part II I showed how he used affections and passions, images 
and the imagination, senses and sensuality, and nature. By close attention 
to the cumulative impact of his language and imagery and to the more overt 
anthropological implications of what he said, I suggested that elements 
which, for incarnational theology, would be positive or at least neutral, had 
been drawn into the arena as hostile combatants. 
In chapter 31 argued the goodness of creation and the value of 
human embodiment, and I drew out the central anthropological corollary of 
integration as well as the subsidiary one of the importance of the 
emotions. Baker's Augustinian pessimism has two main implications which run 
contrary to the incarnational criteria developed in that chapter. Firstly, 
the various parts of the embodied human person, the affections, the senses 
and so forth, are seen as so vitiated that they are viewed as hostile in 
themselves. Thus essential allies, which may admittedly need control or 
redirection, are treated as enemies. This runs contrary to the principle of 
integration: it is difficult to see how an embodied human person can 
develop as a Christian without this integration. 
The second implication is subtler and more pervasive: it centres on 
the presumed superiority of the spiritual over the bodily. At root and to 
varying degrees, the passions, senses and so on are associated with the 
body and for that reason are not really desirable partners in spiritual 
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development. The tacit ideal for Baker, and for those like him, is a kind of 
angelism. ' o5 The most insidious level of conflict turns on an attitude of 
contempt towards the bodily which is clearly contrary to the incarnational 
principles of embodiment and integration. 
In part III of the present chapter I considered the conflict with 
external factors such as creatures and the world, the devil, and grace and 
the Holy Spirit. I argued that Baker's attitude to creatures and the world 
does not accord adequately with the understanding of creation and the 
sacraments developed in chapter 3. Baker sees the devil as primarily 
associated with bodily elements such as the senses and thus underlines the 
evaluative dualism between the bodily and the spiritual. His discussion of 
the work of the Holy Spirit, while warm and extensive, maintains a strong 
grace/nature distinction. 
In part IV I took a broader view of the conflict language of Holy 
Wisdom and, by way of a glance at the journey model, maintained the primacy 
of the conflict model. In any case the journey model works with rather than 
against the conflict model. 
These summarizing and concluding remarks necessarily lack some of 
the more nuanced treatment in the various sections of this chapter. In a 
word, what I have argued is that the conflict model is central in Holy 
Wisdom and is at variance with the incarnational principles of embodiment 
and integration. In the next chapter I will consider more closely Baker's 
understanding of the human person as an individual. The discussion there 
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Autograph letter of Baker to Sir Robert Cotton 
((: ourtesy of British Library, Cotton, Julius C. III, f. 12) 
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G HA PTER5 
"THE SOUL IS SO RAISED ABOVE THE BODY ,,, "' 
THE HUMAN PERSON: INDIVIDUAL 
a) Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that the image of conflict provides 
the primary model for Baker's discussion of the spiritual life. The conflict 
is located mainly within the human person although external forces such as 
the Holy Spirit and the devil also participate. It is true that conflict does 
have a place in the scriptures and in Christian tradition, but the way it is 
understood in Holy Wisdom runs contrary to the integrated understanding of 
the human person and the concerns of incarnational theology as developed in 
chapter 3. 
In the present chapter I shall consider Baker's understanding of the 
human person as an individual. Although the discussion of the previous 
chapter will provide a background, I shall not approach the subject with the 
conflict model as a primary point of focus. I shall be looking to see 
whether Baker's attitudes and assumptions are out of harmony with 
incarnational theology. Part I will deal with the body, part II with the 
soul, part III with the spirit and part IV with faculties of the soul. 
I THE BODY 
b) The body and bodiliness 
In Chapter 31 considered differing attitudes to the body in Greek and 
Hebrew tradition and advocated an incarnational theology which includes an 
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integrated understanding of the human person. I showed how the ascetical 
teaching of some spiritual writers suggests a less than positive assessment 
of the body in comparison with the soul. In the present section I shall 
consider the understanding of the body and bodiliness in Holy Wisdom and 
shall attempt to evaluate Baker's position in the light of incarnational 
theology. 
In general Baker takes a fairly pragmatic line on the body; he never 
rejoices in bodiliness, never dwells on its God-given status and never 
relates it directly to the incarnation. On the other hand, despite a Platonic 
strand, purely negative comments are not numerous. At best the body is 
inferior to the soul or spirit and is to be treated in a way conducive to 
spiritual progress. At worst it is dangerous and requires firm practical 
controls. Nevertheless, Baker tacitly assumes the centrality of bodily 
experience in his acknowledgement of its role in generating metaphors for 
describing the spiritual life: he talks of mystics struggling to express 
their experiences. "They are forced to invent new words the best they can, 
or to borrow similitudes from corporal things... " (61). 
The next four sections of the present chapter will deal with Baker's 
view of the body and bodiliness. Section c) will present his neutral 
exposition: it will deal with the bodily constitution of the human person 
and its relation to the spiritual life, bodily experiences in prayer and will 
end with a concluding remark. Section d) will deal with the superiority of 
the spiritual over the bodily and will evaluate the reasons Baker gives for 
caring for the body. Section e) will assess the anti-bodily strands 
in Holy 
Wisdom, considering the language of "carnal", the value of corporal 
affliction, the body seen as dangerous and 
Platonic elements of 
disparagement of the body. Section f) will make some concluding remarks on 
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the argument of these sections. Part I of the present chapter will conclude 
with sections g) and h) in which the issues of sickness and ar. gelism, 
loosely related to the theme of the body, will be discussed. 
c) The body: Baker as neutral expositor 
When considering the make-up of the human character, Baker retains, 
with contemporaries such as Shakespeare, the language of medieval 
psychology. A person's "complexion" or "temperament" was his or her 
particular blend of "humours" which are the bodily fluids determining a 
person's disposition. 2 Thus there was believed to be a close correlation 
between bodily factors such as blood or phlegm and corresponding 
personality traits such as being sanguine or phlegmatic. There is no 
evidence in Holy Wisdom that Baker retains the full medieval notion, but he 
does assume a link between "bodily humours" and spiritual dispositions. 
At the fall the forbidden fruit caused "miserable depravations" in the 
soul and "irreparably disordered that most healthful, exact temper of (our 
first parents') bodily constitutions" (5). Nevertheless, there remains among 
human beings a natural propension to seek God which varies "according to 
their several dispositions and corporal complexions" (8). More than once 
Baker emphasises the fact that God does not violate our "natural 
complexion" but works with it (9,55). On the other hand, devotion arising 
from "a mere natural temper of the body" is to be suspected (326, cf 152), 
although some "tender souls" will make greater use than others of their 
corporal nature in generating affections to God (385). There is a value in a 
person knowing "the exactly true state and complexion of his body" (67), for 
then he or she can determine an appropriate pattern of asceticism. Baker 
lauds the "ancient monks" whose bodily complexions could cope with more 
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rigorous asceticism than can modern monks (123,136). 
While the Spirit may work with corporal nature and "the material 
disposition in corporal nature" may help in some trials (293), Baker makes 
two strong points. firstly, bodily factors can be detrimental to prayer and 
render us particularly susceptible to temptation. The distemper of the body 
increases fears (336, cf 267); the imagination may be distempered according 
to the disposition of humours and spirits in the body (247); the height of 
prayer can be lowered by corporal factors (356); inferior temptations may 
affect the motions of the body (249). Secondly, the work of the Spirit does 
not depend on corporal conditions (152,331 cf 330,415). 
On several occasions Baker considers bodily experiences that 
sometimes accompany prayer: he does not dismiss these as valueless but in 
general views them with suspicion. He warns the soul not to give free scope 
to tears because they may impair the body (328). What he seems to be 
saying is that tears may be self-induced or merely sentimental. There is 
danger in prayer that causes "stirrings and pleasing motions in corporal 
nature" (403). Nevertheless, he acknowledges that there is a gift of tears 
that the Holy Spirit may give to perfect souls. 
The following quotation, from the chapter on sensible devotion (III, 
1,5) is of interest: 
The special signs and effects of such sensible devotion are oft- 
times very conspicuous in the alteration caused by it in corporal 
nature, drawing tears from the eyes, producing heat and redness in 
the face, springing motions in the heart (like to the leaping of a 
fish in the waters, saith Harphius), and in some it causes so 
perceivable an opening and shutting in the heart, saith he, that it 
may be heard ... " (325f) 
The paragraph continues in this vein for several more lines indicating how 
such experiences may start to go wrong. The reason they go wrong is 
because the person concerned takes too much delight in them; they become an 
146 
The Human Person: Individual 
end in themselves. Nevertheless, as in the case of the Franciscan Br Bernard 
(462), Baker can view bodily effects of prayer with tolerance; if such 
effects spring from a divine principle then they must have value. 
Baker does recognise a harmony between "external comportment" and 
internal condition (55) although men and women are more distinguishable by 
their internal dispositions than by "outward features" (10). He does 
recognise the fact that human beings are bodily and he makes some attempt 
to include this fact in his discussion of the spiritual life. While his 
comments are neutral, however, his tone reveals a particular attitude 
towards bodiliness. Except in the case of the overt bodily experiences 
mentioned above, "suspicious" would be too strong a word to describe this 
attitude. There is, rather, an uneasiness and a sense that the body must 
keep to its station. When all is said and done, Baker may accept a sort of 
harmony between the bodily and the spiritual but the former is certainly 
inferior to the latter. We must now turn to this issue. 
d) The superiority of the spiritual over the bodily 
For the purposes of the present context I am not concerned with 
technical differences between "soul" and "spirit"; such matters will be dealt 
with later in this chapter. What I am concerned with is the evaluation of 
the spiritual side of the human person in relation to the bodily. That the 
spiritual is of more importance than the bodily is a fundamental assumption 
in Holy Wisdom. "By how much the spirit is more excellent and noble than 
the body, by so much are spiritual exercises more profitable than corporal" 
(128); "any matter that concerns the body, health, fortunes, life, etc ... " is 
of less importance than "the solid good of (the) soul" (236f). Referring to 
St Bernard, Baker tells us that "as man was not made for the woman, but the 
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woman for man, so spiritual exercises were not made for czrporal, but 
corporal for spiritual" (427); finally, "the soul is not to serve the body, 
but the body the soul; so that if one of them must ... be the loser, it is 
most just that the loss should lie on the body's side" (433). 
The evaluation is related to prayer: Baker speaks with approval of 
the "high degree of humility" where "the soul is so raised above the body 
... that it hath lost all care and solicitude about it" (280); in prayer all 
bodies and bodily images must be transcended (313); indeed, "the soul comes 
to operate ... more elevated above the corporal organs and faculties, so 
drawing nearer to the resemblance of the operations of an angel or 
separated spirit" (453). A later section of the present chapter will deal 
with Baker's angelism but it is worth pointing out here the implication of 
the final phrases of the last quotation: it would be better to worship 
without a body ("a separated spirit") were that possible, than with one. 
In view of this superiority of the spiritual, it is perhaps a little 
surprising to discover that Baker's attitude to the treatment of the body in 
practice is mild and moderate. But this moderation does not arise from any 
sense of reverence or respect for the body: "Just it is that some due 
regard be had to the body" but "this is not so much for the body's sake as 
the spirit's, which, since in this life it cannot work without the body, by 
too violent workings it may so weaken the body as that it will not be 
enabled for continuance" (433). Moderation is urged strongly: the person 
must "consider the infirmity of the body" (81, cf 60,71,74,91,96,186, 
190,199) but all the time the support of the body is for the good of the 
soul (230,233): harm will come "to the spirit by too much enfeebling the 
body" (232). 
14-8 
The Human Person: Individual 
e) Anti-bodily strands In Holy Wisdom 
I have considered the neutral elements of Baker's understanding of 
the body and the evaluative assumption that places the spiritual above the 
bodily. The overall impression so far is that there is a subtle 
disparagement of the body, at least in comparison with the spiritual. We 
now need to consider whether this prevailing mood is hardened through the 
use of language and notions which are overtly anti-bodily. 
Let us first consider his use of the word "carnal". It occurs several 
times in the first treatise but only once or twice in the second and third. 
It invariably carries a pejorative sense and is equivalent to "worldly" or 
to "sinful". This might lead us to believe that he is using it in a 
straightforward Pauline sense where the flesh (caro) represents the 
principle of sin in the human being which stands over against the spirit or 
the divine principle. Baker talks of "carnal reason" (25,87), "carnal 
desires" (34,39,318) and "carnal will" (167). Thus far he seems to be 
talking in a Pauline sense. But there are some references which suggest 
that he moves away from this to a position where "carnal" is associated 
with "bodily" or "material": He talks of the mind being freed from inordinate 
affection to all worldly and carnal objects (105). But the crucial quotation 
is where he contrasts "carnal open sins" with "the more dangerous sins of 
the spirit" (150). Here "carnal" seems to mean "bodily". 
I wish to draw only a tentative conclusion from this discussion of 
Baker's use of "carnal": He is using the word predominantly in a Pauline 
sense, but I suggest that there has been a slight shift in his mind in the 
direction of "bodily"; thus "bodily" picks up a hint of the pejorative sense. 
In a later section of the present chapter I will consider Baker's 
theology of sickness; here we need merely to notice that a certain value is 
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placed on corporal affliction. Hard corporal labours "afflicting to the body: -" 
serve "for the greater good of the spirit" (138, cf 137). He quotes with 
approval the dictum of St Hildegarde: "the love of God doth not usually 
dwell in robust bodies" (232) and the opinion of Tauler "that the condition 
of the dearest and most perfect servants of God is to have their souls full 
of the divine love and their bodies full of pains" (428). Corporal vigour is 
not conducive to spiritual progress: too much vigour in the corporal nature 
of the young hinders their reaching God (23); internal prayer abates the 
vigorousness of the body (433); souls arriving at the perfect prayer of 
contemplation are able to neglect and forget the body (234). While some of 
this is certainly said with a view to encouraging those in poor health, the 
impression is created that bodily health and well-being are not entirely 
desirable in one who seeks God. 
Indeed, this attitude is taken even further and, although we find 
little of the overt conflict language which Baker uses elsewhere, the body 
comes to be perceived as a definite hindrance to progress in the spiritual 
life: "We have small reason to love the body, for it is that which one way 
or other is the cause of almost all the sins which the soul commits" (233). 
The body is particularly susceptible to the power of Satan "who has great 
dominion over our corporeal powers" (364, cf 327). 
I have already made reference in chapter 3 to a particular aspect of 
Platonic thought which views the body in a negative way. In some Christian 
circles this negative view was taken to extremes: a diabolic origin of the 
human body, a view attributed to the Manichaeans and Priscillians, was 
condemned at the Council of Braga in 561: Si quas plesmetlonem humenl 
corporis dieboli dicit esse figmentum, et concept ones in uteras metrum 
operibus dicit daemonum figurers ... anathema sit-3 But if the extreme 
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position is soundly condemned, there are, nevertheless, intermediate views 
that set up, albeit by implication, a conflict between body and soul or 
spirit. There is a strand in Holy Wisdom which adopts a Platonic line with 
regard to the body, remembering, of course, that Plato himself was not 
unequivocal on this issue. 
There are four main references that need detailed investigation. 
First, the opening words of the book tell us that God was moved by 
goodness "to create man after His own image and similitude, consisting of a 
frail earthly body, which is the prison of an Immortal, intellectual spirit" 
(3). The image of the body as the prison of the soul is clearly taught in 
the Platonic dialogues. "Pure were we, without taint of that prison house 
which now we are encompassed withal, and call a body. "° Viewing the body as 
a prison is very far from the integrated understanding of the human person 
which I have been arguing is a correct incarnat ional view. Indeed, it is 
difficult to see how it can be consistent with the article of faith, 
prominent in the earliest creeds, s about the resurrection of the body. It 
would be a strange idea to resurrect a prison and certainly the Greek 
philosophers would have rejected such a resurrection. ' Nevertheless, a few 
lines further on, Baker explicitly affirms his faith in the resurrection of 
the body, talking of "eternal beatitude both in soul and body in heaven" (3); 
the Platonic and credal strands are in conflict. 
If there were only one such reference in Holy Wisdom, we might view 
it as a maverick, but there are several others. "Self-love and pride may by 
mortification be subdued, " Baker says later, "yet as long as we are 
imprisoned in mortal bodies of flesh and blood, they will never be totally 
rooted out of us" (165). Once again we see implicit here the Platonic notion 
that the real "me" is other than my body which is not merely a neutral 
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package but a prison. 
Thirdly, the temptation to take pleasure in food and drink is such 
that "even the most perfect souls which have abandoned all other occasions, 
yet being imprisoned in bodies that need daily refection, are continually 
exposed to this" (230). Again we see the dualism of body and soul with the 
negative assessment of the body. 
Finally, in another place, although the prison image is not used, the 
body becomes an explicit enemy, in conflict with the soul. "The body being 
gross and lumpish cannot long endure that the soul, its companion, should 
remain in its proper exercise by which it becomes as it were a stranger to 
the body" (334). The clear implication here is that growth in the spiritual 
life should bring about an estrangement between soul and body, an 
estrangement that the body resists, but the enlightened soul seeks. This is 
the philosophy of the Phaedo rather than the theology of the Scriptures. 
Other hints of Platonic thought are to be found in Holy Wisdom: sense 
images in prayer are disparaged because they are merely "shadows of truth" 
(388). The very last words of the book see the end as an "intellectual 
heaven" (492). It may well be the case that these are common-place ideas in 
the patristic spiritual tradition, ' but in a sense it is such ideas that we 
are subjecting to critical scrutiny, through a critique of Baker. There 
seems to be little reference in the fathers to the notion of the body as 
the prison of the soul. e Origen may be exceptional and his view of the body 
as a fetter of the soul is condemned; ' the Origenist notion that human 
souls have fallen into bodies as a punishment for sin is anathematised by a 
canon promulgated at the second Council of Constantinople. ' 0 
The Platonic references in Baker serve to underline the fundamental 
conflict that we have already identified, and that conflict has at its roots 
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an implicit dualism that is here made explicit. They also express a 
disparagement of the body and bodily experience. 
F) Preliminary concluding remarks 
In chapter 4 we considered Baker's assumption of a conflict model in 
his discussion of the spiritual life. It would be untrue to say that this 
model is applied in any explicit or straight forwar : way to the relationship 
between the bodily and the spiritual. By and large, intense conflict 
language is avoided when talking about the body. In terms of practical 
asceticism there is a down-to-earth and balanced attitude. Nevertheless, the 
implication of the incarnational theology I have bý: --n advocating is that the 
body is not merely neutral but positive; it is essential to human experience 
and something to rejoice in. Baker never moves beyond the neutral: in fact, 
the underlying tone is negative. The strong sense of the superiority of the 
soul over the body has led to a disparagement of the body, We will consider 
further his attitude to the body in the next two sections which deal with 
two related issues: his theology of sickness and his angelism. 
g) A theology of sickness 
Holy Wisdom includes a chapter entitled "How prayer is to be 
practised in sickness" (III, 3,5) and there are several other references to 
physical sickness. We need to consider Baker's understanding of sickness and 
to see whether it throws further light on his attitude to the body and 
bodiliness. At least one reason for his interest in this topic must be the 
delicateness of his own health: Prichard's biography tells us that he was 
"almost all his life a weak and sickly man" and that this was not due to 
"indiscretion either in corporall or spirituell exercises. "' ' In addition we 
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should remember that Baker was writing in an awe when sickness was 
prevalent and there was little relief of pain. '-2 
The New Testament clearly portrays Jesus as a healer of the whole 
person, both bodily and spiritual. This understanding of healing passed into 
the early Church: the prayer of blessing of the oleum infirmorum, used in 
the Roman Catholic rite, probably derives from the bishop's Emitte prayer, 
recorded by Hippolytus in 197 AD: it prays that those anointed with the oil 
will be "made well again in body, mind and soul". ' 3 The Council of Trent 
sees spiritual healing as the primary purpose of the sacrament but 
acknowledges that the sick person may "sometimes regain bodily health, if 
this is expedient for the health of the soul. "' 4 The revised rite returns to 
a more integrated view of the human person: it emphasises that Christ was 
concerned for the well-being of the "whole person" (totum hominem); "the 
sacrament of anointing prolongs the concern which the Lord himself showed 
for the bodily and spiritual welfare of the sick. "' s This integrated 
approach accords with the incarnational theology that I have been 
advocating whereas Trent assumes a greater body/soul distinction and an 
evaluation in favour of the soul. 
Baker would certainly agree with the Tridentine position; what we 
need to consider is whether he goes further, in the direction of a negative 
assessment of bodily health. As I have already discussed in a previous 
section, for Baker, the moderate well-being of the body is important, not 
because it is good in itself but for the sake of the spiritual life. Thus, 
excessive spiritual activities and mortifications, which may damage the 
bodily health, are to be avoided (cf 96,462). When sickness does occur it 
may have several positive effects: it may bring an "ill liver" in the world 
to conversion (151); it tends to "drive a soul to seek and adhere to God" 
k 
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(417); bodily sickness may be a God-given means of spiritual health (421); 
it can be linked with the sufferings of Our Lord (429, a highly untypical 
point for Baker and one that is not taken any further in what might seem 
an appropriate context). His teaching on sickness cc : cludes: "it is certain 
that a soul cannot possibly have a firmer ground of assurance of eternal 
happiness than a sanctified use of sickness" (432). 
If he draws positive implications from his consideration of bodily 
sickness, we need now to assess whether he views it as a desirable or at 
least a neutral condition. At one point he comments on a possible conflict 
between bodily health and the good of the soul: he praises the perfect who 
"abstain ... ofttimes to some prejudice of health for the greater good of 
the soul. " Indeed, "a robustious health uninterrupted is not convenient to 
such a one" (67). 1 have already quoted in section e) Baker's reference to 
St Hildegarde: "The love of God doth not usually dwell in robust bodies" 
(232). He quotes Tauler, "that the condition of the dearest and most perfect 
servants of God is to have their souls full of the divine love and their 
bodies full of pains" (428). Even St Benedict "purposely made choice of 
unwholesome places to build his monasteries in, as being desirous that his 
religious should rather be infirm than robust" (428). Slightly grudgingly it 
seems, he admits "it cannot be denied that it is lawful and fitting for a 
sick person to desire and seek remedies proper in that case" (426), 
nevertheless, "it is nothing considerable, as in itself, whether the body 
have ease or no; all the matter is how it fares with the spirit" (427). 
Is Baker merely being extremely encouraging to those who are in fact 
sick? Is he even, as in the St Benedict reference, talking tongue in cheek? 
Whatever his purposes, we need to assess the impression he creates. Bodily 
health. "as in itself" (427), is not seen as positive and desirable; indeed, 
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it is rather detrimental to the spiritual life. Here he goes further than 
the implications of the Council of Trent. His position turns on a 
distinction, indeed, almost a conflict, between the bodily and the spiritual 
lives. His aim is the supremacy of the spiritual rather than the health of 
the whole person. His consideration of sickness, therefore, serves to 
support the conclusions we reached in the previous section. 
h) Angellsm 
For St Thomas Aquinas angels and humans are entirely different 
beings, one of the main differences being that the former are incorporeal' 6 
and do not have bodies as part of their nature: "Angels are not by nature 
conjoined with bodies. "" Despite Aquinas' further statement that "an 
intellectual substance which is not united with a body is more perfect than 
one which is, " we need to bear in mind the force of the opening of the 
letter to the Hebrews: "It was not to angels that God subjected the world 
to come" but to Christ the incarnate who will bring with him "many sons to 
glory. "' a The perfection of the human being is to be completely human, like 
Christ, not to be angelic. 
Nevertheless, there has been a tendency among some Christian 
spiritual writers to try to live the "angelic life" and this has sometimes 
been allied with a severe attitude to the body. 19 There are several 
references in Holy Wisdom to human beings striving to be like angels. One 
could not build a strong case on these references alone, but they need to 
be considered because they strengthen the conclusions I have already 
reached on Baker's attitudes to the body. 
For Baker, the contemplative life is "more sublime and perfect" than 
the active, because it is "more abstracted from the body ... and consequently 
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more angelical and divine" (12). It would be better for a human being to be 
free of the body and "like an angel": the soul would cry out "'0 Lord, free 
me from these my corporal necessities'; for were it not for them she might 
always, like an angel, be in constant contemplation" (234). The soul should 
strive to elevate itself above creatures to a mystical union which "is 
properly the exercise of angels ... Now in Holy Scripture our chiefest 
happiness and perfection are ... that we shall be like unto angels" (451, cf 
464,478). Baker may be thinking primarily of sharing in the exalted 
knowledge and understanding of angels, but very important for him is "to be 
elevated above the corporal organs and faculties" (453), indeed, "to be all 
spirit and, as it were, separated from the body" (490). On the other hand we 
might point out in his favour that nowhere does he relate his preference 
for the angelic to the belief that angels were sexless. 
This angelism is related to his Platonism which we discussed earlier 
in the present chapter. Once again there is the sense that the body is 
rather a nuisance and that it would be far more satisfactory if human 
beings could become angels. An implicit angelism runs throughout Holy 
Wisdom and represents one of the fundamental points of variance with the 
requirements of the incarnationalism developed in chapter 3. Its problem is 
that it undervalues embodied human personhood and attempts to locate 
holiness away from embodiment. We have seen something of this already in 
the previous sections dealing with the body: we shall meet it again as an 
attitude underlying Baker's understanding of the soul. 
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II THE SOUL 
1) The soul: introduction 
Soul is the central anthropological term in Holy Wisdom: it is used 
several hundred times in the course of the book. I have already discussed 
some Greek and Hebrew concepts of soul in chapter 3. The theological 
understanding in the west, as developed by Thomas Aquinas and witnessed by 
conciliar statements, moved away from any Platonic tendency to dualism in 
favour of an approach that showed Aristotelian influence. The terms "body" 
and "soul" were still used but with a greater integration than the use of 
the two separate substantives would suggest. As Timothy Suttor says in the 
introduction to his edition of Summa Theolog. iae la 75-83, "talk of 'body' 
and 'soul', which strongly suggest two things to us, colours a treatise 
which from beginning to end insists they are not two things but two sides 
of one single thing, a man. "2°' It is worth repeating here ideas developed in 
chapter 3, section g): for Aquinas, the soul is not the human person any 
more than the hand or the foot is the human person. "It was because Plato 
held that sensation belonged to the soul as such that he could speak of man 
as a soul using a body; " but in fact "it belongs to the very conception of 
'man' that he have soul, flesh and bone. " For Aquinas the soul is the form 
of the body: it communicates its own act of being to physical matter. 22 
That the soul is the form of the body is a position reiterated by official 
Church teaching: anyone who asserts quod substantia aninae ratlonalls seu 
intellective vere ac per se humani corporis non sit forma is in error. 23 
Later Church statements repeat this position. 2 
As I have already pointed out, Holy Wisdom does not use its terms 
with the precision that a philosopher would favour. Nevertheless, what I 
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will do in the following sections is to analyse Baker's use of soul and see 
whether his assumptions have implications that run contrary to the 
integration of the human person. Section j) will consider the view that the 
soul is the real person; sections k) and 1) will look respectively at the 
understanding of the soul as spirit and the distinction between the 
superior and inferior soul. 
j) The soul as the person 
In modern English we still use "soul" in some contexts to mean 
"person": examples are "poor soul" and "there's not a soul in sight. " If 
Baker's use of soul to mean "person" is simply following this rather vague 
usage then there need be no problem. He does use other terms to refer to 
the human person: "spiritual internal liver" (45,49,67,411), "Christian" 
(42,46,99,103), "religious person" (99, cf 109,123,184,194,232,235, 
285 etc), "subject" (100,101,410), God's servant (86,114). Whenever any of 
these is used he invariably accompanies it with the masculine pronoun. 
But the word he employs most frequently to refer to the human person 
is "soul": this is used several hundred times and always carries the 
feminine pronoun. Sometimes a combination of these terms reads rather 
strangely. A couple of examples will demonstrate this: Baker has mentioned 
"religious or spiritual persons" (183) and continues 
if such an one had not pursued an internal life, he would have 
perhaps enabled himself to quit one pleasure by diverting himself 
from thence to some other, which would have recompensed and 
satisfied for that loss ... ; whereas, in a spiritual life, a soul 
having in resolution abandoned all sensual pleasures ... she cannot 
recompense the bitterness ... (184) 
In a second example, he has been referring to "a secular devout person" who 
"may reap much benefit, applying to his own use so much of the spirit of 
159 
The Human Person: Individual 
religion as discretion will show to be fruitful to h: m ... " Then he suddenly 
shifts the "person" word and says "such a soul, thcýgh she be not obliged 
really and personally to withdraw herself from w ; rldly conversation ... " 
(111). 2S 
Although many of Baker's treatises were addre-Jsed to nuns, his use of 
the masculine in all other contexts proves that he is not using the 
feminine for soul because he is thinking of women. 26 In view of the fact 
that the Latin anima is feminine, his use of the feminine is 
understandable. 27 
It might be thought that Baker is using "soul" in a technical sense 
to mean something like "the individual person in relation to God, " that the 
feminine suggests passivity and that this is the appropriate attitude 
towards the divine initiative (at one point Baker refers to the spiritual 
person as "the patient" (426)). 2e But there are many occasions when "soul" 
means simply "person", as when he refers to the soul with "her habit (and) 
tonsure" (131) or "such ignorant tender souls (especially women)" (252) or 
"the death of well-willed or well-disposed souls" (23). In the following 
quotation "soul" is exactly equivalent to "Christian": "the duty of a 
Christian (much more of a soul that aspires to perfection) is to love 
nothing at all but God" (168). Examples of this usage could be multiplied. 
It seems that for Baker, the soul is the person: "wort if scat ions do regard 
the whole soul with all the faculties of it (and consequently the whole 
person)" (207). 
We will see in the next section that this is not the full story: 
running alongside this sense is a rather different understanding of soul. 
But what we need to note here is that using soul (always with the feminine 
pronoun) to represent "the whole person" moves the focus of personhood away 
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from the flesh-and-blood man or woman to something other than the 
bodily. -21 Given that "person" and all other equival_ t expressicns, such as 
the ones listed at the beginning of this section, are always referred to as 
masculine, the use of "soul" as feminine is at root unincarnational. In other 
words, his primary "person" word is not focussed on the masculine which, at 
that period, was customarily used to stand for man or woman, and he is 
certainly not making a feminist point in his use of "she" for the soul. 
Therefore, he has shifted the essence of personhood away from concrete 
embodiment and located it in a spiritualized "she". This move is entirely in 
accord with what I have called his evaluative dualism where the body is 
disparaged in comparison with the soul. 
k) The soul as spirit 
Although Baker constantly uses "soul" to mean the human person, there 
are many occasions when it is understood purely as something spiritual. At 
the beginning of Holy Wisdom he indirectly defines "soul" as "an immortal 
intellectual spirit" (3); this is supplemented later: "The soul being a pure 
spirit, consisting of mere activity, cannot cease doing and desiring 
something" (24). When he says that "we are imprisoned in mortal bodies of 
flesh and blood" (165), 30 the "we" presumably refers to the essential 
persons who are spiritual souls rather than a unity of body and soul. 
Nevertheless, Baker sometimes discusses souls as things that we 
possess rather than things that we are: "Good Christians endeavour to save 
their souls" (42, cf 118); "find out what thy soul would have thee do" (88). 
What seems to be the case is that Baker is operating with two fairly 
distinct senses of "soul": firstly, the word refers to the whole person; 
secondly, the word refers to the spiritual part of the person. There are 
¼ 
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many examples of each of these two usages. In addition, there are several 
references where the two senses are used in the same sentence without any 
apparent embarrassment on Baker's part: "souls ... cannot have any assurance 
of the state and inclinations of their souls" (29); "if the business concern 
herself and her own soul's good" (91, the "her" referring to a previous 
mention of soul); religious souls ... fly the sight of the world ... to purify 
their own souls" (121); the Divine Spirit will become "the very soul of our 
souls" (165 ). 31 
There is a parallel group of references where the second sense of 
"soul" is replaced by "spirit": "souls are directed ... without the least 
benefit of their spirit" (44); a soul is encouraged "to follow the directions 
of her own spirit" (48f); indeed, we must "spiritualize all the faculties of 
the soul, causing it to become a pure spirit" (181); "she will herself 
advance in spirit" (412). 
I have already suggested that the use of soul with the feminine 
pronoun for the human person displays an unincarnational tendency. The 
second major use with its emphasis on the spiritual and the desirability of 
increased spiritualization simply confirms this tendency. The shift that 
Baker seems to favour is not one from the spiritual to embodiment and 
hence complete human personhood, but from embodiment to increased 
spiritualization. His uses of soul suggest that for him the focus of 
personhood is not embodiment. 
1) The superior soul and the Inferior soul 
The soul may be "a pure spirit" (24) for Baker, but he assumes 
various distinctions when talking about it. Where Aquinas, following 
Aristotle's De Anlma, might talk of vegetative, sensitive and intellectual 
C 
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souls, -- Baker seems to view the soul as having two major "portions": He 
talks of the "superior and spiritual" and the "inferior and sensitive 
portion" (202 ). 11 These two "portions" are referred to in several places and 
ways: "the inferior grosser part of the soul" (152); "the sensual portion of 
the soul" (221); "the inferior soul" with its "sensitive appetite" and 
"imagination" in contrast to "the superior soul" (329). These "portions" are 
characterised by their particular faculties, the powers by which they act, 
faculties which have been depraved by the Fall (5,76). Although at one 
point he talks of "the three faculties of our souls" (78), elsewhere he 
hints that there are many faculties: eg "the soul in all its faculties" (79). 
Never explicit, he implies, nevertheless, that the faculties of the superior 
soul include will, understanding and reason, and of the inferior soul, 
imagination, memory and sensitive appetite (334). 34 
Baker mentions the "superior soul" many times in the course of Holy 
Wisdom. Its main faculty seems to be the will: at one point he seems to 
identify the two when he talks of sinful affections to creatures residing 
"in the superior soul or rational will" (168). It is desirable for the 
superior soul to repose above events in the inferior (206, cf 203) but also 
it must have dominion over the inferior: "the superior soul, whose office is 
to bridle and restrain sense" (231, cf 170); sin impairs the "due 
subordination of the sensitive faculties (the imagination, memory and 
appetite) to the superior soul" (334); in aspirations "the dominion that the 
superior soul has over (the interior senses and sensitive faculties) is now 
become very great" (463, cf 481 ). 
Indeed, the life of prayer should bring about a gradual emancipation 
of the superior soul from the sensual portion of the soul. All its 
operations become more spiritual (356,378,385f). In this context the 
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inferior soul is in close alliance witn the body which is a prison for the 
superior soul (421 etc). Is 
Baker will go even further than this and in the next section I will 
need to consider his understanding of spirit and of the notion, found in 
many mystical writers, of the "summity of the spirit". Although from a 
slightly different angle, his distinction between superior and inferior soul 
serves to strengthen the argument of the present chapter. A conflict does 
not here reside in a simple body/soul distinction: indeed there seems to be 
a close kinship between what is said of the body and of the inferior soul. 
But the urge for emancipation from the inferior and the implication that 
the inferior has little or nothing of value to contribute to the spiritual 
life as it ought to be, lead in the direction of a dis-integration of the 
human person. 
III THE SPIRIT 
m) Spirit 
We have already looked at the link between spirit and soul; in the 
present section we will need to consider in more detail Baker's 
understanding of "spirit". It would be valuable firstly, to consider the 
subsidiary ways in which he uses "spirit": sometimes he talks of "the 
humours and spirits of the body" (330,429,433, cf 232), material or quasi- 
material factors which underlie particular personalities. Occasionally, 
"spirits" are persons or personalities: "active spirits ... are no less 
harmful to a community than a lesser number of loose spirits (148, cf 52, 
142); "each several disposition must be put in a way suitable to the spirit 
of the party" (10, cf 124,372). He also uses the sense of "the spirit of an 
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institution", as in "the spirit of St Benedict's order" (121, cf 52,133, 
141). Finally, there are spiritual beings such as angels and the devil (eg 
34). All these uses, however, are secondary to the central theological use. 
Although there are occasions where soul is identified with spirit (eg 
3,11,24,39,406), it is far more common for a distinction to be drawn 
between them. Nor does Baker identify the superior soul with spirit. The 
spirit is the part of the human being which has particular affinity for God 
and which is essentially distinct from the corporal. For Baker, the end of 
the Christian life is quite clearly that the soul should be brought to 
"perfect union in spirit with God" (3,9,20,119,137,182,307,378 etc). 
But it is also clear that "the region of the spirit" is "a region exalted 
above nature" (19); sensible devotion may mount up to the spirit (122,325, 
328), but ultimately, Baker is more impressed by the condition where "the 
inferior soul seems to have no part at all in the actuations of the spirit 
towards God" (329). 
When Baker talks about the spiritual, the adjective he most 
frequently uses is "pure": external mortifications are "less pure and 
spiritual" (9, cf 33,121,123,124,182,320,331,333 etc). Indeed "the true 
judgment of a progress is to be made with reference principally to prayer, 
according to the increase in the purity and spirituality" (350). For Baker 
purity is the condition of being unmixed (with material or sensible 
concerns). 
Baker's model for the human person seems to place the soul, with its 
superior and inferior portions, at the centre: the superior reaches to the 
spirit and the inferior to the body. The soul is almost invariably feminine 
while the spirit and the body, where pronouns are used, tend to be "it" (eg 
312). This tripartite arrangement is clearly stated at one point: "Now the 
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peculiar virtue by which all harmful inconveniences either to the body or 
spirit may be avoided, is that supernatural discretion by which a soul is 
enabled to hold a mean" (434). By "mean" he means a balance between 
excessive spiritual or corporal mortifications). But there is an evaluation 
built in, where the focus of personhood is shifted in the direction of the 
spirit: with reference to Hebrews 4: 12, Baker claims that it is desirable "to 
spiritualize all the faculties of the soul, causing it to become a pure 
spirit, exalted and separated from sensible objects ... This is that division 
of the soul and spirit mentioned by St Paul, by which the pure spirit works 
as a spirit, not obscured nor infected with sensual ends and interests" 
(181). 
Despite occasional language suggesting integration ("to draw sensitive 
nature upward into the spirit" (328)), conflict, or at least escape, remains 
the most obvious model: sensible fervour depresses the operations of the 
spirit (323); exercises in spirit may run contrary to bodily strength (154); 
"the soul ... is so elevated in spirit that she seems to be all spirit, and, 
as it were, separated from the body" (490). There is a constant urge 
towards the "spiritualizing and purification of the spirit" (295). 
Spirit, for St Paul, may be a powerful symbol of the divine principle 
within the human person, but it does not necessarily stand in contrast to 
the body or the senses? Baker's constant tendency is to spiritualize, with 
the basic presumption that being incarnate is not really a desirable 
condition. We now need to consider another level of his understanding of 
spirit, the notion of "the supreme point", and its compatibility with 
incarnational theology. 
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n) The supreme point of the spirit 
The notion of the supreme point of the spirit occurs frequently in 
mystical writings and perhaps has neoplatonic root S. 3-7 Different words are 
used for it by various mystical authors. Where Eckhart used "spark" (funke 
der seelen), "bottom", (boden) or "top" (tolden), Tauler, whose work Baker 
knew well, preferred "ground" (grunt, sometimes boden or dot ten). ='e Indeed 
this mystical theory involved Baker in controversy; several chapters of 
Prichard's biography are dedicated to it. 3'3 The "ground" was humorously 
nicknamed "fundus Thaulericus, Thaulerus his fund"40 or "Tauler's bottom". 
St Teresa and St John of the Cross used "centre". 11 Authors with whom Baker 
is more closely associated, such as Barbanson, Harphius and Benet Canfield, 
have the notion of "fine point of the soul". 4" In summing up, the 
Dictionnaire suggests that authors who emphasize contemplation prefer words 
associated with the basic idea of "summit"; when they place the emphasis on 
passivity, they prefer words associated with the idea of "ground". "3 Such a 
summarizing of the subject may well be open to question, but that need not 
concern us for the purposes of the present discussion. 
When we come to Holy Wisdom we find that Baker uses several names: 
"supreme portion of the spirit" (14), "supreme point of the spirit" (15), 
"depth and centre of the spirit" (15,295), "pure top of the spirit" (121, cf 
415,456,461). He speaks of God dwelling in the purest summit of man's 
spirit (120) and of prayer not piercing deep enough into the spirit (132, cf 
303,332,337,400). He talks of "the summity of the spirit" (351) and of 
"the centre of the spirit beyond all her (the soul's) faculties" (485). 
In all these references he does not seem to be particularly aware of 
any distinction between height, depth or centre, but uses the metaphors 
indiscriminately. This "place" is at the extreme of the "superior spirit" 
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(415,443). God is most perfectly encountered "above both the understanding 
and will" (faculties of the superior soul), "namely, in that supreme portion 
of the spirit which is visible to God alone, and in which He alone can 
inhabit; a portion so pure, noble, and divine, that it neither hath nor can 
have any name proper to it, though mystics endeavour to express it by 
divers, calling it the summit of the mind, the fund and centre of the 
spirit, the essence of the soul, its virginal portion, etc" (478). The soul 
who has gone far in the spiritual life is able "by experience to make a 
division between the supreme portion of the spirit and inferior nature, yea, 
between the summity of the spirit and the faculties of the same; for that 
portion of her by which she cleaves to God seems to be another third 
person distinct from herself" (486). 
It is not easy to comment on a supposed "portion" of the human 
person that "neither hath nor can have any name proper to it. " Faculty 
language of the will or understanding can be unpacked in terms of what the 
human person can do and therefore might be generally understood. Even soul 
and spirit language may be necessary for discussing religious consciousness 
and the fact that the spiritual cannot be entirely reduced to the material. 
I have argued for an integrated understanding of the human person but even 
so cannot avoid some language of duality. With regard to the "fund", 
however, it is difficult to avoid sharing the scepticism of Baker's 
contemporary critics. 
What Baker emphasizes about the "fund" or "summity" is the gap 
between it and the ordinary faculties of the person, the willing, 
understanding, sensing and imagining and so on. So great is the gap that 
this exalted "portion" "seems to be another third person distinct from 
herself". If the "fund", understood in this sense, is the very centre of 
1. 
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personhood then the unity of the incarnate person is undermined. If the 
"fund" is the place where the human person most perfectly meets God, then 
God is less perfectly met in the ordinary bodiliness, which, consequently, is 
less graced and less valuable. Baker's teaching on the "supreme point of the 
spirit" serves to strengthen the case we are building up in this chapter. 
But to avoid a peremptory dismissal of the concept, we should perhaps 
consider it further, The "spark of the soul" is notoriously difficult to 
explain. Frank Tobin offers a detailed discussion of the notion as used by 
Eckhart. °° He writes: "It is not without reason that there is confusion 
surrounding this doctrine ... inconsistencies and apparent contradictions 
abound. "d5 He wonders at the end whether we are dealing with something 
philosophical or something experiential or mystical. 16 It has been suggested 
that the spark could be the focus of integration of the human person and 
thus not run counter to incarnational theology. This view is apparently 
taken by Julian of Norwich °7 and, more relevantly for our purposes, is 
hinted at in Tauler's writings. he talks of the need for "a gathering up, an 
inward recollection of faculties without any dispersal, for in unity lies 
strength ... For just as all the branches of a tree spring from one trunk, 
so also must all powers of the soul be gathered up within its ground. " 
Baker's wide-ranging and apparently indiscriminate use of the various 
terms and his idea of the "third person" suggest that he does not exploit 
this potential integration. In view of Tobin's remarks we may be led to ask 
whether the "supreme point" is a logical postulate, necessitated by a sense 
of the desirability of integration and by a need to specify a locus for the 
action of the divine on the human; the latter important, perhaps, because 
the spiritual authors cannot quite accept the appropriateness of God 
working directly on the flesh and blood person. A second explanation is that 
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the stumbling talk about the "supreme point" is an attempt to articulate an 
"ineffable" experience which only mystics have. We might object to the 
cerebral nature of the first explanation and the elitism of the second. 
Furthermore, examination of actual mystics indicates the problematical 
nature of this notion of ineffability. 
Even if we reject "supreme point" language and use the vaguer and 
less substantive "unity" (as, for example, "God operates primarily in the 
unity of the human person"), we are still left with the various inner 
conflicts, the strict hierarchy, the spiritualizing tendencies. Thus, I would 
suggest that the notion of the supreme point of the spirit, at least in 
Baker, does not enable a rapprochement with incarnational theology. 
IV FACULTIES OF THE SOUL 
o) The faculties of the soul 
We have already noted that Baker's anthropological language includes 
the term "faculties" (or "powers"). Faculty psychology is at least as old as 
Augustine. Aquinas developed the subject; 49 his term "power" may be defined 
as "an inborn ability or 'faculty' to conduct a kind of operation. "s° This 
way of discussing the activity of the human person was taken for granted 
in Baker's period. 61 
Holy Wisdom is not very explicit as to what the individual faculties 
actually are, although it refers to the "three faculties of our souls" (78); 
these, it seems, are the faculties of the superior soul. s2 Certainly they 
include understanding and will to which Baker refers throughout Holy 
Wisdom. Memory, Augustine's third, is referred to only once, and then, with 
Imagination and appetite, as one of "the sensitive faculties" which stand in 
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contrast to the superior soul (334). Baker is certainly aware of Augustine-'s 
three: in his commentary on the Cloud of Unknowing he writes: "Other 
authors express the powers of the superior soul by the names of memory, 
understanding, and will; but our author uses the terms understanding, reason 
and wi11; "1ue he continues: "the power which others call memory our author 
calls understanding, and that which others call understanding our author 
calls reason. "E4 Elsewhere he explicitly refers to "the powers of the 
superior soul, viz. memory, will and understanding. "" 
Low tells us that "in Baker's published writings there is only one 
significant reference to memory, a quotation from the the works of 
Harphius. "s6 I have already pointed out that Baker recognizes variation in 
vocabulary: while he quotes Harphius with approval, he does not necessarily 
adopt his usage. In Holy Wisdom, he refers to the mind several times 
(indeed, for him, real prayer is mental prayer), but the will and the 
understanding are the powers of the superior soul with which he constantly 
deals. 
In this present section I shall make some general remarks about the 
faculties, and shall then proceed in the following sections to consider them 
individually. 
As always, the contamination of the human race began at the fall 
when "miserable depravations" were caused in all the powers and faculties 
of the soul (5). The whole person, consequently, is "universally depraved" 
(207,209). The superior and inferior souls each have their own faculties: 
those of the former are sometimes called "the superior rational faculties" 
(177) or simply "superior faculties" (184). Those of the inferior soul are 
called "the imaginative and discursive faculties" (14), "the sensible 
faculties" (87), "corporal or sensitive faculties" (280), or sometimes simply 
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"inferior faculties" (334). 
Although grace is "a certain divine principle or faculty" and "the 
virtue thereof extends itself through all the faculties of the soul" (76), 
its work of counteracting the depravations occurs primarily in the three 
faculties of the superior soul, whence it spreads "throughout the whole 
mass" (78). The faculties form an arena for the conflict between grace and 
depravation but a deeper conflict is also suggested, namely, that between 
the inferior faculties and the superior: the inferior faculties "do strive to 
depress the spirit" (334); they "ofttimes do resist our superior reason" 
(203). The superior soul strives to subordinate the sensitive faculties 
(334). 
At root there is a "dis-integration" of the faculties: while all the 
faculties may be disordered, Baker discusses the condition where the 
inferior are in disorder and the superior in peace and harmony (202). 
Admittedly, a better situation would be for the harmony to permeate all the 
faculties, but the conflict does not make this easy. 
Finally, as we have already seen in the previous section, there is a 
sort of union in the summity of the spirit, "beyond all her faculties" (485) 
when the soul operates "without any perceptible use of her faculties" (486). 
But as I suggested in that section, Baker does not seem to exploit any 
potential this concept may have as the focus of integration. 
Faculty language need not contradict incarnational theology: the 
human person does operate in different ways and talk of willing, 
understanding, imagining and so forth may be a convenient way of describing 
it. But to establish a conflict among these powers and to see them as 
operating independently of each other to such an extent seems to go against 
the completeness and unity of the human person. 
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In the next three sections I shall consider Baker's portrayal of the 
imagination (an inferior faculty), the understanding and the wt: l (superior 
faculties) to see how they relate to incarnational theology. 
p) The imagination 
We have already seen in the previous chapter how the imagination, one 
of the sensitive faculties (334), is drawn into the conflict model. Here we 
need to consider whether Baker's assessment of it is entirely negative. 
It is clear that the imagination has a part to play in the life of 
prayer. Baker observes that "mystic authors" have divided the spiritual life 
in several ways; he quotes two or three of these before presenting his own 
division (350f). For him the first degree is "discoursive prayer or 
meditation" (351); the vast majority of "souls" start in this degree and 
"active livers" as opposed to those called to contemplative ways might well 
stay there: "the exercises of the active livers are much in the imaginative 
and discursive faculties of the soul, so is likewise their union" (14). While 
their meditation "will grow more and more pure" it will "never... exclude a 
direct use of the imagination" (375). Active livers are constantly the prey 
of "vain images of distracting things" (363) so one great value of forming 
religious images is to counteract the worldly ones: the aim of such souls 
should be "to wipe out ... the vain images contracted abroad by 
superinducing or painting over them new and holy images" (363, cf 354). The 
purpose of such images is to generate affections to God (361). 
But the imagination is essentially unstable (203,236,336, cf 310); 
at times it refuses to present suitable images (329); it is not easily 
subject to reason (248). There is a deeper problem associated with it. the 
distinct images it presents will need to be rejected by the soul because 
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they are imperfect shadows of truth (388): there is a distinctly Platonic 
flavour here. So the use of the imagination is a dangerous though perhaps 
necessary stage through which the contemplative soul must pass: the aim of 
the soul is to exclude all manner both of sensible and intellectual images 
(359); indeed contemplative prayer is better than discursive because it 
transcends all operations of the imagination (12). As prayer progresses it 
becomes increasingly emancipated from the imagination (357f, 375,388,403, 
442). The ideal condition would be for there to be no use of the 
imagination at all, but that, Baker admits, is inconsistent with being in the 
body (458). What can be achieved is the successive "purification and 
spiritualizing" of images (358). 
How are we to assess Baker's discussion of the role of the 
imagination? We have already seen that he places it in the arena of 
conflict. But he also sees it as having a positive function in the early 
stages of prayer. Nevertheless, he is far more aware of its dangers than of 
its strengths; it is rooted in the senses (cf 97,121,31 1)67 and stirs up 
sensuality (388). Indeed, it is rooted in bodiliness: Baker urges the value 
of "spiritual prayer" ... "elevating his mind to God to transcend all bodies 
and bodily images ... Happy is the soul that when she prays empties herself 
entirely of all images" (313). It may well be the case that any worthwhile 
spiritual goal is ultimately beyond our present reach; nevertheless, the 
favouring of a condition, or the struggle to reach a condition that Baker 
acknowledges to be impossible for incarnate human beings (458, quoted 
above) is hardly a recommendation of his spirituality. Of course, the 
"revolving of images" (236) does have its negative side: the images may be 
unworthy or "sinful" (eg 236,246); they may provide an escape from the 
world of real experience into one of make-believe; in the prayer context 
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"distinct and express images" (355) or "grosser images" (10,71,357), such 
as viewing God as an old man with a beard, are limited and limiting. What 
Baker seems to be suggesting is that in prayer we should be moving beyond 
the use of metaphor and model. This point of view finds. support in the 
"abyss of unknowing" in the apophatic tradition. -'-t, Baker may have that 
tradition in mind. But, while his warnings perhaps have some value, he 
seems, as in other areas, to overstep the mark and to create a rather 
negative impression of the imagination. This impression is created both by 
the content of what he says and by the imagery in which he expresses it. 
His spiritualizing attitude to the imagination and his disparagement of its 
value suggests a fundamental inadequacy in his Christian anthropology. 59 
q) The understanding 
Baker associates the understanding with both the imagination and the 
will. Thus, in some ways, it is a bridging faculty. His language and 
assumptions are reminiscent of Aquinas: "But the proper activity of the 
soul, which is to understand by means of images, cannot take place without 
the body. For the soul understands nothing without imagery, and there is no 
imagery apart from the body; "'-cl again, "we cannot will anything unless given 
an understanding of it. 161 Baker often takes understanding with reason. 
These are related by Aquinas: "Reason and understanding cannot be distinct 
powers in man ... the relation of reasoning to understanding is that of 
motion to rest ... the first is of the incomplete, the second of the 
complete. "32 
For Baker, the understanding, unlike the imagination, is an entirely 
neutral faculty; it is linked with the imagination in bringing precedent 
motives for meditation (330); indeed, quoting St Augustine, "all good 
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proceeds from the understanding as its first principle" (450f). The 
understanding is stored with good motives (362); the understanding and not 
the imagination receives divine "illustration" (89f, cf 6,86,87). While 
Baker is often negative about the imagination, he is rarely so on the 
several occasions when he links it with the understanding. Nevertheless the 
imagination may hinder the understanding (311). The understanding has a 
natural vast capacity (3); it is "our only director" (243). 
Despite this positive appreciation of the function of the 
understanding, the faculty will be superseded. Although understanding and 
will are linked together: "the understanding contemplating and admiring God 
.., the will adoring and obeying" (164), nevertheless, "whatsoever the 
understanding operates with reference to God can produce no good effect 
upon the soul further than it hath relation to and influence on the will" 
(387). It is the paidagogos or tutor of the will. Prayer for the 
contemplative will become "pure prayer of the will without any perceivable 
help or concurrence of the understanding" (336, cf 310,366,384); the will 
has little by little gained ground on the understanding and leaves it behind 
(375,383). 
I shall not comment at this point about Baker's way of dealing with 
the faculty of understanding, but shall go on immediately to consider the 
will. 
r) The will 
For Baker the will is the sovereign faculty, the soul's "principle 
faculty, and, indeed, all in all" (336). If he is to place the centre of the 
human personality in one of its faculties it is in the will. 63 
He draws a distinction between the "superior will", an expression he 
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uses many times, and "our natural carnal wills" (167). The former is a 
faculty of the superior soul and is "spiritual" (90,385) and "rational" 
(168,388). When Baker uses plain "will", he means the superior will, and I 
shall follow this usage. The will, like the other faculties, was depraved 
through the fall (4f), nevertheless, "it cannot be replenished with any 
object of goodness less than infinite" (3). Twice Baker insists that "all 
merit and demerit lies in the superior will, and not at all in sensuality 
considered in itself, and as divided from the will" (203, cf 420). The 
fundamental orientation towards God is found here and prayer is centred 
here. 
Baker uses the expression "heart" several times and, as in biblical 
anthropology, it of ten means more or less the same as will: He talks of "the 
prayer of heart or will" (310, cf 11,313). At other times it complements 
the will: for example, he speaks of a soul "tending to God and working 
almost only with the heart and blind affections of the will" (12). 
The second degree of prayer for Baker is "the prayer of forced 
immediate acts or affections of the will" (351). He distinguishes acts, 
which "are made in and by the superior will only" from affections which 
"begin at the first almost wholly in inferior nature" (385). The "more 
sublime exercise" is the immediate act of the will (370) and the will is 
several times described as "a blind faculty" (364, cf 356). 
Baker's teaching on prayer presupposes a definite hierarchy of 
faculties: in the earliest stages, the senses and imagination are used, but 
these must soon be superseded, having fed the understanding; the 
understanding in turn feeds the will which is the principal "organ" of 
prayer; gradually the will is emancipated from the understanding "till at 
last the prayer becomes entirely of the will" (383). In this condition "we 
177 
The Human Person: Individual 
love with the whole possible extension of our wills" (451); their operations 
are "most purely spiritual" (456); indeed, the will is transformed: "so 
wholly possessed and inflamed with divine love ... that it is become like 
fiery burning steel, clean through shining with this fire. It is now a will 
deiform, and in a manner deified" (464). In this state the whole person has 
reached a most exalted condition (465). The highest condition of all, 
however, as we have seen, is the union which "passes above both the 
understanding and will ... in that supreme portion of the spirit" (478). 
Baker's understanding of the will may go some way towards providing 
a point of integration of the human person. Nevertheless, our consideration 
of the faculties leads us in the same direction as our discussion of the 
body and the soul: the more spiritual something is, the more detached from 
ordinary bodiliness, the better it is. While union with God in will may have 
happy effects in the whole person, closer adherence to the truths of the 
Catholic faith (479), greater virtue (465) and so on, the locus of union 
never seems to be the whole person, but a spiritual portion. This suggests 
a deficiency from the perspective of incarnational theology. 
s) The mind 
To complete our survey of Baker's understanding of the psychological 
make-up of the human person, we need to glance at his use of the 
expression "mind", In the Cloud of Unknowing "mind" is the word used for 
the principle power of the soul. 6 According to James Walsh, "'Mind' (is) the 
word used to translate Augustine's memoria. "bs Later manuscripts of The 
Cloud altered "mind" to "memory", no doubt to bring it in line with 
Augustine. °° Baker's commentary on The Cloud seems to be rather confused at 
this point and he does not mention "mind" at x11.67 
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In Holy Wisdom "mind" is used rather vaguely without any obvious 
technical meaning. In the broadest sense it seems to be a sort of "location" 
where the soul's faculties of imagination and understanding act. Thus it 
entertains thoughts and images: he talks of "imaginations and thoughts as 
rest in the mind alone" (246, cf 199,249). But it is not a passive 
receptacle: it is at the centre of the activity of prayer. Baker defines 
prayer as "an elevation of the mind to God, or more largely and expressly 
thus: prayer is an affectuous actuation of an intellective soul towards God" 
(299). Mental prayer is the only true prayer and as soon as the mind 
wanders the prayer ceases (313). The "mentality" of prayer is central to 
Baker's understanding (315).,: -0 For effective prayer the mind must be in a 
condition of patience, tranquillity and peace (23,92,486). 
For Baker the mind is closely related to the understanding and the 
will. In fact in many references it seems to be equivalent to understanding. 
This picks up a Thomistic sense: "the principle of understanding ... is 
called mind or intellect. "r-9 Thus, like the understanding, the mind is 
discussed using images of enlightening: "Supernatural light illustrates 
man's mind" (3); "secret whispers enlighten the mind" (478, cf 328). It is 
the mind that contemplates God (3,4,333,445,450). At one place an 
identification seems to be suggested: any "employment the mind or 
understanding exercises" is preliminary because real prayer "is only and 
immediately exercised by the will" (301). 
This close link with the understanding is supported by the fact that 
the mind is often mentioned with the will or heart: "troubles in heart and 
passions in mind" (44,313); in prayer "the mind and superior will are 
wholly abstracted and elevated above nature" (166, cf 168); "a ... reposeful 
operation of the mind ... with the whole bent of the will" (450, cf 289, 
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316). Indeed, Baker's frequent use of the expression "well-minded souls" (eg 
107,146,179,184,203,216,251,264,383 etc) which seems to mean "of 
good will" - (he occasionally uses "well-willed", eg 23) - suggests that 
there may be an even closer link between the functions of mind and of will. 
In fact the mind is sometimes treated as a faculty: the quotation 
above (450) refers to its "operation" and elsewhere Baker talks of "the 
disposition of the spiritual soul (that is, the judgment of the mind and 
resolution of the will" (293). He tells us "God ... is alone exposed to all 
the faculties of the soul, to be contemplated by the mind, embraced by the 
will ... " (445 ). 
Finally, it should be noted that for Baker, the mind stands in 
contrast, if not opposition, to the body. He talks of "the indispositions ... 
either of our complexions or minds" (197). The complexion is, of course, the 
individual's character based on the combination of bodily humours. "Motions 
in the body" may influence the operation of the mind (249) but each may go 
its own way: even when the body is exhausted "the mind or will should never 
be weary or backward, but remain ever invincible, forcing inferior nature to 
comply" (289). This, of course, is not to deny that we can be mentally tired. 
Our consideration of Baker's use of mind has been necessary to 
complete our picture of his understanding of the psychological make-up of 
the human person. We have already noted that he is not particularly 
rigorous in his terminology and his assumptions about the mind do not 
generate any new contribution to the argument of this chapter. We should 
simply note that his emphasis on the mental and the "mentality" of prayer 
is at the expense of bodiliness and of the whole person. Thus our 
discussion in this section serves to strengthen the general progress of the 
argument. 
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t) General summary and conclusion 
The various strands of my argument will be drawn together in the 
concluding chapter. In the present context I will simply offer some remarks 
arising from this discussion of Baker's theory of the human person as an 
individual. We must remember from the start that he does not have an 
original or a systematic philosophy of the human person. Much of what he 
thinks must be read between the lines or from the language and imagery he 
employs. It is clear that he makes his assumptions and draws his 
terminology from the theological and spiritual context in which he lives. 
While he remains an individual and while he brings his personality and 
experience to bear on a range of spiritual language and influences that he 
shares with others, he is nevertheless a reorderer, clarifier and passer-on, 
rather than an innovator. This is not to deny the freshness and challenge 
of some of his emphases ; 70 nevertheless, as I argued in chapter 2, a 
critique of Baker is a critique of more than Baker. 
In the present chapter I considered the way Baker fits the body into 
his anthropological scheme. Despite practical suggestions about 
mortification which are moderate in tone, his prevailing understanding is 
characterized by a sense of the inferiority of the body. Sometimes his 
comments are overtly negative, as in his references to the body as a prison; 
at other times it is the tone of his language that suggests a disparaging 
attitude. Beneath all this is the ideal of angelism. Such a view clearly 
conflicts with the value which incarnational theology places on embodiment. 
Baker's discussion of the soul is more complex. A crudely understood 
body/soul distinction is not really at the centre of his thought at all: the 
distinctions he draws are much more subtle. He sees the person as having a 
higher and a lower part and these terms are used evaluatively as well as 
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descriptively. The body tends to be associated with the lower, the soul 
straddles the two and the spirit and its summity are in the higher. The 
powers of the soul are scattered across the higher and the lower. This 
hierarchy inevitably places more value on the higher with an underlying 
disparagement of the lower, a disparagement that sometimes becomes overt 
hostility. 
For Baker real personhood is centred in the spiritual, away from the 
incarnate state of psycho-somatic unity, and it is there that God is 
encountered. Hence there is the constant drive away from experience in the 
bodily. The aim is emancipation from the body and the inferior soul by way 
of a gradual spiritualization. The greatest value is placed on the spirit 
and value is inversely proportional to bodiliness. 
This summary is sketchy and lacks the more nuanced approach of the 
various sections of the chapter. In those sections I indicated the several 
ways in which Baker's view conflicts with incarnational theology. His 
concept of the human person is at variance with the principles established 
in chapter 3, primarily for the following reasons: firstly, his evaluative 
dualism of the spiritual and the bodily; secondly, his location of personhood 
away from embodiment; thirdly, the consequent lack of an integrated 
understanding of the human person; and finally, the spiritualizing impetus 
towards a largely though not exclusively covert angelism. 
These factors suggest that Baker's theory of the individual does not 
really accord with the requirements of incarnational theology. In the 
following chapter we shall consider the human person as a social being and 
see how far Baker's assumptions are in agreement with the social 
implications of the incarnational theology developed in chapter 3. 
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THE HUMAN PERSON: SOCIAL 
a) Introduction 
Chapter 5 dealt with the human person as an individual and showed 
that Augustine Baker's anthropology runs into problems when measured 
against incarnational theology. Although Baker is primarily interested in 
the spiritual life of the individual soul rather than in the communal life 
of Christians, he tacitly acknowledges that, to a greater or lesser degree, 
the former takes place in a social context. That the Christian life is 
social is an uncontrovertible fact, strongly re-emphasized by the second 
Vatican Council. Collectively, we form the body of Christ, St Paul tells us, 
and throughout the New Testament there is emphasis on the social 
obligations and unity of Christians. Thus arose the related doctrines of the 
church and sacraments, the theory and practice of communal prayer and 
liturgy, and the religious life. 
Baker's teaching is directed essentially to women and men, perhaps 
more to the former, who live in monastic communities. While he may be 
taking a lot for granted with regard to the social dimension of life, he has 
a certain amount to say about it, albeit often in passing. Modern members 
of Baker's English Benedictine Congregation will always be interested in the 
way he deals with the divine office and the common life. 
I have already mentioned, in chapter 2, the fact that those who have 
discussed Baker, from his own day to the present, have felt the need to 
single out and defend his approach to the social dimension of the Christian 
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life. As I showed there, their conclusions, to a greater or lesser extent, 
are in Baker's favour: he does not stray into what Catholic critics would 
consider to be unorthodox. My own conclusions will be less favourable. 
In the present chapter I shall consider his position on a number of 
issues: the church, the sacraments and the liturgy, the divine office and 
the communal life. I shall also consider the way he views various 
relationships: with Christ, with the superior, with the spiritual director. 
Then I shall look at his understanding of friendship and of women before 
concluding with a glance at the themes of the golden age and the goal of 
the human person. My conclusion will be that his teaching is too much 
focussed on the individual: not only is human personhood over- 
spiritualized, as I showed in the previous chapter, but it is also 
insufficiently anchored in its present context of social relationships, 
activities and responsibilities. 
Social relationships presuppose bodiliness; it is reasonable to 
believe that Baker's limited emphasis on the social dimension is related to 
his spiritualizing tendency. The inadequacies which I will identify in the 
course of the present chapter point back to and confirm the deficiencies 
discussed in chapter 5. 
I CHURCH AND SACRAMENTS 
b) The Church 
When Baker talks about the Church, he invariably means the Roman 
Catholic Church; this position is entirely in accordance with the Roman 
ecclesiology which would culminate in the definitions of the first Vatican 
Council. Indeed, it would be surprising if Baker, a convert to Rome in the 
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Reformation period, were to hold any other view. He mentions the Church 
twenty odd times in the course of Holy Wisdom and a fairly consistent 
picture emerges. 
The religious life about which he is concerned is seen as firmly 
located within the Church: this form of life is "the most happy, quiet and 
secure ... of any in God's Church" (114). The spiritual life of 
contemplatives, however remote from the concerns of ordinary Christians, 
must always conform carefully to what the Church ordains (133). Indeed, 
instruction in the fundamental doctrines of the Catholic faith is a sine qua 
non for progress in prayer (cf 13,63, cf 32). Baker assures us that one of 
the results of passive union is "a most firm clear assurance and 
experimental perception of those verities of Catholic religion which are the 
objects of our faith" (479). In talking of "supernatural passive union", he 
says that even Catholics, if they be inexperienced in internal ways, will 
find it difficult to understand, but that "out of the Catholic Church no 
such graces and communications were ever heard of" (481). 
If contemplative prayer is rooted in the Catholic faith, it, in turn, 
brings blessings on the Church (140,296). But this benefit is spiritual: 
nevertheless, Baker acknowledges that monks were, in the past, drawn from 
their manual labour and prayer to answer the Church's missionary and 
pastoral needs, and that this was God's will (138). He includes a chapter (I, 
3,10) "Of the apostolical mission into England", but such missionary 
activity is certainly not something to seek out. Rather, he quotes 
favourably St Anthony who discouraged his monks from frequenting crowded 
churches and from bringing non-monks into their chapels, and St Stephen of 
Grammont who forbade his religious to have public churches or to join 
confraternities. Clearly, Baker has reservations about participating in 
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ordinary Church life. 
For Baker there is no speculation about the nature of the Church: 
admittedly, he does not set himself this task. Rather, a model of the Church 
is taken for granted and this model is an institutional one. As Baker's 
contemporary, Cardinal Robert Bellarmine affirmed, the Church is a society 
"as visible and palpable as the community of the Roman people, or the 
Kingdom of France, or the Republic of Venice. "' This institution carries a 
juridical and theological authority to which Baker bows without question. 
Only once does he see the Church in a different light, as a healer: "if ... 
thou stumble and perhaps fall down, and get some harm thereby ... get up 
again and return into the right way, using such remedies for thy hurt as 
the Church ordains" (37), but here the context is the parable of the 
pilgrim, a long quotation from Walter Hilton. --3 Baker does not dwell on New 
Testament models: his ecclesiology is essentially the standard Roman 
ecclesiology of his contemporaries. 
c) The sacraments 
I have already considered, in chapter 3, the place of the sacraments 
in incarnational theology. They show the principle of the incarnation by 
embodying divine power in material form and human action. As Christ himself 
is the "sacrament of encounter with God, ", ' so the church, his body, is the 
sacrament of Christ; this body acts through the celebration of the 
individual sacraments. As expressions of the church, they are essentially 
social in nature. 
During the middle ages, the belief in seven sacraments became 
general; it was affirmed in 1439 at the Council of Florences and again at 
Trent. s In Holy Wisdom only four of the seven sacraments are mentioned, 
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namely, and in order of frequency, confession, the eucharist, orders and 
baptism. 
Baker accepts that through the sacraments the Holy Spirit is 
communicated to us (6) and that they renew grace removed by sin (7). An 
ordinary Christian life will involve reception of the sacraments and this 
principle is taken for granted by Baker. Nevertheless, he is neutral rather 
than enthusiastic about them and when he does discuss them, he is more 
concerned to state dangers than positive effects. I will consider this point 
in more detail at the end of the present section. 
Baker's attitude is summed up in a paragraph in which he explicitly 
states the Tridentine position and gives full references: firstly, the 
sacraments do convey grace ex opere opera to; secondly, they do so at all 
times and to all persons that duly receive them; but thirdly, "the quantity 
and measure of the said grace is ... said to be ... according to the peculiar 
disposition and co-operation of each person respectively. " The correct 
disposition is brought about by the practice of internal prayer (294, cf 
256). 
Excessive reception can produce irreverence (150); tepid reception can 
merely increase hardness of heart (151). In fact, people do not enter 
monasteries for "the use of the sacraments; nor for hearing of sermons" 
(119) because these things can be done just as well outside. The end of the 
religious life is "not to enjoy the sacraments" (257). We shall see in a 
later section that Baker constantly praises the golden age of the past when 
the religious fervour was so much greater than in the present, and this in 
spite of the fact that there is "far greater frequentation of sacraments in 
these days above the ancient times" (139). Indeed, "it is not ... the external 
practice of virtues, nor much less customary frequent confessions, 
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communions ... but pure spiritual prayer ... that must ... bring a soul to a 
state of perfect freedom" (182). 
Now it may be argued that Baker takes the sacramental system and its 
positive effects for granted. He does not overtly deny the importance of 
the sacraments as an essential part of the Christian life. Indeed, he 
specifically disowns the Euchitae (another name for the Messalians) who 
"condemned all other things besides prayer, despising the sacraments" (315). 
At the period in which he wrote the sacraments may have been viewed in a 
somewhat mechanical way rather than as rich community celebrations of the 
incarnate power of God. Baker's remarks suggest an impatience with the 
mechanical approach: indeed, Justin McCann sees Baker's teaching as being 
opposed to "the dominant spirituality of the Counter-Reformation ... which ... 
required very frequent confessions and the regular services of a 
professional 'director'. ' It is true that sacraments can easily become 
nothing more than external actions. They can be received merely from "an 
impulse of nature and its satisfaction. " In this they differ from internal 
affective prayer which alone "cannot possibly want purity of intention" 
(312). 
On the other hand, while Baker's fears about the mechanical approach 
may generate a valid critique of the sacramental practice of his time, do 
they in fact go further than this? Do they point not so much towards a 
more incarnational approach as towards an emphasis on spiritual prayer at 
the expense of sacraments? In a work on the spiritual life the length of 
Holy Wisdom, the sacraments are remarkably peripheral. Of course he takes 
them for granted: a Catholic Christian could not do otherwise. But to argue 
that he presumes a positive understanding of them is to argue from silence. 
In fact, Baker's comments seem to suggest a coolness on his part with 
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regard to the effectiveness of the sacraments in the spiritual life. What he 
actually says about them, taken with the paucity of counter-balancing 
positive statements, goes further than merely pointing out the dangers of 
externalism. Other, generally favourable, readers of Baker have noticed this 
dif f iculty. e 
It would be wrong to condemn the sacramental theology of another age 
from the perspective of modern concerns. Nevertheless, we are investigating 
Holy Wisdom as it stands as a work helpful for men and women of today and 
not simply as an historical document. While accepting the value of Baker's 
attack on the mechanical use of sacraments, we may discern beneath this the 
spiritualizing tendency we have already identified in the previous chapter. 
Baker's emphasis does favour the inner and the spiritual at the expense of 
the physical and bodily. His references to sacraments do not stand up well 
in the light of incarnational theology. 
In the following two sections I shall consider in more detail what 
Baker has to say about the four sacraments with which he deals. 
d) Baptism, orders and the eucharist 
The decision to consider these three sacraments together is not a 
theological one, but nor is it arbitrary. It is because Baker's comments on 
them are so brief. 
He refers to baptism only twice, in the chapter entitled "How God 
communicates internal light" (I, 2,6). We have seen in chapter 4 the 
prominent role played by the Holy Spirit in the spiritual conflict; according 
to Baker "that fundamental grace, which in Scripture is called donum 
Spiritus Sancti (the gift of the Holy Ghost) ... is conferred on all in 
baptism" (76). He describes this "fundamental grace" later as "that talent 
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or stock that has God's image on it, and not Caesar' 3, which God bestows on 
everyone in baptism ... to trade withal, which ... being well managed, 
multiplies into many talents" (78). This is an unexpectedly rich idea, 
hinting at both the baptismal seal and the notion of baptism as a process 
of growth rather than merely a moment of grace. Eut this is all that Holy 
Wisdom has to say on baptism. 
In his several references to orders, Baker accepts an hierarchical 
understanding: the order of priests is the one "to which all other inferior 
orders do tend" (107). The sacrament of orders does not give the priest the 
ability to be a spiritual director, but, if a proper director cannot be 
found, an ignorant confessor will have some value "for even by such men 
doth the Holy Ghost speak by reason of their office" (51). 
Nevertheless, the desire for orders is not relevant to Baker's 
interests: the primitive monks, always admired models, were not concerned 
"for the getting of learning or for the disposing themselves to holy orders" 
(137). In his chapter "Of the apostolical mission into England" (I, 3,10) he 
speaks admiringly of St Augustine and his companions, "our first holy 
converters of England" who undertook their labour only when "an absolute 
command was imposed on them by the Supreme Pastor" and even "when they 
were consecrated and exalted to the episcopal function, yet still they 
retained both the exercises and fashions of monastical contemplative 
persons" (158). This, of course, was very much in tune with the feelings of 
Pope Gregory. ' 
Baker urges those who aspire to "so formidable an office" as that of 
priest to spend themselves in contemplative prayer, because their pastoral 
success depends on it (107f). Indeed, and here he quotes Cardinal 
Bellarmine, there are some who "do often (if not daily) celebrate the most 
191 
The Human Person: Social 
holy Sacrifice" and yet are "so void of all devotion ... so cold of Divine 
love" (309). 
It is clear that Baker values holy orders and appreciates their 
necessity in the church. But in Holy Wisdom they are not relevant to his 
spiritual teaching. Admittedly, much of what he says was aimed at women 
religious in a period when the ordination of women was unthinkable. 
Nevertheless, there is no sense whatsoever of a uniquely priestly 
spirituality. If anything, the priesthood might be a distraction from the 
real work of the God-seeker: Baker tells the story of St Florentius, bishop 
of Utrecht and then of Münster, who had to justify his desire to pray (109). 
There is no sense of a mystical conformity to Christ through priesthood, 
but there is also little sense of priesthood being an embodiment of service. 
The spirituality of Holy Wisdom is a lay spirituality. 
The Council of Trent re-emphasized the central dignity of the 
"tremendous and most holy sacrament of the Eucharist. 11° As Baker would 
have known, it was for the mass, among other things, that Catholics in 
Britain were going to the stake. 
Once again, Baker's overt interest in this sacrament is slight. The 
grace accorded in baptism is "cherished or increased by the worthy use of 
the holy Eucharist" (76), but "tepid communions" harden the heart (150, 
cf 151). He offers sound advice, however, on the over-scrupulous avoiding of 
communion (261, cf 264). 
There is a duty of communicating (251) but frequent communions are 
not a principle means of perfection (182), indeed they have small effect 
without prayer (263). 
Baker shows a standard Catholic reverence towards the sacrament of 
the altar. It is taken for granted that people will communicate, but he is 
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once again particularly sensitive to the dangers of externalism. The 
eucharist, for any particular communicant, could become an empty gesture: 
interior prayer could not. Thus interior prayer is the essential means of 
spiritual progress. 
e) Confession 
During Baker's period official Church statements on the sacrament of 
penance or confession had dwelt almost entirely on the forgiveness of sins 
and the various pre-conditions attached to this. The fourth Lateran Council, 
however, had used the image of healing: "A priest should be prudent and 
cautious; like a skilled doctor, pouring wine and oil onto the wounds, he 
should diligently search out the circumstances of the sinner and of the sin 
... so as to profer counsel and apply remedies for the healing of the sick 
person. "" "To profer counsel": it is this aspect of the sacrament that we 
might expect to be of particular interest to Baker, because it seems to 
have a direct impact on spiritual progress. 
The relationship and possible conflict between the spiritual director 
and the confessor was something of which he was painfully aware: when he 
was sent to Cambrai as an unofficial spiritual director to the nuns, he 
found that his teaching conflicted with what was being offered by the 
official confessor, Fr Francis Hull. 12 In a later section we will consider 
the relationship between the "internal liver" and his or her spiritual 
director. For the moment we need to investigate how Baker understands 
confession, the sacrament about which he has the most to say, and the role 
of the confessor. 
Baker's first remarks about this sacrament occur in the course of 
Hilton's parable of the pilgrim which Baker quotes in its entirety. Before 
k 
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starting on the spiritual journey, "purge (your sins) away by hearty penance 
and absolution" (32). As with communion, the purpose of penance is to renew 
the grace of the Holy Spirit given in baptism (76) and its reception is a 
duty (251). 'The Sacrament of Penance and Confession is a holy ordinance 
indeed, instituted by our Lord, not for the torment but ease of consciences" 
(257). There should be liberty in the use of the sacrament (373) and if it 
proves profitable it may be used frequently (263). 
The role of the confessor is simply "to hear faults confessed, to 
give absolution, and there an end" (47). A director needs greater wisdom, 
although, as we have seen, in the absence of a director, a simple confessor 
might do (51). Elsewhere the advice of a "confessarius" is paralleled with 
that of a spiritual guide (185) and wise confessors may well be able to 
exercise the sort of prudence required of a spiritual director (cf 256). 
Beyond these few points, Baker's main concern is with the dangers 
associated with confession. He dedicates a whole chapter to "scruples 
concerning confession" (II, 2,11). This theme is picked up elsewhere (eg 35, 
56,73,245f). He is concerned that confession should bring peace of mind 
rather than anxiety: if it is a source of anxiety, then it is best used as 
little as possible. 
As with the eucharist, he is aware that this sacrament may be used 
in a purely external way (172). The caveats are so insistent that the 
underlying impression is that this sacrament does not provide a real and 
constant impetus to spiritual progress. As with communions, "customary 
frequent confessions" are inferior to "pure spiritual prayer" in bringing 
the soul to perfection (182, cf 262); he quotes Bellarmine again on the 
problems of confession without devotion and love (309, cf 416). 
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F) Conclusion on the sacraments 
We are now in a position to draw some to-- tative conclusions on 
Baker's sacramentology. A consideration of his : nderstanding of the 
individual sacraments supports the general disc ; sion of section c). 
Nevertheless, in his favour I would reiterate three Doints. Firstly, he is 
not anti-sacramental, but accepts the basic sacra: -ntal theology of the 
Church. The sacraments are essential to the Ch: stian life and their 
reception, in accordance with the tradition of the : zurch, is assumed as a 
basis for the spiritual life. Secondly, his criticis ýs are largely directed 
against externalism or mechanicalism. Thirdly, his main concerns are with 
prayer and mortification, not with the sacraments. 
Having acknowledged these points, however, -2 must delve deeper and 
attempt to discern his underlying attitude. What -vierall impression do his 
scattered remarks on the sacraments create in the mind of his readers? I am 
aware that such an apparently intuitive procedure requires great caution. 
What I would suggest is that Baker's central worry about the dangers of 
externalism and his frequent hints at the internal/external distinction, 
which prevent his being unequivocally enthusiastic about the potential of 
the sacraments, allied to his constant emphasis on internal prayer, relate 
to the dualistic attitude that we have discussed in previous chapters. One 
feels that he does not give enough importance to the role sacraments might 
be expected to play in an incarnational theology of the spiritual life. 
I have already quoted Justin McCann's comment on Baker's 
dissatisfaction with a spirituality requiring "very frequent confessions". 13 
This was a spirituality akin to that recommended by, for example, Baker's 
contemporary, "the holy Bishop of Geneva" (51) in his Introduction to the 
Devout Life. ' " This book was, of course, written for people outside the 
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cloister. Francis de Sales' more advanced work Treatise on the Love or God, 
makes far less explicit reference to the recepticn of tie sacraments. 
Nevertheless, as one editor says, the later presupposes the earlier work and 
"though he only introduces the Sacraments incidentally, he does not fail to 
speak of them frequently, and with ... magnificent praises ... as when he 
says (ii, 22) that the communication of Christ's body and blood is the very 
consummation of the charity he is writing of, and the crown of God's love- 
dealings with us. "' I 
It is interesting also to notice a contrast between Holy Wisdom and a 
similar work, Institutlo Spiritualls by Ludovicus Blosius (1506-1566). ' 6 
Baker makes several favourable references to his fellow Benedictine Blosius 
and shows many similarities of general attitude and teaching. Nevertheless, 
he nowhere matches the warmth with which Blosius speaks of the eucharist: 
"The servant of God should be anxious to receive the venerable sacrament of 
the Lord's Body. For by the humble, frequent, and devout reception of the 
Eucharist he will progress more steadily in divine union and holiness of 
life than by any other exercise. "" This might suggest on Baker's part a 
coolness towards sacraments which contrasts with the attitude of some 
writers of his own period. 
g) The divine office 
Whatever the origins of the divine office as a formal corporate 
prayer for the sanctification of the hours of the day, it has always been a 
central feature of Benedictine monasticism and St Benedict legislated 
extensively for its practice. 1e As a Benedictine Baker might be expected to 
include some consideration of this central feature of the spiritual life of 
a monastic community. 
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Baker speaks about the office well over twen .y times in the course 
of Holy Wisdom and a fairly consistent attitude tc cards it emerges. This 
attitude is similar to that towards the sacraments, but, if anything, he 
shows an even greater awareness of the dangers of externalism. 
His first reference talks of the problem of "actions and ways which 
outwardly make a fair show, as solemn performances of divine offices ... " 
Souls should perform these duties carefully, but perfection is to be found 
in "exercises of the spirit" (25). Without "the virtue of spiritual 
discretion ... performing of solemn offices (etc) ... are so far from being of 
any worth that they do rather prejudice and diminish that virtue" (80, cf 
150). Indeed, the spirit of St Benedict's order and rule does not consist in 
a "public, orderly, protracted, solemn singing of the Divine Office" (121). 
He dismisses the objection that interior prayer distracts from "long 
solemn offices laboriously celebrated" (133); if anything, the choir might be 
a distraction from interior prayer (155). Baker is aware of a possible 
conflict between communal prayer and private prayer, and it is quite clear 
where his preference lies: he tells a story from St Gregory, which is worth 
quoting at some length, "of one of his monks whom the devil in the shape of 
a blackamore, tempted out of the community in the time of such 
recollections. By which may be perceived the great fruit and efficacy of 
such prayer; for the devil could be contented he should be present at the 
office, because during that exercise he could more easily distract his mind; 
but knowing the force of internal prayer ... his principle aim was to 
withdraw him from so profitable an exercise" (124). 
Baker acknowledges certain ascetical values attached to the office: 
for instance, the performance of the night office stops the sensuality of 
sleep (235f) and frequenting the choir helps against evil thoughts (248). 
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Nevertheless, the office in itself is limited in its spiritual effects: it is 
limited in its power to produce contemplative recollection (303); unlike real 
internal prayer, it can be recited "lying in our sins" (300). 
In view of what I have said so far, it is hardly surprising to find a 
chapter entitled "Of scruples concerning external duties" (II, 2,10) which 
deals primarily with the office and which adopts a fairly easy-going 
attitude towards the duty of office-recitation. 
Nevertheless, Baker provides some interesting comments on how the 
office might be used to help internal prayer. He feels that there needs to 
be an attention of mind fixed on God. The psalms present an ever-varying 
succession of different emotions and affections, thus drawing the mind from 
its fixed point. To follow these differing emotions is to practise "the 
lowest and most imperfect degree of attention". A second and higher degree 
is where a person either brings to the office, or develops during the 
office, "an efficacious affection to God" to which that person adheres 
regardless of "the sense of the present passage which they pronounce". The 
"third and most sublime degree" is where the person has achieved such a 
profound union with God that "they can attend also to the sense and spirit 
of each passage that they pronounce" and find their union increased thereby 
(305f). These are positive and creative suggestions about the integration of 
personal and public prayer. Baker acknowledges that the office can be said 
aspiratively (462), but its use in this way depends on the prior practice of 
internal prayer (306). It can never be enough to content oneself with the 
off ice (309,320) which is ultimately a means and not an end (348). 
Nevertheless, vocal prayer in public which is "by the laws of the Church of 
obligation" must not be neglected or disparaged. It is in the context of 
this remark that he makes his single reference to the office as something 
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of value for the broader community (304). 
Despite the occasional remark suggesting that the office can be 
valuable in itself, the predominant tone is - lightly impatient and 
disparaging. The overall impression is that the office is at best neutral. 
He assesses it purely as a means of sanctification of the individual and is 
very sensitive to the dangers of externalism. There is little or no sense of 
the signs and gestures of the liturgy of the office being in themselves 
acts of prayer of the incarnate person. 
Of course, his concern with externalism is a valid one. Vocal public 
prayer can be merely a form of words and gestures that fails to engage the 
complete commitment of the person. His comments could be taken as the 
starting point for a theory of integration in prayer. But he does not really 
move in this direction. One is left with a sense that bodily and vocal 
prayer are not as important as interior prayer and the reason lies in the 
spiritual/bodily dualism and the in-built evaluation which, we have seen, 
underlie his approach to the contemplative life. 
II RELATIONSHIPS 
h) Introduction 
In the following five sections of the present chapter I will consider 
the way in which Baker deals with some relationships in which the Christian 
is involved. I am taking it for granted that human personhood is bound up 
with the pattern of relationships in which the person engages. It is through 
a person's bodiliness that he or she relates to others and to the world. 
Indeed, it might be said that communication is one of the main functions of 
bodiliness. I have suggested that Baker shifts the focus of personhood away 
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from the bodily towards the spiritual; thus a consideration of the place of 
relationships in the Christian's progress in the spiritual life will throw 
further light on his understanding of personhood. Although Baker has the 
"interior liver" in mind, he is explicitly writing fcr the Christian would-be 
contemplative living in community. Thus, a lot is said in Holy Wisdom about 
relationships. 
1) The relationship with Christ: example and meditation 
I am not assessing merely Baker's anthropology but his Christian 
anthropology. Thus it is necessary to look more closely at his understanding 
of the position of Christ in the life of the contemplative Christian. I have 
already considered the experience of Christ in the context of his body the 
church, through sacrament and liturgy. Here I will survey Baker's 
understanding of Christ in a more direct sense. 
I indicated in chapter 4 that the Holy Spirit is referred to more 
often than Christ. Nevertheless, although Holy Wisdom cannot be said to be a 
work of Christocentric spirituality, - it focusses far more extensively on 
God - Christ is spoken of many times and with an attitude of warm devotion. 
But there is rarely, if ever, any sense of intimate union with Christ in, 
say, the Pauline sense as identified by writers such as Wikenheuser. ' 9 In 
the present section I shall consider two areas: Christ as exemplar and 
Christ as the object of meditation. In section j) I shall look at the 
personality of Christ and union with Christ. 
The most common way in which Christ is seen is as an example or a 
teacher. Several times Baker refers to "a most perfect example ... given by 
our Saviour" (169, cf 108f, 228f, 241,346,427,488f etc). As a teacher, 
Christ is quoted as an authority to back Baker's own spiritual emphasis: the 
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precept of our Lord urges constant prayer (314ff); he favours contemplative 
prayer (12,16,403); he supports "impudent" persistence in prayer (324). 
Secondly, the events of Christ's life provide objects for meditation. 
It is interesting that Baker makes very little reference to the reading of 
scripture in monastic lectlo divina. The desert fathers did some, he tells 
us, particularly of the psalter (136); meditating on the Holy Scriptures is 
a valuable spiritual exercise among others (196, cf 424,480), but its 
value is limited unless accompanied by inner prayer (309); Fr Alvarez, a 
hero figure for Baker, spent time pondering the scriptures (342). These few 
references constitute all he has to say about it. Nevertheless, Baker 
frequently alludes to or quotes scripture and his comments on meditating on 
the life of Christ presuppose a sound knowledge of the gospels. 
Consideration of the sufferings of Christ provides a higher motivation 
for the soul than does fear of hell (354). Meditating on the "blessed 
Humanity of our Lord" (354) or on some mystery of his life or passion helps 
to generate affections (367f, 370,386f, cf 441). Indeed, one value of the 
great desolation is that it gives a deeper insight into our Lord's 
desertion, and produces "a most inflamed love to Him" (486). 
Despite this positive assessment of such meditation, a spiritualizing 
tendency creeps in that turns on the inferiority of the imagination and 
understanding to the will. Baker discusses "the position of many spiritual 
authors, and particularly of F. Benet Canfield" that exercises of the 
understanding must be left behind in favour of those of the will, except 
for the case of the Passion of our Lord. He sums up their reasoning: "What 
an ingratitude it would be to God, say they, and what a neglect of our 
soul's good, purposely to forbear a frequent meditation of this mystery, the 
ground of all our happiness, the root of all merit, the supremest testimony 
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of divine love towards us ... " (376). Baker refers to Fr Canfield several 
times" and all favourably; only on this issue does he disagree (cf 465). 
For him, even meditation on the Passion must be surpassed; in fact, internal 
prayer of the will accords more perfectly with the spirit of the Passion 
than does simply meditating on it (377). In support of his position Baker 
refers to The Cloud and Barbanson (465). The "some others" (465) who, with 
Canfield, take a pro-Passion line, include the favoured authority Blosius. 
For Blosius le souvenir de la Passion ... est celui qui dolt toujours 
accompagner l'homme de priere et qui suffit par lui-meme 6 nourrir sa vie 
spiri t uelle. 21 
But there is another factor here: while acknowledging that for the 
perfect a reflection on the humanity of Christ can drive the soul more 
deeply into the divinity (378) and that all our good actions derive from the 
merits of the Passion (379), Baker believes that "introversions and 
addresses to the pure Divinity" are better than "acts or affections to the 
Humanity of our Lord" (394). This position is clearly rooted in his 
spiritualizing tendency. 
The consideration of the place of the Passion raises a question as to 
how apophaticism fits into Baker's teaching. We ought to consider here 
whether his discussion presupposes a well-considered negative theology, 
which might be suggested by his references to the Cloud of Unknowing. 
Underlying this is a deeper question as to the relationship between 
incarnational and apophatic theology. There is not space in this thesis to 
explore the issue in any detail. The central figure behind the 
apophatic/cataphatic (negative/affirmative) way of looking at theology is 
Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite. His influence on both eastern and western 
traditions has been immense-22 although there is much evidence of 
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apophaticism earlier in the tradition. " At the root of apophaticism is a 
sense of the fundamental unknowability of the transcendent God. Ca`. aphatic 
theology, on the other hand, is concerned with what we can affirm about 
God. It might be supposed that for a religion based on the incarnation, a 
real presence of the divine in the human, the cstaphatic should have a 
prominent place. In fact the two theologies are brought together by Aquinas 
who, in the words of Lossky, "reduces the two ways of Dionysius to one, 
making negative theology a corrective to affirmative theology. "24 How 
Aquinas does this need not concern us here. In the words of Andrew Louth, 
negative and affirmative theologies "are two sides of the same coin. 125 For 
George Maloney, the author of the Cloud appreciates the importance of the 
cataphatic approach, while accepting that it is imperfect and must be 
complemented by the apophatic. 2 But it might be argued that Louth and 
Maloney are over-emphasizing the affirmative element in the spiritual 
writers with whom they deal because they realize that the negative does not 
entirely square with the implications of incarnation. The priority of the 
apophatic is a noticeable feature of many spiritual writers and a feature 
that Baker shares. 
Holy Wisdom does not offer a systematic theological approach, so it 
is difficult to specify just how far Baker was aware of the 
apophatic/cataphatic relationship. He certainly has a strong apophatic 
dimension, linked to an insufficiently positive appreciation of the 
importance of the incarnate Christ. This fits comfortably with his 
spiritualizing anthropology but runs into conflict with incarnat ionsl 
theology. 
Apophaticism itself, unless adequately balanced, does not accord with 
the requirements of incarrational theology which argues that God is really 
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known in Christ. Thus I would argue that a strong apopha` is emphasis, if 
present in Baker, does not, in itself, justify his surpassing of 
Christocentric meditation. But I would freely admit that my comments on 
apophaticism are by no means exhaustive. 
j) The relationship with Christ: personality and union 
On the rare occasions when Baker risks discussing the personality of 
Christ he adopts a high Christology that detracts from the human qualities. 
"Our blessed Saviour ... by virtue of the hypostatical union ... was 
replenished with all manner of graces without measure. " The only reason for 
his years of solitude and times of prayer was to give us an example; "He 
utterly refused to meddle in secular affairs" (108f). On top of this Christ 
"as Man" had "a most perfect knowledge, perception, and feeling of the 
nothingness of creatures, and the absolute totality of God ... remaining 
continually plunged in the abyss of His own nothing ...; " nevertheless, 
"without offending truth He could not believe any other creature to be more 
holy and perfect than Himself" (275). Such statements give little or no 
sense of ordinary human development. 
Theories as to what Jesus knew about himself are notoriously 
questionable. I suppose that Baker has as much right to speculate as anyone 
else does. I wish only to point out that the image of Christ that emerges 
is of someone who is not quite human, someone, almost, who is acting out 
the part of a man rather than actually being one. To the extent that this 
is true, Baker's understanding of the incarnation is inadequate. 
Finally, we need to consider the few occasions when Baker refers to a 
union with Christ closer than by imitation or meditation. He refers to a 
soul having reached the high degree where it is "Christ and His Holy Spirit 
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that lives, reigns and operates in her" (357); he sp _ aks of the martyrs who 
have "the love of Christ burning in their hearts and constraining them" 
(77); he tells us that the love of Christ will nct permit us to exercise 
enmity (227). But the only time that Christ becomes an. end is in the 
parable of a pilgrim which Baker quotes from Hilton (31-38): 27 the style of 
this parable with its strong emphasis on the love of Jesus and its warm 
refrain "I desire nought but Jesus" contrasts noticeably with the style of 
the rest of Holy Wisdom. In this respect, Holy Wisdom is indeed at variance 
with an important strand in medieval piety, although its basic approach to 
the spiritual life agrees with that of Hilton. 2a 
There can be no doubt about Baker's devotion to the person of Christ 
to whom he refers predominantly as "our Lord" or "our Saviour". But his 
understanding of Christ accords with the spiritualizing tendency we have 
already identified and is not entirely in line with incarnational theology. 
k) The religious in community 
Baker's primary concern is with the sanctification of the individual: 
"It is not for edification of others that a monastical state was instituted 
or ought to be undertaken. " The aim should be "to purify their own souls, 
not to give example or instruction to others" (121). He quotes with approval 
an ancient hermit called Jacob: "I came not to this solitude to benefit 
other men's souls, but to purify mine own by prayer" (339). 
The outcome of this, in a practical sense, is that the individual 
religious should be reluctant to take on responsibilities or commitments 
without or within the community: "true internal livers" are not "forward to 
usurp offices abroad not belonging to them, as of preaching, hearing 
confessions ... " (133). As regards offices within the community, "it is a 
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wilful thrusting one's self into dangerous distractions and temptations for 
any one voluntarily to desire or seek such employments" (409). Such a 
person should "fly honours, offices, care over others and the like" (44). 
Should a superior wish to impose a responsibility on a subject, however, the 
latter "may represent unto him his just grounds of fear lest such an 
employment should prove notably prejudicial to his soul" (409). Nevertheless, 
such offices are necessary and if the superior insists, the subject must 
make the best of it. Baker dedicates a chapter to "How prayer is to be 
exercised in distractive offices" (III, 3,4). 
The avoidance of offices is one thing, but the dissuasion extends 
further: things that "divine calls" urge us to avoid include "unnecessary 
though permitted conversations and correspondences with others, either by 
speaking or writing" and "encumbering or ensnaring ourselves by any 
voluntary assumed tasks, obligations etc, though in matters in themselves 
good" (44). With the main concern "the adorning of his own soul" (226), we 
can see here a community member who might prove very trying to his or her 
fellow religious. Baker places various restrictions on ordinary community 
life; for instance, conversations must be in common, not in twos and threes 
(192); religious must not speak purely to edify others and must discuss 
only indifferent subjects" (199). 
On the other hand, Baker's comments on community life are not all so 
negative: he condemns the tepidity through which religious may act in a 
legally correct way while performing "their external necessary obligations 
to God and their brethren sleepily and heartlessly, without any true 
affection" (27). He is even willing to admit a tiny measure of passion: "just 
reason and necessary good of others shall require that some things be done 
with eagerness" (which he views as a passion), but it must be used 
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discreetly and "not thereby prejudice their own internal quiet of mind" 
(178f). He lists ten benefits of mortification, one of which is that "it is 
of great edification to our brethren and neighbours" (176f); however, this 
is the ninth of the ten, and all the others pertain directly to the 
individual's sanctification. 
Here I have looked at the community life in a general sense; in the 
next section I shall consider the more intimate relationship of friendship. 
Baker's attitude to community life is detached and cautious: there is none 
of the warmth that we find in the rules of St Basil or of St Benedict. The 
root is found, once again, in spiritualization. Firstly, the process of 
sanctification, about which Baker is centrally concerned, is essentially a 
solitary and inner affair in which other people are peripheral. Secondly, he 
believes that, anyway, it is through contemplation that "we most 
efficaciously express our charity ... to our friends" (378). He may say, at 
one point, that we should "upon occasions offered do all we can to procure 
or effect the things we pray for, by exhortations, reproofs etc" (222), 
nevertheless, the main thrust of his position seems to be impelled by the 
belief that it is the spiritual that really matters, and that the bodily is 
of lesser value. 
1) Friendship 
Holy Wisdom has twenty-five or more references to friendship, several 
of them of some length. The book includes a chapter entitled "The order and 
degrees of charity to others" (II, 2,5). The position of friendship in the 
Christian and indeed human life had exercised writers from classical times. 
Both Augustine and Aelred of Rievaulx would draw on Cicero in the 
development of their own ideas. --4 Augustine's personal need for friendship 
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and his views on the subject are sensitively expounded by Peter Brown. 
Baker never displays Augustine's warmth or intensity but he echoes some of 
his ideas. 
True friendship for Baker is something centred in God. The motive of 
the love of others is the divine will and command; the ground is our 
relationship with God; the end is to bring others to God; the location is 
the superior will, - anything proceeding from natural sensual affection is 
"defectuous" (220). A strong natural/supernatural distinction pervades: there 
can be no merit in natural love (221). The involvement of the senses in any 
way is undesirable; as to the affections: "root them out of the sensual 
portion of the soul" (221). "Sensual friendship grounded on external or 
sensual respects are (sic) most unbeseeming persons that have consecrated 
themselves only to God" (222). 
Friendship for others is always focussed on God, never on the other: 
Charity is defined as "a love of friendship to God , and for His sake only 
to men or ourselves"; "there cannot be any other true friendship but 
charity, or the love which we bear to God or for God; ... all other pretended 
friendships ... are mere sensual self-love" (211). By a rather far-fetched 
argument Baker goes on to argue that even if people should die for such a 
("pretended") friend "the true motive of all was a sensual self-love unto 
themselves" (211). 
The practical outcome of this is that friendship becomes a 
spiritualized quality divorced from ordinary human concerns. Baker's 
constant tone is one of warning: "internal livers" should have no "vainly 
complying friendships" (25,70); we should "forbear and break off all 
particular partial friendships and compliances" (44,192,198); "sensual 
friendships" are things that the soul "ought carefully to prevent and avoid" 
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(112); consideration of friendship should be treated with suspicion (148, 
cf 811. ); even "professions of friendships" are grouped with "murmurings, 
detractions, ... vain and disruptive disputes" as things to be avoided (196); 
we should place "against excessive (though not unclean) love to persons, 
friends etc, the love of God and spiritual things" (208). Indeed, things 
bodily are so irrelevant to real friendship in his eyes that the "supreme 
object ... of our charity among creatures" (after the humanity of Christ) is 
"His heavenly Virgin Mother, and after them the heavenly Angels and blessed 
Saints" (225). "To value ourselves or any mortal friends or kindred before 
the glorified saints", he continues, "would be irrational and unseemly" 
(ibid). Nevertheless, Baker can presumably see the value of (spiritual) 
friendship because he sees "loss of friends" (179) and "deprivation of 
dearest friends" (268) as a painful mortification which therefore has great 
potential. 
In the context of friendship there is, for Baker, an overt conflict 
between the senses and charity, between the natural and the supernatural. 
In this conflict the senses are clearly and unequivocally the enemy. Our 
findings here support what has already been shown in chapter 4. 
I do not wish to draw conclusions which fail to do justice to Baker. 
There is a value in what he says: it is the common and universal experience 
of men and women in religious communities that some associations of one 
person with one other become inward-looking, divisive, exclusive and 
diminishing. But others, where the individuals are "truly seeking God", to 
use an expression of St Benedict, mature the participants and create a 
wider receptivity to others. The presence of grace, or divine charity, or the 
Holy Spirit, may well be a crucial factor in the latter. On the other hand 
it is impossible to see how any genuinely human friendship could occur tr 
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the absence of sensual or bodily factors. As one writer points out, "'I± may 
help to remember St Thomas's wise reflexion that, because we are men and 
not angels, a human act accompanied by a natural reaction ("passio") is not 
more imperfect but more perfect for man, because more truly human. "-! 'O 
Graced bodiliness seems to lie at the heart of Christian friendship, 
certainly in the context of an incarnational theology. Baker's theory of 
friendship, which has been a pervasive one in the religious life right up to 
the present day, falls short: not only does he fail to bridge the gap 
between the senses and charity, but he presents their relationship as one 
of conflict. He fears particularity and is suspicious of intimacy. To claim 
that we should experience greater love for disembodied angels than for any 
human friends is to undermine the full value of being human. 
m) The spiritual director 
The tradition of the spiritual guide is ancient and universal, 
reaching well beyond the confines of Judaism and Christianity. Its 
specifically Christian context can be traced back to the disciples who 
responded to the command of Jesus to "follow me"3' and who asked "Lord, 
teach us to pray, as John taught his disciples. 132 The desert tradition of 
monasticism, favoured by Baker (cf I, 3,6), gives ample place to the 
teacher/disciple relationship, 33 and it is taken up by St Benedict whose 
Rule opens with the words "Listen carefully, my son, to the master's 
instructions. "3° Baker too will deal with the relationship between spiritual 
director and disciple. 
Holy Wisdom dedicates a chapter to the role of the external director 
(I, 2,2), but there are frequent references throughout the book. A director 
is particularly important for those who are setting out on the spiritual 
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1Ife: "grace directs them to use the mediation of others" (46). The director 
will instruct the disciple, "judge her propension to contemplative ways", 
know when the disciple should move to another degree of prayer and so on 
(47). The three qualities a director should possess are good natural 
judgment, learning and experience; the second is the least important of the 
three (47). Directors should be chosen carefully: scrupulous souls should 
not choose scrupulous directors (51). Spiritual direction is not tied to holy 
orders, and lay people, both male and female, if they have the right 
qualities, can make good directors (51). 
In general, Baker's remarks on the director are characterized by 
common sense. He is aware that in cases of doubt about the spiritual life, 
whether in prayer or in mortification, a good director can helpfully resolve 
the difficulty (84,187,190). On the other hand he delivers several 
warnings about the dangers of a bad one: he talks of "bad directors who 
feed scrupulosity" (246, cf 255) and "unexperienced directors" (31). 
Baker's prevailing tone is favourable to the director: he or she is 
always there when needed (cf 258,379) and may be helpful even at advanced 
stages of prayer such as passive unions (473f). Nevertheless, there is a 
prominent strand in Holy Wisdom that curtails the importance of a director. 
This strand arises from Baker's theory of inner inspiration or of "divine 
calls", a theory that alarmed some of his contemporaries who felt that it 
might compromise the authority of the superior. According to Baker "there 
are two internal lights and teachers, to wit 1) the spirit of corrupt 
nature; 2) the Divine Spirit" (39). We have already in chapter 4 considered 
the conflict between them. Ultimately it is God who is our director and "the 
light of reason, or external directors, or rules prescribed in books, etc" 
must be subordinate "to the internal directions and inspirations of, God's 
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Holy Spirit" (41). "Divine inspirations", he tells us, are either "immediately 
communicated to the soul alone; ... or also mediately, with the concurrence 
of ... an external director" (45). 
But the aim is to get beyond the need for a spiritual director, 
frequent conference with whom can lead to "continual solicitudes, 
scrupulosities, and dangerous distractions. " Instead, the desirable state is 
"repose, cessation, introversion, and a continual attendance unto what God 
speaks within unto the soul" (54). Obviously, some will never have 
sufficient sensitivity to divine inspirations to be able to forego external 
guides (53), but the more perfect will quit "servile dependence on external 
teachers" (97), who can never really "order the internal operations of the 
soul" (103). Baker is somewhat dismissive of directors in the Jesuit sense 
who receive an account of how the meditation has gone (365), but who 
perhaps fetter a soul which has become "more solicitous to give 
satisfaction to her director than to perform her duty to God" (366). Baker's 
prayer of the will, however, cannot easily be described to directors because 
of its inner nature (389). 
I am setting out here not to draw any controversial conclusions from 
my consideration of what Baker has to say about the spiritual director. 
There is a lot of common sense in what he says. A director is a means to 
an end who, so long as helpful to the disciple, may continue to be used. 
Much sound practical advice is given about the qualities of directors and 
how they should help their disciples. It is clear that Baker is speaking 
from reliable personal experience. Nor am I attempting to give a detailed 
survey of his theory of divine inspirations; a discussion of these may be 
found elsewhere. -3s 
But there are certain assumptions in what Baker says that accord 
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with the broad trend that we have already identified. He holds that divine 
inspirations are "immediately communicated to the soul alone" (45) and that 
ultimately such communication is preferable to mediated inspirations. The 
bodily director is superseded by a more spiritual communication. This may 
be because Baker believes that only an individual person can know his or 
her inner state, or, more likely, because it is a move in the direction of 
"spirituality" away from sensuality and bodiliness. Unmediated 
communications "to the soul alone" may well be a common-place of spiritual 
teaching, but I shall not consider here the further philosophical problem as 
to how incarnate human beings may receive such communications. 
n) The superior 
The position of the superior in religious communities has been 
prominent throughout the Christian tradition. While perhaps finding a 
scriptural basis in the heroic obedience of Christ to the Father, it may in 
monastic communities have derived from the teacher/disciple relationship of 
the earliest monks and nuns. 36 This relationship was personal and often 
characterized by mutual love. St Benedict catches something of the personal 
quality of obedience in his legislation on the position of the abbot in 
community. Perhaps in the stable Benedictine community such a relationship 
with the abbot who "is believed to hold the place of Christ in the 
monastery137 is possible. In centralized orders with rapidly changing 
superiors and provincials of whom the individual religious perhaps saw 
little, the personal relationship may not have been so possible. In Baker's 
day the English Benedictine Congregation was organized on the model of a 
centralized order. This might lie at the root of his ambivalent attitude 
towards superiors. 
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Holy Wisdom includes several chapters that deal largely with the 
superior. The first of these (I, 2,9) is entitled "Divine calls do not 
prejudice authority". For several pages (98-101) Baker handles the criticism 
of his teaching by "some who, either out of ignorance, passion, or interest, 
have declared themselves enemies thereto ... " because they think it will 
cause "great prejudice ... to the due authority of superiors" (98). He then 
proceeds so fulsomely that the reader begins to suspect that there must be 
a sting in the tail. "All ... commands of superiors ... are ... true divine 
calls" (99); external obedience is always right against internal inspiration 
(99); if the superior says something is not a divine inspiration, then it is 
not (100); obedience is an absolute (101). So much for the subject's 
reaction to the superior: now Baker turns on the latter. "True it is that in 
such a case it may happen that a superior may commit a great fault" (101). 
Whereas a subject will gain by obeying any command of the superior, however 
unreasonable, superiors themselves have duties: "to penetrate into the 
dispositions of their subjects" and "to use great discretion" (101); 
commands "without any regard to the divine will" are "very dangerous to the 
superior" (101). 
In the chapter entitled "The special duties of religious persons" (I, 
3,7) Baker condemns those who "seek superiorit ies" (141) and dismisses the 
common belief that "active spirits are more fit for superiorities ... than 
contemplative" as "most unreasonable and groundless" (142). He develops a 
list of reasons why this is so, all turning on the greater sensitivity of a 
contemplative superior to what the religious life is really about, namely, 
inner prayer. The chapter entitled "The duties of superiors" (I, 3,8) says 
little beyond urging the superior to be careful about the sort of people 
admitted to the monastery (145) and to allow his or her subjects enough 
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time for their recollections (149). 
Whereas his casual remarks urge obedience to superiors (eg 92,185 
etc), there are also criticisms: modern superiors are rather lax in that 
they have allowed recreation (197, cf 200). The chapter "Of obedience" (II. 
2,14) is fairly critical of superiors. Baker acknowledges the Benedictine 
ideal of complete openness with one's abbot or abbess; -38 unfortunately it 
does not work like that, mainly because of the "incapacity and insufficiency 
of superiors" which he develops at some length by giving a list of things 
that they ought to do (285). Nevertheless, despite all this, the superior 
must be obeyed (285). 
The most notable impression created by a close study of the religious 
superior as portrayed in Holy Wisdom is one of ambivalence. We know that 
Baker's own experience of dealing with superiors was far from harmonious; 
we know that the area of obedience to authority was one of the most 
controversial aspects of his teaching; we know that Serenus Cressy has 
attempted to smooth the rough places. But we are assessing the text as it 
stands and even if we did not know these things, the sense of irresolution 
and conflict would be clear. Baker's awareness of an ideal of the 
superior/subject relationship is not unconditionally or full-heartedly 
expressed; it does not enjoy the warmth of St Benedict's portrayal of the 
abbot. Instead there are constant caveats drawn, presumably, from bitter 
experience. 
Our overall concern is to see how Holy Wisdom fares in the light of 
incarnational theology; I have claimed that despite its original features 
the book reflects the views of a substantial body of spiritual writing and 
that a critique of it is, in fact, a critique of considerably more. I have 
already identified elements of conflict and dualism, a spiritualizing 
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tendency and a subtle anti-bodily tone. But Baker's discuss; of the 
superior is perhaps a peculiar feature of his, rather than characteristic of 
many spiritual writers. His position contrasts sharply with, for instance, 
that of St Benedict. Arguments levied against Baker's comments may well be 
effective against Baker alone. But what his discussion of the relationship 
between superior and subject suggests is a lack of harmony, almost a 
conflict, in what should be a crucial human relationship for the religious 
in his or her growth in the spiritual life. In the Benedictine system the 
abbot or abbess has quasi-sacramental status as a mediator of Christ's 
presence, but in Baker's views we find an inconsistency and uneasiness. 
I have now completed my consideration of the way that Baker handles 
several of the central relationships of the religious man or woman, with 
the community in general, with intimates, with the spiritual director and 
with the superior. While he shows a level of common sense and practicality, 
there are also difficulties attached to all these relationships. One feels 
that Baker does not grant sufficient importance to the social context of 
human personhood and that this failure to do so is what we might have 
expected in the light of our findings in chapters 4 and 5. 
In the concluding sections of the present chapter I shall investigate 
three themes that relate loosely to the broad subject of the human person 
as a social entity. The first is Baker's understanding of woman; this 
investigation needs little justification if we bear in mind that 
anthropology must include both "anerology" and "gynaecology". The others 
pertain to his understanding of time, of time past and of time future. 
III OTHER ISSUES 
.C 
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o) Baker's understanding of woman 
Despite the prominence of some women in the Christian tradition, 
women such as Mary, the mother of Jesus, and Catherine of Siena and Teresa 
of Avila, finally declared doctors of the church in 1970, the first women to 
receive that accolade, the official Church has not been all that aware of 
the rights and abilities of women. 
Aquinas, for instance, in his question "de productione mulierum" 
starts by considering "should woman have been made in the original creation 
of things". He quotes the dictum of Aristotle "that the female is a male 
manque. " He does not baldly accept this but concludes that "only as regards 
nature in the individual is the female somehow defective and manque. " In 
the same article he tells us that the appropriate subjection of woman to 
man is not slavery but a subjection for the woman's "advantage and benefit, " 
arising "because the power of rational discernment is by nature stronger in 
man. "39 Baker, too, as we shall see in the present section, will assume that 
women are more sensual and men more rational. 
Baker's central experience as a spiritual director was gained during 
his time with the English Benedictine nuns of Cambrai; many of his writings 
are based on conferences for them. It is clear that they held him in high 
esteem and defended his reputation after his death; his friend, Abbess 
Catherine Gascoigne, felt that Holy Wisdom was an accurate summary of his 
spiritual teaching. With these points in mind we must now consider the 
understanding of woman that emerges from the pages of Holy Wisdom. 
Firstly, Baker has adopted certain stereotypes: he talks of "that 
tenderness and compassionateness which abounds naturally in women" and 
which makes them "disposed to a greater fervour in charity" (13). While 
women have "lesser and more contemptible gifts of judgment" (106) and are 
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weaker in understanding (13,106,362) they may show "stronger wills and 
more fervent affections" (106, cf 362). They are far more prone than are 
men to experiences in the senses: "devout women ... naturally do mcre abound 
with sensible affections than men" (330, cf 477 and 462 where "violent 
agitations do chiefly befall ... women and devout ignorant men"). 
Nevertheless, the prayer of meditation may be less suitable for women than 
that of the will, presumably because the former involves a more energetic 
use of the mind (362f, 365). Women love chattering: "among women there can 
scarce be any recreation if the tongue be too much stinted" (200). The 
Church calls women "the devout sex" and, indeed, one author, whom Baker does 
not name, is sure that "for one man near ten women went to heaven" (107). 
In the latter comment we may detect a hint of Baker's humour. 
While Baker acknowledges in one place that women may be able to 
exercise a valuable role of spiritual leadership in convents (51f), many of 
his references to women are paternalistic: they are "simple, unlearned 
women" (13), "tender devout souls" (243), "ignorant tender souls" (252), 
"ignorant, passionate and fearful women" (260), "simple unlearned persons 
especially women" (304), "ignorant persons including women" (370), "tender 
innocent virgins" (401). His fundamental view of women should be clear from 
this list. If he allows in two or three places that "women are more 
frequently graced ... with the gift of high contemplation than men" (13) and 
that, as far as God is concerned the Holy Spirit may issue divine calls to 
men and women equally (110), there are two references that suggest an 
assumed attitude of male superiority: he speaks of moving beyond "all 
strange affections, images and distractions" to "a love much more MASCULINE, 
pure and divine" (10). Here masculinity is associated with spiritualization, 
with detachment from bodiliness. Secondly, "the contemplations of men are 
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more noble, sublime, and more exalted in spirit; that Is, less raking of 
sensible effects ... than those of women" (107). 
In one or two places he mentions the dangers of relationships 
between men and women. "Sinful imaginations" (presumably of a sexual 
nature) in bed at night are to be diverted quietly by prayer (236); 
consultations of women with their (male) directors should be sparing 
because of "dangerous familiarities and friendships" (57); indeed, as St 
Francis Xavier warns, there is less good "from frequent treaties between 
persons of different sexes" than "peril in them to both" (58). Friendships 
"between persons of different sexes" are more prejudicial to prayer than 
those between persons of the same sex (222). At the back of his mind, of 
course, is the sin of Adam, "hearkening to the flattering temptations of his 
wife, seduced by the devil" (40). 
As we might expect certain women are idealized. '0 He speaks of the 
"yet more supereminent degree" of contemplation in "His own most heavenly 
Virgin-Mother" (16); he doubts whether any creature apart from "our Blessed 
Lady hath ever arrived to so high a degree of perfection in this life as to 
become wholly impassible" (241); the "supreme object ... of our charity" 
after Christ should be "His heavenly Virgin Mother" (225). Prayer to Mary 
features very rarely, however (395f, cf 254,431). St Teresa is mentioned 
warmly on several occasions. °' 
In the previous chapter we considered Baker's use of the feminine 
pronoun for the soul while using masculine pronouns for the human person; 
at one place in Holy Wisdom he allows this feminine usage to generate a 
rather arresting metaphor: "here the soul is in a case like to a tender 
mother with unspeakable satisfaction regarding her most amiable child ... 
In 
like manner, a soul does actually regard God" (447). °2 This kind of imagery 
219 
The Human Person: Social 
in Baker is very rare, however. 
This is not the place to consider in detall the impact of recent 
feminist theology; even so, we need to glance at certain relevant issues. 
Peter Brown comments on "the studied misogyny of much ascetic literature" 
and its social implications in the late antique period. d3 Margaret Miles 
shows how such an attitude, in various guises, prevails in later Christian 
history: for most Christian authors "rationality clearly existed more 
strongly in males. "°° The converse of this was that women were particularly 
associated with sensuality. Further, "the association of females with body 
and males with reason, though it was prior to and more widespread than 
Christian tradition, is also endemic to Christianity. "45 Hence the presumed 
superiority of man over woman was bound up with the superiority of the 
spiritual over the bodily. 
Baker's assumptions about woman and man symbolize and express his 
understanding of the bodily in relation to the spiritual. The crucial 
quotation is where he uses St Bernard: "If bodily ease may indeed be a help 
to the spirit, it is to be admitted for that purpose; for, as St Bernard 
says, as man was not made for the woman, but the woman for man, so 
spiritual exercises were not made for corporal, but corporal for spiritual" 
(427). Here the woman/body, man/spirit parallel is made explicit. Just as the 
senses are inferior to the spirit, so the woman is inferior to the man. 
Despite the fact that women are particularly suited to prayer of the will, 
the higher contemplation is described as "masculine" (10) and it is 
masculine because it is purer, that is, more removed from the bodily. It may 
be objected that Baker always uses "she" language for the soul: I have 
already shown, however, that "soul" is used in different senses. As the soul 
becomes more spiritualized, "spirit" language takes over and the spirit is 
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never referred to as "she". 
As with everything he says, Baker is a child of his time: it would be 
unreasonable to expect to find a feminist theology between the lines of 
Holy Wisdom. Baker apparently got on well with women and there is a level 
of sensitivity and appreciation in what he says. °° Many women of the time 
would have found him encouraging and it may be the case that his attitude 
is less patronizing than that of contemporaries. A-7 Nevertheless, patronizing 
it still is. A patronizing attitude is one assuming a superiority. In 
spiritual writers such as Baker, this attitude to women is closely linked 
with the evaluative dualism that exalts the spiritual at the expense of the 
bodily. Incarnational anthropology, dwelling as it does on the value of 
concrete embodiment, invests equal worth in the state of being a man and 
the state of being a woman. Therefore, Baker's attitude towards women falls 
within the framework of his general anthropology and shares its inadequacy. 
p) The golden age 
The incarnation is about the particularization of the divine in human 
history: Jesus Christ, a particular man, was born, lived and died in a 
particular time and place. This particularity led pagan opponents to 
question the apparent arbitrariness of it. °a In the Catholic tradition the 
incarnation continues through Christ's body, the church, and Christians are 
part of that incarnation through the sacraments of incorporation. Thus the 
incarnation is both a moment and a continuum. Incarnational theology values 
the unique events of the past: the life, death and resurrection of Jesus 
which focus the history of Israel, and the development of the Christian 
tradition down the ages. It values the hope of future fulfilment. But for 
individual human beings, bodily and particularized, the crucial time of grace 
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and of experience of incarnation is the present. The memories of 'ý'Iie past 
and the aspirations of the future are concretized in the present. 
This is reflected in the very title of Gaudium et Spes: "The Church 
in the world of the present time Te Ecclesla in mundo huius temporis). Of 
this Charles Moeller writes: 
The Church is in the world of today and cannot withdraw from it. 
This fact gives rise to a series of obligations, responsibilities and 
questions for the Church. Furthermore, the words "of this time" 
suggest the biblical theme of the kair-os, the hodle, the "today" 
which God speaks. " 
The implications of this are that the two extremes of living in the 
past in a world of nostalgic reminiscence, or living in the future in a 
context of vague, unfulfilled hopes, fail to accord with the full 
requirements of such incarnational theology. What is required is a positive, 
optimistic commitment to the present time of graced embodiment. Thus, 
incernational theology has implications for a Christian understanding of 
time. 
My comments here are necessarily cursory and merely provide a 
context for the consideration of a theme that runs throughout Holy Wisdom. 
While past standards may have been better than those of the present and 
while Baker is entirely committed to the implications of living a spiritual 
life in the present, the present is constantly devalued in comparison with 
the past. 
For Baker "the true spirit of religion" is "too much generally 
decayed" (25); "true spirituality is in these days so rare" (103); "the true 
spirit of religion ... is ... miserably decayed in these days" (129, cf 133); 
"in these wicked times, in which there is such a decay of charity in the 
world and of fervour in religion" (268); "the great decay of religious 
discipline and perfection in the world" (283, cf 284,291); "corporal 
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infirmity and incapacity" of spirit, "especially in these days" (334). Such 
phrases could be multiplied. For Baker the present represents a miserable 
decline from the glory of the past. 
This pessimism about conditions of the present is linked with a 
pronounced respect and admiration for hero figures of the (remote) past: 
"ancient martyrs ... rushed before the persecuting judges to confess the 
name of Christ" (77) (and this in an age when many of Baker's 
contemporaries including fellow Benedictines were being put to death for 
loyalty to their faith); "it is wonderful to read of that depth of 
recollectedness and most profound introversion to which some ancient 
solitary persons ... have come" (122); "in ancient times many holy souls did 
attain to perfect contemplation by the mere use of vocal prayer" (302, cf 
136). He praises "souls that lived (as anciently they did) ... having no 
images of creatures" (308); "this was the contemplation of many of the 
ancient hermits and is, no doubt of some in these days" (463). 
Besides the various scattered references, Baker dedicates a chapter 
to "the contemplation of the primitive monks" G, 3,6). For him the quality 
of ancient practice surpasses that of his contemporaries: the ancients 
showed "incomparably more abstraction of life", austerities "beyond the 
strength of our infirm corporal complexions" and external employments more 
conducive to prayer "than those ordinarily practised in these days" (136). 
In view of Baker's great near- cont em porar ies such as Teresa of Avila, John 
of the Cross and Francis de Sales, it would be surprising if his derogation 
of the present was total. In fact, he acknowledges once or twice that there 
are 'Iseveral holy persons" ... who ... "teach more accurately than formerly 
the knowledge and practice of pure internal contemplative prayer" and "that 
sole exercise in a good measure" makes amends "for all other defects in 
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which we seem to come short of the ancients" (, -40). But tnis is no 
disparagement of the ancients, because methods of prayer "in those times 
were not at all necessary" (307). 
For Baker there was greater rigour in the past (196f, 199f) and 
greater discipline (145); the "practice of antiquity" is favoured (148). This 
preference for the past is made explicit in another way: with regard to the 
conversations of religious during periods of recreation, "it were better to 
talk of the occurrences of former times than of the present" (201). 
At one point Baker says that active contemplation is "almost an 
entire reparation and restitution of the soul to the state of primitive 
innocence" (454). The sense of former glory is something close to Baker. But 
for him the golden age has become tarnished. We might expect a reverence 
for the past in a man who pursued antiquarianism, who searched out the 
medieval historical precursors of the new English Benedictine Congregation 
and who relied so much on earlier literary authorities in his spiritual 
writings. The period in which he lived, in difficult conditions, exiled from 
his native-land, might naturally breed a pessimism. Nevertheless, we are 
attempting to judge Holy Wisdom not merely as an historical artifact but as 
a book of spiritual instruction valuable in the 20th century. 
I would suggest that Baker's idealizing of the past at the expense of 
the present tends to lower the value of the present bodily experience of 
human persons in their individual and social context. This idealization thus 
lends support to the anti-incarnational tendencies that I have already 
identified. 
q) The end 
In this section I shall consider teleological rather than spatial or 
¼ 
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temporal aspects of the spiritual life of the human person, although the 
end is something not yet achieved, and therefore in the future. Baker '"3s no 
sense of a communal end such as might be found in the eschatology of. ' St 
Paul. For him, the "only principle end why a religious person has engaged 
himself in a life of obedience is the good and advancement of his soul" 
(285). Only once is the body explicitly included in the scheme of salvation: 
referring to the human person, he writes that the end "for which he was 
made ... (is) "eternal beatitude both in soul and body in heaven" (3). 
While the f inal end is an individual union with God in heaven, "a new 
right unto eternal happiness (perhaps) more sublime than man in innocency 
was destined to" (6), Baker considers the preliminary end of this life: 
"uninterrupted attention and union with God as was practised by Adam in 
innocency" (7). But this will be brought about in different ways: while the 
"general end of man's creation ... is a perfect and constant union in spirit 
to God by love" (14), the end of the contemplative lif e is "so 
supereminently noble and divine that beatified souls do prosecute the same, 
and no other, in heaven" (17). 
This end of the contemplative life is "sublime" (18), "glorious" (163), 
"the state of perfection" (487). The "union in spirit with God by love Is 
entirely supernatural and divine" (163, cf 96). If Baker is talking about the 
presence of God's Spirit as the essential means of bringing about this 
union, then that is one thing. But, as we might expect, he is talking also 
about a move away from the natural rather than a transformation of the 
natural. "This is the end of all perfection", he says, "to have the soul 
become so extenuated and purified from all carnal desires as that it may 
continually be in an actual ascent to spiritual things" (317). 
Becoming more spiritual is what primarily interests Baker: "our union 
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in spirit with God" (310); drawing a person "more and more deepl:; t3wa: -, ýs 
the spirit, in the perfect operations whereof consists the consummaticn of 
an internal life" (333). Indeed, as we have seen already in the previous 
chapter, "our chiefest happiness and perfection are ... that we shall be like 
unto angels both in our knowledge and love" (45 1). 
Despite his single reference to "beatitude both in soul and body" (3), 
the final happiness of the human person, found in a loving union with God. 
is essentially spiritual and individual. This is the tone that pervades Holy 
Wisdom. 
r) Concluding remark 
At the root of this chapter has been the theology of the body of 
Christ, '=, O with its practical implications in terms of community and 
relationship. In the words of Vatican II, "God did not create man as a 
solitary ... by his innermost nature man is a social being, and unless he 
relate himself to others he can neither live nor develop his potential. "" 
This may appear to be stating the obvious, but many spiritual writings have 
tended to focus on the sanctification of the individual, often at the 
expense of the community. Miles refers to "the blatantly dualistic, 
individualistic and privatistic focus that characterizes the literature of 
Christian devotion. ""'- Baker, as we have seen, shares this focus. 
At the heart of community and relationship is communication which is 
entirely dependent on embodiment. r---3 A disparagement of bodiliness and a 
move towards the spiritualization of experience are linked with an emphasis 
on the individual. Thus the social context of human life becomes peripheral. 
There is a crude level of individualism in which a person serves others for 
the furthering of his or her own spiritual develcpment. This is certainly 
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present in Baker. But he hints also at a more sophisticated justi-- 4-c3ýion of 
his individualistic f ocus. This is by way of a kind of "religious 
Thatcherism": the unremitting pursuit of individual spiritual advantage 
ultimately betters the whole community. Yet here, surely, is a case of the 
end Justifying the means, and an absence of integration. Incarnational 
theology requires a human life that is embodied, integrated and experienced 
within the body of Christ. Spiritualization, linked with individualism, draws 
the human person away from that locus and hence from the full implications 
of being human. 
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CHAPTER 7 
"SUBMISSION OF HIS WRITINGS TO LAWFUL AUTHORITY"' 
CONCLUSION 
a) Introduction 
It is appropriate now, in this short f inal chapter, to draw together 
the various conclusions I have reached and to summarize what I have done. I 
chose to study Holy Wisdom because it presents the essence of the spiritual 
teaching of Augustine Baker. That teaching has been influential both within 
the English Benedictine Congregation and beyond it. What I established in 
chapter 2 was that Baker's ascetical theology is neither eccentric nor 
unique. Peculiarly receptive to the various spiritual currents around him, 
his work reflects much in common with other ascetical writers. Admittedly, 
there is an unusual feature here, an idiosyncratic nuance there, but his 
theology, and particularly his Christian anthropology, is shared with others 
and may to some extent be taken as representative. In addition, he stands 
at a privileged point in the transmission of various strands of spiritual 
tradition: an English, or rather Welsh, man, established on the Continent in 
the first half of the 17th century, passing on the fruits of patristic and 
medieval piety, but widely read in the spirituality of his own and of the 
previous century. The fact that Holy Wisdom encapsulates so much that was 
considered unexceptionable is important to my purpose. Although my primary 
intent has been to develop a criticism of the particular book, a secondary 
aim has been an investigation of what that book represents. If Holy Wisdom 
succumbs to my criticism, then other writings will not go unscathed. 
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These brief points should re-establish the relevance and the extent 
of what I have tried to do in this thesis. 
b) Incarnational theology as the starting point 
In the general introduction and in chapter 21 defended the process 
of submitting an historical text of the 17th century to a theological 
critique of the 20th. Proponents of H617 Wisdom recommend it as a living 
text of spiritual instruction. Such a recommendation releases the work from 
the security of datedness and makes it fair game for the attention of the 
theological insights of the present day. What I investigated was the 
Christian anthropology of Holy Wisdom, that is, the way in which Baker 
understands the human person. 
My starting point was a particular understanding of incarnational 
theology. This is, of course, an umbrella term covering a range of loosely 
connected views rather than the name of a systematic or monolithic 
theology. Starting from different perspectives, scriptural, philosophical, 
historical and dogmatic, I moved on to draw out in chapter 3a set of 
incarnational principles deriving from the teaching of the second Vatican 
Council and especially of Gaudium et Spes. My intent was to use these to 
provide the basis from which the anthropology of Holy Wisdom would be 
criticized. I suspected that there was a tension between the implications of 
such incarnational theology and the actual spiritual anthropology of Baker. 
My findings in this thesis bear out such a suspicion. 
My incarnational perspective can be summed up very briefly. The 
incarnation of the Son of God, which lies at the heart of most 
understandings of Christianity, entails the goodness of embodied human 
personhood and the central position of the body within the integrated human 
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person. These entailments in turn imply that human experience, of which 
"spiritual" experience is part, occurs within the context of integrated 
personhood. Chapter 3 developed these ideas in some detail. They were used 
in various ways in the core of the thesis, the critique of Holy Wisdom 
carried out in chapters 4-6. 
c) The Issue of conflict: chapter 4 
I approached the text in two main ways. The first was through a 
sensitivity to the pattern of language and a reading between the lines. The 
second was through an analysis of the explicit content. The first way was 
prominent in chapter 4, "The Conflict Model". 
I attempted to spell out the implications of the metaphorical texture 
of the book. I found that a conflict model underlay much of what Baker was 
saying and that this model had considerable implications for anthropology. 
The human person, far from being seen as a centre of integration, was 
viewed as an arena of conflict. Conflict, in itself, is an undeniable part of 
Christian tradition. The opposition to sin lies at thd heart of the New 
Testament witness; the second Vatican Council affirms that "the whole life 
of men ... shows itself to be a struggle ... 
between good and evil. "2 From 
the point of view of the incarnational theologian, however, problems arose 
for Baker because of where he located the conflict. Elements of the human 
person, in themselves neutral if not good, became enemies in the spiritual 
battle. His statement of this was not always explicit: very often the 
implication arose from the cumulative effect of the language chosen. The 
tone of a piece of writing, while communicating with greater subtlety than 
the explicit content, communicates none the less. 
It is not necessary here to rehearse all the issues dealt with in 
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chapter 4. With varying degrees of complexity, the affections and passions, 
the imagination and the senses were seen as foes within the arena of the 
person. Creatures and the world were seen as enemies coming from wILthout. 
The overall effect was that what should be positive within the framework of 
incarnational theology was viewed as negative. In addition, several elements 
of this chapter - the anti-feminist image of nature as a cunning temptress, 
for example - would recur in different ways in my analysis of the more 
explicit content of Holy Wisdom in chapter 5 and 6. 
If I were to sum up chapter 4 as a premise in the skeletal argument 
of this thesis, it would be as follows: Baker (and the spiritual writers who 
share his anthropology) uses a conflict model in expounding the spiritual 
life, but locates the conflict in such a way that it undermines the value of 
embodiment and Antegration. 
d) The individual person: chapter 5 
In chapter 5, while retaining a sensitivity to the linguistic currents 
in the text, I focussed on the more explicit content. A detailed exposition 
of Baker's understanding of the body, the soul, the spirit and the faculties 
of the soul suggested that at root his ideal is an angelic one. The real 
"internal liver" is the one who is moving away from embodied experience to 
something unbodily and "spiritual". Real human personhood for 
Baker is 
located in the soul which must become increasingly emancipated from bodily 
things. His view, once again, represents a strand within Christian 
spirituality that he shares with others. 
This brief summary is, of course, an over- s implif icat ion of what was 
developed in chapter 5. But as a simple premise in the argument of the 




human person as an individual turns on his giving central value to the 
process of spiritualization at the expense of embodiment. 
e) The social person: chapter 6 
The basic method of chapter 6 was the same as that of chapter 5: a 
drawing out of the explicit while retaining an awareness of the impact of 
the imagery. The incarnation leads into the doctrine of the church as body 
of Christ and so, for the incarnational theology I have advocated, human 
personhood is defined and experienced in a social context. In chapter 61 
spelled out Baker's understanding of social features of Christianity such as 
the sacraments, common prayer and relationships. On this subject there was 
perhaps more variety among spiritual writers: in chapter 21 mentioned some 
areas of Baker's teaching that were potentially controversial in his own 
day. But his attitudes were by no means eccentric and what he says was 
considered to be entirely within the bounds of Catholic orthodoxy. 
In terms of the argument of the thesis, chapter 6 makes the 
following assertion: Baker's primary focus on a spiritualized individualism 
is supported by an attitude towards the social dimension of life which 
conflicts with incarnational principles. A disparagement of the social is 
related to a deeper disparagement of the central means of social 
relationship, namely, embodiment. 
f) Synopsis of the argument of the thesis 
It would be valuable now to sum up the previous sections of the 
present chapter as well as the thesis as a whole. In schematic form, my 
argument is as follows: 
233 
Conclusion 
1. H01, y Wisdom is an orthodox work of Catholic spirituality which sinares 
features in common with many other such works (ch 2). 
2. It is also a work of continuing spiritual influence (ch 2). 
Therefore, 3. A criticism of Holy Wisdom is also a criticism of 
other Christian spiritual works that share its anthropology. 
and 4. It may Justifiably be criticized from the perspective of 
modern theological insights. 
5. The incarnat ion, a central doctrine of Christianity, entails the 
goodness of embodied human personhood and the important position of 
the body within the integrated human person. These entailments in turn 
imply that human experience, of which "spiritual" experience is part, 
occurs within the context of integrated personhood (ch 3). 
This is the incarnational perspective, derived from 
the witness of scripture and of later authorities, 
particularly Vatican II, from which the Christian 
anthropology of Holy Wisdom is criticized. 
6. Baker uses a conflict model in expounding the spiritual life, but 
locates the conflict in such a way that it undermines the value of 
embodiment and integration (ch 4). 
7. His understanding of the human person as an individuai turns on his 
giving central value to the process of spiritualization at the expense 
of embodiment (ch 5). 
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B. His primary focus on a spiritualized individualism is supported by an 
attitude towards the social dimension of life which conflicts with 
incarnational principles. A disparagement of the social is related to 
a deeper disparagement of the central means of social relationship, 
namely, embodiment (ch 6). 
Therefore, from the perspective of incarnational 
theology, the Christian anthropology of Holy Wisdom 
and of many writings that share such anthropology is 
inadequate. 
g) "A time to break down and a time to build up" 
I feel some regret that my findings have resulted in a somewhat 
negative assessment of Baker. Strangely, I feel I would have liked him very 
much as a person. If my conclusion on H617 Wisdom seems more of a whimper 
than a bang, then in this final section I will allow myself the indulgence 
of a little visionary speculation. 
At the conclusion of her assessment of the devotional manuals, 
Margaret Miles identifies their two underlying assumptions: firstly, the 
existence and superior value of a spiritual world; secondly, that individuals 
must resolve to identify with this, extricating themselves from the 
conditions of ordinary life. 3 I would ascribe these with the label 
'Oevaluative dualism". 
In the course of nineteen years of Benedictine monastic life, I have 
come to question first the latter and then the former of these assumptions. 
My doubts arose from a sense of the unity of human personhood: all my 
experiences are my experiences, and not the experiences of a soul or of a 
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body. I came across people who tried to use traditional monast4c practices 
such as silence, solitude and detachment as an escape route, a way of living 
an angelic life rather than of coming to terms with the full implications of 
being a human being. I do not for a moment deny that some people have 
reached a full and integrated humanity through monastic life; for others, 
however, the life has caused or enhanced a process of disintegration. Their 
humanity has been atrophied and they have been left with a deep and 
unarticulated bitterness and misery. 
Reflecting on the incarnation and the goodness of creation made me 
realize that the divine is known in integrated human experience. No doubt 
there are moments of more intense communion with God; quiet reflection 
enhances our sense of human personhood; the prayer of praise, the practice 
of lectio divina, times of solitude, detachment from the urge to possess or 
control, all these can lead to a deeper, freer humanity. But at the end of 
the day, being an embodied human person is grounded in Joyful relationships 
with others, in serving and, in turn, being cared for, in creative work, in 
insistent concern for what is Just and right, in the feel of the wind and 
the sting of seawater and the fresh, transient smell of bluebells. 
Now angels cannot delight in bluebells: to do so is our duty and our 
privilege, if we are being ourselves, that is, human beings. A fundamental 
misapprehension of Baker and of the ascetical teaching he represents is 
that these things of the senses and nature, of the affections and of human 
friendships, are somehow preliminary. For him, and perhaps even more for 
Augustine before him, if they are used as anything other than signposts, 
then they become shackles, coarse chains that hold back the soul from 
soaring. Now this view of theirs requires a spiritual world that is greater 
than the material and a human soul that is spiritual and is the locus of 
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essential human personhood. 
It may be the case that we cannot avoid language suggesting division, 
that ambivalent words such as "spiritual" and "material" must be retained. 
The problem with them is that they inevitably suggest a greater degree of 
dis-integration than is appropriate. My experience, supported by the 
implications of incarnational theology and in harmony with such "modern" 
concerns as feminist theology and eco-theology, suggests that the direction 
for true Christian development is towards integrated experience. ' In other 
words all our human experiences form a sacramental matrix and "spiritual" 
does not mean "unbodily" or "other" but refers to a quality of depth or 
intensity. 
Holy Wisdom has its strengths: there is a value in restraining greed, 
in savouring obedience, in spending time in prayer. Perhaps, at root, we and 
Baker are concerned with the same fundamentals. There is no doubt that 
traditional spiritual teaching has helped many men and women to richness of 
life. But for today his anthropology is an articulation that bewilders, a 
teaching that misleads. To move on from where Baker has led, in search of 
new language, is no discredit to him, but an inescapable quality of the 
religious enterprise itself. 
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CHAPTER 3 
1. HW, p378. 
2. It is interesting that modern discussions of spirituality often take 
for granted an incarnational stance. In his review of B. McGinn, 1. 
Meyendorff & J. Leclercq, Christian Spirituality: Origins to the 12th 
Century (RKP, London, 1986), Anthony Meredith perceptively notes: "If 
there is a discernible and (? ) intentional emphasis of this valuable 
work, it is the attempt to deplatonize spirituality" (The Month (Feb 
1987), p 82). He points out the relative neglect of Origen in the book 
and concludes: "rhe attempt to offer a version of Christian 
spirituality which is both incarnational and socially relevant may 
be a 
form of apologetics, but it may end up by recommending a somewhat 
eviscerated version of the phenomenon it hopes to describe. " 
Lavinia Byrne makes a similar observation in her review of Cheslyn 
Jones, Geoffrey Wainwright & Edward Yarnold (eds), The Study of 




main part of the book and asks: "Where are the c-l^f-beat characters ý; ho 
serve to remind us that holiness is more than wholeness or even more 
than toeing a party line? " (The Month (Jan 1987), p 44). 
3. Margaret Miles has also noted this point: "Theological writings exhibit 
neither the wealth of practical advice nor the blatantly dualistic, 
individualistic and privatistic focus that characterizes the literature 
of Christian devotion" (772e Ima8-e and Practice of Holiness (SCM, 
London, 1989), p ix). 
See J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (A &C Black, London, 
1968), p 141. Docetism claimed that Christ's manhood was unreal. 
IrUearly its ultimate roots were Graeco-Oriental assumptions about 
divine impassibility and the inherent impurity of matter ... it was an 
attitude that infected a number of heresies, particularly Marcionism 
and Gnosticism. " With regard to Marcionism and Gnosticism see J. 
Stevenson, A New Eusebius (SPCK, London, 1968). He quotes Irenaeus with 
reference to the followers of the Gnostic Valentinus: '7hey deny that 
(the Saviour) assumed anything material, since indeed matter is 
incapable of salvation" (p 89), and Tertullian with reference to 
Marcion: Marcion held that "salvation will be the attainment only of 
those souls which had learned his doctrine; while the body, as having 
been taken from the earth, is incapable of sharing in salvation" (p 
101). 
5. Cf the following quotations, from Leo Sherley-Price's edition: "Only 
with reluctance would (the saints) provide for the needs of the body" 
(p 47); "Every bodily pleasure brings joy at first but at length it 
bites and destroys" (p 52); "The inner life of man is greatly hindered 
by the needs of the body" (p 55); "Doubly woe to those who love this 
miserable and corruptible life" (p 55). From 7he Imitation of Christ 
(Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973 119521). Baker translated some of the 
works of Thomas A Kempis: see p 61 of present thesis. 
6. A further question, which cannot be dealt with 
extent to which the classic conciliar statemei 
themselves sufficiently incarnational in the 
developing that notion here. 
7. One is reminded of the Catechism on which 
Catholic children were brought up: see questions 
in this thesis, is the 
its on Christology are 
ways in which I am 
generations of Roman 
4-8. 
8. Church Dogmatics, Vol 3, Pt 2 (T &T Clark, Edinburgh, 1960), pp 380f. 
9. For Orphism and Pythagoreanism, see W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of 
Greek Philosophy, Vol 1 (Cambridge UP, 1971), pp 150f, 198f; for the 
influence of Pythagoreanism on Plato see Guthrie, Vol 3, (Cambridge UP, 
1975), p 32. 
10. Iliad, xxiii, 100. 
Phaedo, 70a, 80d. All Plato references are to Edith Hamilton & 
Huntington Cairns (eds). The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Bollingen 









18.81d, cf Phaedrus, 250c. 
19.80 b. 
20. Cf the disputed dialogue Greater Hipplas, 295c. 
21. Timaeus, 87d seq. 
22. Republic, 5.462d. 
23. Timaeus, 34c. 
24. Laws, 10.892a. 
25. Republic, 5.462d, 9.585d. 
26. See J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge UP, 1969). 
27. See J. M. Rist, Epicurus (Cambridge UP, 1972). 
28. R. T. Wallis, Neo-Platonism (Duckworth, London, 1972), p 9; Wallis 
quotes Porphyry's Life of Plotinus. 
29. A. H. Armstrong, The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early 
Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge UP, 1967), p 229. 
30. A. H. Armstrong and R. A. Markus, Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy 
(DLT, London, 1960), p 44. 
31. See note 4; also, E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian In an Age of Anxiety 
(Cambridge UP, 1965), ch 2, and Hans Lietzmann, A History of the Early 
Church, Vols 1&2 (Lutterworth, London, 1967 (19611), pp 270f. 
32. H. W. Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament (SCM, Londcn, 1974). 
33. Ibid pp 10f. 
34. Ibid p 26. 
35. G. F. Moore, Judaism, Vol 2 (Harvard UP, Cambridge, 1927), p 295; for 
further discussion, see Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellen,, 4sm (London, 
SCM, 1974), RP 196f. 
251 
Notes 
36. "I D. S. Russell, The Method and Message of' lewish Apocalypt-'c (London, 
SCM, 1964), p 145. 
37. Cf G. Kittel and G. Friedrich (eds), Theolciýical Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol 7 (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1971), p 1057: "Even when 
one counts all the instances (of awpa) in the Synoptic Gospels there 
are still only 51 as compared with 91 in Paul's Epistles. When the 
technical use for corpse or slave is omitted, the ratio is 91 to 33 in 
Paul's favour. " 
38. Ibid p 1057. 
39. Ibid p 1060. 
40. Hans Conzelmann, An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament (SCM, 
London, 1969), p 176. 
41. Ibid p 178. 
42. D. E. H. Whiteley, The Theology of St Paul (Blackwell, Oxford, 1974 
(19641), p 39. 
43. Conzel-mann (1969), p 179. 
44. Whiteley (1974), p 44. 
45. All references to the Rule are from Timothy Fry (ed), RB 1980: The 
Rule of St Benedict (Liturgical Press, Collegeville, 1981); the present 
reference is ch 73: 8, p 297. 
46. Ibid p91. 
47. See Adalbert de VogU6 and Jean Neufville, La R66gle de Saint Be-noft, Vol 
2 (Cerf, Paris, 1972), p 708. 
48. Ch 61: 6, pp 274f. 
49. Respectively, ch 4: 11, p 183, quoting 1 Cor 9: 27; ch 57: 5, p 265, 
referring to Acts 5: 1-11; chs 33: 4, p 231 & 58: 25, pp 269f, alluding to 
1 Cor 7: 4. 
50. Respectively, ch 53: 7, p 257; ch 7: 62, p 201. 
51. Ch 72: 5, p 295. 
52. Ch 7: 8-9, p 193. 
53. De VogUd & Neufville, Vol 2, p 691. 
54. Ch 2: 31,33,34,37,38, pp 177f - all in the chapter on the qualities 
of the abbot; ch 31: 8, p 229; ch 41: 5, p 241 etc. 
2 55. Respectively, ch 2: 29, p 177, quoting Prov 223: 14; ch 7: 4, p 194-1, quoting 




















Ch 27: 6, pp 224f; he means spiritually sick. 
See ch 5, sect ion II. 
Cf RB 80, p 95: 11rhe Rule offers no theories about the life of prayer. " 
Ibid p 578. 
Ch 52: 4, p 255. 
See ch 4. 
Respectively, ch 53: 7,15, pp 257,259; ch 36: 1, p 235; ch 2: 2 & ch 63: 13, pp 173 & 279. 
The Substance of the Rule of St Benedict, p 1. 
Ibid p 2. 
ST 1 a, 75-83, Prologue, p 3, quoted from Timothy Suttor 
Blackfriars edition, Vol 11 (Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1970). 
ST la, 75,4 (p 19). 
Ibid p 19, footnote c). 
ST la, 75,7 (p 37). 
ST la, 76,1 (p 43). 
ST la, 76,1 (p 49). 
Ibid p 2, footnote a). 
Ibid p xvi. 
(ed), 
73. The second Vatican Council ended in 1965, but its thinking has 
remained an inspiration for Catholic as well as for more general 
Christian thought; the latest assessment of Gaudium et 5ý>es is by Enda 
McDonagh, published in Adrian Hastings (ed), Modern Catholicism: 
Vatican II and After (SPCK, London, 1991), pp 96-112. McDonagh argues 
that "twenty-five years on it is still a powerful and inspiring 
document" (p 110) despite limitations with regard to some of the 
specific topics with which it attempted to deal. Nevertheless, "its 
influence has depended not on its precise analysis or formulations, 
but on the direction and concern it so clearly indicated. " (ibid) 
74. All quotations from Austin Flannery (ed), Vatican Council II: the 
Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents (Fowler Wright, Leominster, 1980 
(19751); present reference, art 2, p 904. 
75. Quoted in Adrian Hastings, A Concise Guide to the Documents of the 
Second Vatican Council, Vol 2 (DLT, London, 1969), p 16. 
253 
Notes 
76. GS art 3, p 904.1 have retained the term "man" when quW 
from the 1960s translation. 
77. In Herbert Vorgrimler (ed), Commentary on the Documents of Vatlca, -i II, 
Vol 5 (B & 0, London and Herder, New York, 1969), p 71. 
78. Ibid p 119. 
79. Ibid p 126. 
80. Ratzinger in Vorgrimler, p 129. 
81. GS art 1, p 903. 
82. GS art 25, p 926. The document explicitly alludes to Aquinas, I Ethic., 
Lect 1. 
83. GS art 32, pp 931f. 
84. Hastings (1991), p 102. 
85. McDonagh argues that the Council would have achieved a more complete 
anthropology if it had recognized even more "that the person may only 
be person as person-in-relationships-in-structures, as person-in- 
community ... " (ibid). 
86. See, for example, Raymond Brown, The Gospel According to Tchn I-XII 
(Chapman, London, 1971), p 4. 
87. Jn 1: 3; cf Col 1: 15f and the Niceno-Constantinopolitan creed. 
88. Brown, p cxxii. 
89. Prov 8: 29f. 
90. Wis 7: 24. 
91. Rom 8: 21; this is a theme echoed in the writings of Teilhard de 
Chardin. 
92. DS 800, "Creator ... utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem 
et corporalem ... 1, 
93. Vatican I quotes Lateran IV, see DS 3002. 
94. GS art 12, p 914. 
95. HW, pI 
96. Robert Butterworth, The Theology of Creatlon (Mercier, Cork, 19-69), 
16. 
97. Ernest Evans (ed), Tertullians Treatise on the Resurrection (SKK, 
London, 1960, % p 19 (ch 6). 
254 
Notes 
98. Cf Enda McDonagh in Hastings (1991). Refer, ring to GS he wriites "its 
openness to the world of its time built on ... the c)'Ioneer, -r, ýz theological work of ... Rahner ... 11 (p 96). 
99. Karl Rahner, Theolo8-ical Investi8-ations, vol 17 (DLT, London, 1981), 
"The Body in the Order of Salvation", p 75. 
100. TheoloElcal Investi8, ations, Vol 6 (London, 1969), "The UnIAty of Spi-it 
and Matter in Christian Faith", p 160. 
101. Thomas V. Morris, ne Logic of God Incarnate (Cornell UF, Ithaca, 1986), 
p 142. 
102. Ibid pp 62f. 
103, GS art 22, pp 922f. 
104. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol 3, Pt 2, p 347. 
105. Theological Investigations, Vol 6, p 169. 
106. Evans (1960), p 24 (ch 8). 
107. Ibid p 25. 
108. See, for example, ST la, 75,7 (Blackfriars, London, 1970), p 37: "the 
soul in a certain fashion demands the body in order to act. " See also 
ST, la, 76; John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theolp8-y (SCM, 
London, 1971 [19661), p 65 and, from a rather different starting-point, 
Antony Flew, The Presumption of Atheism (Elek/Pemberton, London, 1976), 
pp 110f. 
109. Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed. 
110. See note 106. 
111.1 Cor 12: 27, cf Rom 12: 5. 
112. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol 1 (Nisbet, Welwyn, 1968 119511), 
p 265. 
113. Col 1: 18, cf 2: 9. 
114. Eph 5: 23f. 
115. Lumen Gentlum, art 1, p 350. 
116. GS, arts 13 & 14, pp 914f. 
117. See present chapter, end of section D. 
118. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropolo87y in Theological Perspective (T &T 
Clark, Edinburgh, 1985), p 235. 
255 
Notes 
119. A. Kosnik et al (eds), Human 5exuality: Mew Directions 
-4n Ca., cc Thought (Search Press, London, 1977), p 1. 
120. Ibid p 86. 
12 1. Ibid p 82. 
122. "rhe Integrative Power of Religion", Review for Religious, Vol 42, Pt 3 
(May/Jun 1983), p 416. 
123. "Psychotherapy: The Healing of the Mind", Review For ReliElous, Vol 41, 
Ft 2 (Mar/Apr 1982), p 272. 
124. Being Human (Chapman, London, 1984), p 91. 
125. Ibid p 106. 
126. "Spiritual Friendship", The Wa7, Supplement 10 (Sum 1970), p 71, 
quoting De Veritate 26,7 ad 7. 
127. "The God of the Scriptures: an Invitation to Passionate Prayer", Review 
for Religious, Vol 48, Pt 5 (Sep/Oct 1989), p 651. 
128. William F Kraft, "Negative Feelings Can Foster Positive Growth", Review 
for Religious, Vol 42, Pt 2 (Mar/Apr 1983), p 253. 
129. Pannenberg (1985), p 265. 
130. Quoted by Peter Brown, 7he Body & Society (Faber, London, 1989), p 31. 
131. GS art 2, p 904. 
132. Cf GS art 22, pp 922f. 
133. GS art 12, p 913. 
134. Theological Investigations, Vol 2 (DLT, London, 1963), "The Resurrection 
of the Body", p 206. 
CHAPTER 4 
1. HW p21. 
2. Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford UP, 
1985), p 15. 
3. Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God In Rel4lous 
Language (SCM, London, 1983), p 15. 
4,. On the relationship between model and metaphor see Soskice, p 
55. 
There can be models which are not metaphors, eg physical models. 
For 




not be of concern because we are dealing wi, -, ý, language. In the c--ntex. of the present chapter the conflict model is a broad way of look'-,; ý at the spiritual life based on a widespread an-' varied use of conflict 
metaphors. 
5. ES R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge UP, 1968 119531), 
P 92: "There are great advantages in thinking about a scientif-4c theory through the medium of thinking about a model for it. " A Iso, Ian T. Ramsey, Models and Mystery (Oxford UP, 1964), ch , "Model-s in the natural sciences and in theology"; Soskice, ch 6; McFague, ch 3. 
6. Eg Ramsey, ibid, also Models for Divine Activity (SCM, London, 1973), 
Christian Empiricism (Sheldon, London, 1974); Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (Gill & Macmillan, Dublin, 1976); McFague, ch 4. 
7. Models and Myster7, passim. 
Op cit p 180. Although Dulles is primarily concerned with ecclesiology 
his comments have relevance in other areas of theology. 
9. See eg Peter C. Craigie, The Fý-oblem of War In the Old Testament 
(Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1978). 
10. On the Holy War, see eg Walther Zimmerli, The Old Testament and the 
World (SPCK, London, 1976), pp 57f. 
11. See eg Walther Eichrodt, Theolog-y of the Old Testament, Vol 1, (SCM. 
London, 1964 119611), pp 139f; Gerhard Von Rad, Old Testament 




Eichrodt, op cit Vol 2 (SCM, London, 1967), p 324. 
Ibid p 329. 
Chaim Herzog and Mordechai Gichon, Battles of the Bible (Book Club 
Associates, London, 1978), p 14. 
15. Even St Benedict, a frequent authority for Baker, recognizes that the 
Old Testament needs to be used with discernment: in advising his monks 
what to read at night he says, "but not the Heptateuch or the Books of 
Kings, because it will not be good for those of weak understanding to 
hear these writings at that hour" (RB 80, ch 42: 4, p 243). 
16. For general remarks on the cursing psalms, see eg S. Mowinckel, The 
Psalms in Israel's Worship, Vol 2 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1962), ch X1. 
17. See eg Roland de Vaux, Ancient Israel (DLT, London, 1961), ch 4. 
Standard histories are Martin Noth, The History of Israel (A &C Black, 
London, 1965 119581) and John Bright, A History of Israel (SCM, London, 
1966 (19601). 
18. Eg Is 49: 15, Hos 11: 1 f. 
19. Eg Song of ! jongs. 
25 7 
N -es ot 
20. For Marcion, see Henry Chadwick, Th e Eaf-ly Ch urch (Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1967), pp 38f; J. Stevenson (ed), A Mew Eusebius (SFCK, 
London, 1968), passim. 
21. As an example of the pagan use of alleFory, Origen quotes Cels, -s' 
reference to Homer; see Henry Chadwick (ed), OrI8-en: Contra Ceýsý, n 
(Cambridge UP, 1980 [19531), ch 42 (pp 357f). 
22. See David Winston, Philo of Alexandria (Faulist Fress, New York, 1`98 D. 
23. Nicholas de Lange, OrI8, en and the Tews (Cambridge UP, 1976); )'oseph 
Wilson Trigg, Ori8, en (SCM, London, 1985 119831). 
24. Op cit p 120. 
25. For a positive modern discussion of allegory, see Andrew Louth, 
Discernin8- the Mystery: an Essay on the Nature of Theology (Oxford UP, 
1983), pp 96f. 
26. An obvious example is his favourable quotation of Hilton's parable of 
a pilgrim U, 1,6); see note 98. 
27. Trigg, p 125. 
28. See eg 1 Pet 2: 13,17; Mk 12: 17; Tit 3: 1; 1 Tim 6: 1; Eph 6: 5. 
29. See eg Lk 21: 12, Jn 16: 2; also Rev. 
30. See eg Mt 10: 34f, 19: 29. 
31. Chapter 2 section e). 
32. See Oxford En871ish Dictionary, entry "flesh". 
33. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, "Pauline Theology" in lerome Biblical Commentary 
(Chapman, London, 1969), p 820. 
34. Rom 7: 15,18. 
35. Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Vol 1 (SCM, London, 
1968 [19521), p 191. 
36. See chapter 2, section e). 
37. On the evil imagination see N. P. Williams, The Ideas of the Fall and 
of Original Sin (Longman, Green & Co, London, 1927). 
38. A. Vanneste, 'q-a Pr6histoire du ddcret du Concile de Trente sur le 
pechds originel", ]Vouvelle Revue Thddologique, 
Vol 86, No 5 (May 
pp 357f. 
39. In Rom. 4,7, quoted by Vanneste, p 360. 
40. DS 792. 
258 
Notes 
41. See eg P. Kline, Fact and Fantasy in Freudian 7-c-cry 
1972). 
42. See eg E. Storr (ed), Tung: Selected WritinEs (F,: rtana, '-on-1c, -i. 
43. See note 37. 
4.4. ST 1a2ae 30,1, quoted in Dictionnaire de SpiritLj, 3--'ýj, Vol 
(Beauchesne, Paris, 1937), p 1347. Some of the material that fol-', 3 ý4 
comes f rom the Dictionnaire article, "Concupiscence", by Charles 
Baumgartner. 
4.5. Karl Rahner, Theolo87ical Investigations, Vol I (DLT, London, 1961), "The 
Theological Concept of Concupiscentia", pp 352f. 
46. Dlctionnalre de Spiritualltes, p 1347. 
47. Leo Scheffczyk, "Concupiscence", in Sacramentum Mundi, Vol 1 (B & 0, 
London, 1968), p 403. 
48, Ibid p 404. 
49. See chapter 3, section n). 
50. Dictionnaire de Splrituallt6, Vol 1 (Beauchesne, Paris, 1937), p 235. 
51. ST 1a2ae 22-30, Blackfriars edition, Vol 19 (London, 1967), pp xxif. 
52. la2ae 59,1. 
53.2a2ae 58,9. 
54.1 a2 ae 2 4,3. 
55. F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics (Chatto & Windus, London, 1975), p 63; J. M. 
Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge UP, 1969), p 26. 
56. Rist, p 26. 
57. Sandbach, p 62. 
58. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theolo8-, v, Vol 1, pp 15f. 
59. Timothy Suttor (ed) in ST, Blackfriars edition, Vol 11, p 271. 
60. Rahner finds such a doctrine in the writings 
development into the modern period: see Theol 
16 CDLT, London, 1979), 7he 'Spiritual Senses' 
"rhe Doctrine of the 'Spiritual Senses' 
Interestingly, he finds this teaching in 
important authorities for Baker (p 130). 
of Origen and traces its 
ogical Investigations, Vol 
according to Origen" and 
in the M idd le Ages". 
Harphius and Blosius, 
61. For further comments, see chapter 5, section o). 
259 
Not es 
62. Henry Herp, d 1477. 
63. Present chapter, section k). 
64. Chapter 5, section h). 
65. His positive view of spirit will be discussed in ch 5, part III. 
66. Chapter 5, section e). 
67. Charles Davis, Body as Spirit (H & S, London, 1976). 
68. DS, C, 7 
69. Ernest Evans (ed), St Augustine's Enchirldion (SPCK, London, 1953), p 25 
(ch 27); see also note p 116. Other references to massa damnata and 
similar concepts are given in Louis A. Arand (ed), St Augustine: Faith, 
Hope and Charitv (Newman Bookshop, Westminster, Maryland, 1947), p 122, 
note 65. 
70. See feminist analysis generally, eg, Susan Griffin, Woman and Nature 
(Women's Press, London, 1984 (19781). 
71. Brown (1989), eg pp 26t 34,39,112. 
72. Council of Orange II, see DS 383. 
73. Council of Trent, see DS 1511. 
74. How far 7he Cloud suggests a disparagement of creatures remains 
debatable; see eg James Walsh (1981), p xv. 
75. Kittel, Vol 111 (1965), p 893. For a discussion of the use of this 
crucial word in GS, see, eg, Hastings (1969), pp 22f. 
76. See J. B. Bauer, Enc7clopedis of Biblical 7heology, Vol 3 (Sheed & Ward, 
London, 1970), p 808. 
77. For patristic references to the devil, see M. J. Rouet de Journel, 
Enr-hirldion Patristicum (Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1956), "Index 
theologicus", 210,413,420. 
78. See, for instance, Armand Veilleux (ed), Pachomian Koinonia, Vol 3 
(Cistercian Publications, Kalamazoo, 1982), p 39; Ldon Cristiani, La 
Spi. ritualit6 du D6sert: Cassien, Vol 2 (Editions de Fontenelle, St 
Wandrille, 1946), pp 135f; Peter Brown, The World of Late Antiquity (", 
& H, London, 1971), pp 53f, 101f, and Society and the Holy In Late 
Antiquity (Faber, London, 1982), pp 123f. 
79. In Evagrius, for example; see John Eudes Bamberger (ed), Evagrius 
Ponticus, The Praktikos (Cistercian Fublications, Spencer, 1970), pp 3f; 
cf "Evagrius is well aware of the distinction between the demons and 




80. RB 80, p 622. 
81. DS, C1 ab. 
82. Ibid C 2cb, D la. 
83. Ibid D 2c. 
84. Cf Rom 8: 26. 
85. On p1 Baker quotes St Bernard; cf Rom 5: 5. 
86. Cf Council of Trent on justification, DS 1561. 
87. See chapter 1, part II and chapter 2, section m). 
88. Antony Low (1970), p 116. 
89. Eg Merchant of Venice, Act II, scene 2. 
90. Cf Edward Yarnold, The Second Gift (St Paul's Publications, Slough, 
1974). 
91. Aristotle is a witness; see W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek 
Philosophy, Vol 6 (Cambridge UP, 1981), pp 396f. For Aristotle, theoria 
is "the pleasantest and best activity" (p 260). Theoria of Greek 
philosophy is not exactly the same as Christian "contemplation", 
although the theoris language is used by Christian writers. 
92. For a detailed discussion of this in Augustine, Gregory and Bernard, 
see Cuthbert Butler, Western Mysticism (Constable, London, 1922), pp 
195f. For a comment on the development of the distinction among 
Dionysians, see James Walsh (ed), The Cloud of Unknowing (Paulist 
Press, New York, 1981), pp 61f. 
93. See eg chs XVIIf. 
94. See . 5ecretum, which sees the move towards passive contemplation as 
the way of perfection, and Commentary, where the position adopted by 
The Cloud is re-affirmed. 
95. See chs XVII, XVIII. 
96. Cf 59, where actives are discouraged from meddling in contemplative 
matters. 
97. See chapter 1, section f) and chapter 6, section n). 
98. Hilton, bk 2, ch 21. This parable is quoted in full. It is an allegory 
of the pilgrim soul journeying to Jerusalem, spurred on by love of 
Jesus to overcome all difficulties. It is characterized by a warm 
devotion which contrasts with the style of the rest of Holy Wisdom, 
although it presumes an anthropology similar to Baker's and has a 
considerable -amount of conflict imagery. 
261 
Not es 
99. Eg "curritur via mandatorum Del" (Prol 49, p 166); "Ad malorem ... doctrinae virtutumque culmina perven. 4es" (ch 73: 9,291! -: ), and 
others. 
100. The last probably taken from Barbanson's Secr-ets Sentlerýs. 
101. Garcfa Colombds, "The Ancient Concept of the Monastic Life" in Monastic 
Studies, Epiphany 1964, p 78. 
102. Ibid p 79. 
103. See RB 80, note on Prologue 3: "Military metaphors for the spiritual 
life recur throughout RB, both in borrowings from RM and in original 
passages and are indeed a commonplace already in the New Testament ... 
and in Hellenistic philosophy" (p 158); the combat here is against the 
devil and vices (p 581). 
104. Juan de Castaniza OSB, The Spiritual Conflict and Conquest (BO & W, 
London, 1874). The editor of this edition is Canon Vaughan OSB. The 
first English edition of the work was produced in 1598. Vaughan 
argues in his preface that it was very popular among the early 
members of the restored EBC, Baker's contemporaries. Strangely, 
however, I can find no reference in Holy Wisdom to Castaniza or to his 
works (but see chapter 2, section g) with regard to Cressy). 
The real author of 7he Spiritual Conflict and Conquest is not 
Castaniza, in fact, but Lorenzo Scupoli; although not referred to in 
Holy Wisdom, Baker certainly knew it and quoted it favourably (see P. 
Spearritt (1975), p 37). A recently published article quotes a 
translation by Baker of a passage from Suso in which the prevailing 
image is warfare (Owen & Bell (1989), pp 2810. 
105. See especially chapter 5, section h). 
CHAPTER 5 
1. HW, p280. 
2. For a summary of the medieval notion, see, eg Brian Stone, Cha u cer: A 
Critical Study (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987), ch 15. 
3. DS 462. 
Phaedrus 250c, cf Phaedo 81f and Cratylus 400c where he attributes 
the belief to "Orphic poets". 
Cf DS 5,10,11,12 etc. 
6. Cf Acts 17: 32. 
7. Cf for instance, G. W. Butterworth (ed), Origen: On First Principles 
(SPCK, London, 1936), 4.4.10, p 327. 
262 
Not es 
8. See G. W. H. Lampe (ed), A Patristic Greek Lexicon 1-ý78 
(19611), awpa, pp 1362f. 
9. ES Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (eds): Methodius, Second 
Discourse on the Resurrection" in The Works of Methodlus etc (T &T 
CLark, Edinburgh, 1874). 
10. DS 403. 
11. P, p66. 
12. See Margaret Miles' general remarks about suffering and devotion in 
The Ima8-e and Practice of Holiness (SCM, London, 1989), pp 173f; she 
warns, however, of the danger of an attitude that overvalues pain and 
suffering. 
13. B. Shlemon, D. Linn and M. Linn, To Heal as Tesus Healed (Ave Maria 
Press, Notre Dame, 1978), pp 55f. 
14. DS 1696, quoted by Paul VI, apostolic constitution: The Sacrament of 
Anointing of the Sick (Nov 30th 1972); see Pastoral Care of the Sick: 
Rites of Anointing and Viaticum (Chapman, London, 1983), p 6. 
15. Introduction to the interim translation of The Rite of Anointing and 
Pastoral Care of' the Sick (Liturgical Books, Dolmen, Dublin, 1974), p 
16. 
16. ST 1 a, 50,1. 
17. Ibid 1 a, 5 1,1. 
18. Heb 2: 5,10. 
19. Among the early monks an angelic condition was something desirable. 
See, eg A. -J. FestugiLhre, Les Moines D'Orient, Vol IV/1, "Enqud3te sur 
les Moines dEgypte 6VIstoria Monachorum in Egypto)" (Cerf, Paris, 
1964): Abbd Or was I'd1apparence tout ang6lique" (p 29); of Abba B6s, 
Olson maintien tout ang6lique" (p 36); of the holy man Thdon: "On 
pouvalt le voir le visa8-e tout an8-ddllque" (p 42). Interestingly, the 
angelic aspect was sometimes linked with a transfigured bodily 
appearance: eg, in the Vie de Saint Euthyme: "ll avalt l'air d'un ange 
... Pour ce qui est 
de l1aspect corporel, son visa8-e 6talt rond, 
brillant, blanc, avec des yeux pergants ... " FestugiLhre, Les Moines 
D'Orient, Vol III/1, Mes Moines de Palestine, Cyrille de Scythopolls: 
Vie de Saint Euthyme" (Cerf, Paris, 1962), p 113). However, even a 
favourable commentator concedes that "the caricature of the monk as a 
world-hater (is) unfortunately often supported by evidence from 
monastic literature itself" (Columba Stewart, The World of the Desert 
Fathers Tairacres, Oxford, 1986), p 6). 
Specifically on the link between the treatment of the body and 
angelism: "ro combat temptations some stood naked in cold wells or 
rolled in the thorn bushes. Ideally, the monk should aim fior an angelic 
apathy in which his sexual passions would be completely dead to any 
stimulation", - (James A. Mohler, The Heresy of 
MonastlcJsm (Alba House, 
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New York, 1970), p 73). If the Dialogues of St Gregory 3r-e to be 
believed even Benedict, the moderate patriarch of western mcnasticism 
indulged in naked thorn-rolling to subdue sexual urges (FL 66, col 
132). The desirability of quasi-angelic sexlessness is found in 
Theodoret (c. 393-c. 460): "Il est un point toutefois oCj les moines se 
rapprocheront vraiement des an8'es, cest ffardant la virginit6. Les 
anges n'on t pas de sexes ... LA r6side leur saintet6" (Fierre Canivet: 
"Thdodoret et le monachisme syrien avant le concile de Chalc6doine" In 
7*h6ologie de la Vie Monastique (Aubier, Ligugd, 1961), p 254). 
20. Vol 11 (Blackfriars, London, 
chapter 3, section g). 
21. Ibid pp 18f (ST Ia, 75,4). 
1970) p xvi; see also my comments in 
22. Ibid p 49 (ST la, 76,1). 
23. Council of Vienne, AD 1312, DS 902. 
24. DS 1440,2828. 
25.1 have been able to find only one place where a soul is referred to 
with the masculine pronoun: Baker has been talking at length about the 
young beginner in the monastic life (he), then he suddenly shifts to 
"soul": "Whereas, if a good foundation of spiritual prayer were once 
laid, such a soul, by being applied to his studies or external offices 
(154). 
26. It is interesting to note that in the Cloud of Unknowing one chapter 
is headed "In this exercise a soul is absolved of his particular sins 
(ch xxiii) and another "How a soul must dispose itself to suppress 
all awareness ... " (ch xliv). As far as 
I can tell there is no use in 
this work of the feminine pronoun. 
27. Animus also exists, but it is used in the Vulgate far less frequently 
than anims (1% columns to anima's ten in F. P. Dutripon. Vulgatae 
Editionis Bibliorum Sacrorum Concordantiae (Bloud & Barral, Paris, 9th 
edition, nd) and only occasionally to mean "soul". 
28. The suggestion that the feminine implies passivity before a 
divine 
initiative is not, to the best of my knowledge, found in Holy Wisdom. 
It would be wrong, however, to dismiss it as an anachronistic 
idea. 
Contemporaneous witnesses include St John of the Cross (1542-91) and 
John Donne (1572-1631). The former writes in the first person singular 
of the soul, the amada: 
Oh noche, que junaste 
amado con amads, 
amada en el Amado transformada! 
and proceeds with erotic imagery: "And 
I caressed him/ In breezes f. -cm 
the fan of cedars blown" (Gerald Brenan, St 
John of the Cross: His Life 
and Poetry (Cambridge UP, 1973), pp 145f). 
John Donne writes in one of 
his "divine meditations": 
Yet dearly'l love you, and wou'. d be loved fain, 
But am ýetrothed unto your enemy, 
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Divorce me, untie, or break that knot again, 
Take me to you, imprison me, for I 
Except you enthral me, never shall be free, 
Nor ever chaste, except you ravish me. 
(A. 1. Smith (ed), Tohn Donne: The Complete English Poems (Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1971), pp 314f). Both these witnesses are, of course, 
men. 
29, With reference to a section of the Baker MS Book D, Placid Spearritt 
suggests that the scribe of Ampleforth MS 49, Dom Benedict Preston, 
"tries to change the pronouns for the soul from masculine to feminine" 
("A Baker Centenary", Ampleforth Tournal, Vol LXXX, Pt III (Aut 1975), 
p 36); even if this is correct, Baker MSS written by other scribes use 
"she" (eg De Conver-satione Morum, copied in 1694, in Douai Abbey 
library and The Substance of the Rule of St Bennet, written by Leander 
Prichard in 1650 (Stanbrook, 1981)). Baker himself may not have been 
consistent, but my point is not altered: Holy Wisdom and a substantial 
body of spiritual literature do use "she". 
30. Cf section e) of present chapter. 
31. A similar distinction is made explicit at the opening of Blosius' A 
Book of Spiritual Instruction: 
1. The one rational soul may be considered in three ways, and is 
therefore called by three names. 
2. It is called anima, soul, if it is considered as to its exterior 
and interior senses, and sensitive appetite or desire. 
3. It is called spiritus, spirit, if it is considered in its 
rational powers: memory, intellect and will. 
4. It is called mens, mind, or the apex of the mind, if looked at 
in its essence, as the image of God and turned to him. 
5. Often, however, the different names are used indiscriminately. 
(Ludovicus Blosius, A Book of Spiritual Instruction (B & 0, London, 
1955 119001), p 1, (edited by a Benedictine of Stanbrook). 
32. Cf ST la, 78-80. 
33. A parallel to this way of talking is found in Julian of Norwich: eg 
"And these two parts were in Christ, the higher and the lower, which 
are only one soul. The higher part was always at peace with God in 
full Joy and bliss. The lower part, which is sensuality, suffered for 
the salvation of mankind. " (Edmund Colledge and James Walsh (eds), 
. Tullan of Morwich: 
Showings (Paulist Press, New York, 1978), ch 55, p 
288). There is no reference to Julian in Holy Wisdom, as far as I can 
discover, and she does not feature among Baker's formal translations 
(see Placid Spearritt in American Benedictine Review (Sept 1974) pp 
Jon 310f). However, he did know and translate her: a sect, of her 
-hology" (see Owen Showings appears in the MS called "The Upholland Ant 
and Bell (1989), pp 277f). Showings became known to the readling public 
in the 1670 edition of Serenus Cressy (Colledge and Walsh, p 17) and 
"we owe the preservation of the long text to the piety and 
learninz of 
Augustine Baker and his spiritual school" (ibid p 22). 
34. See section p) for further comments. 
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See section e). 
3 16. What Paul says on this subject is, admittedly, complex and 
consistent. 
37. Dictionnalre de Spiritualit4d, Vol 1, Ame, gives an historical. summary 
of the use of the concept. 
38. Ibid col 452. 
39. P, pp 132-135. 
40. P, p 134. 
41. Dictionnalre, col 46 1. 
42. Ibid col 463. 
43. Ibid col 466. 
44. Frank Tobin, Meistar Eckhar-t: 7hought and Langua8-e (Philadelphia UP, 
1986), pp 126f. Tobin lists the relevant literature on the subject. 
45. Ibid p 127. 
46. Ibid pp 138f. 
47. Cf "The interior part draws the exterior by grace, and both will be 
eternally united in bliss through the power of Christ" (Colledge & 
Walsh (eds), p 213). 
48. Maria Shrady and Josef Schmidt (eds), Tauler: Sermons (Paulist Press, 
New York, 1985), sermon 1 on Christmas, p 37. 
49. ST la, 77-83. 
50. Timothy Suttor (ed), ST Vol 11, p 272. 
51. See Low (1970) for a simplified comment on this, pp 75-79. 
52. Cf section 1) of present chapter. 
53. Commentary, p 210. 
54. Ibid p 211. 
55. Of Finding-, p31. 
56. Low, p 78. 
57, Cf ST la, 78,4: "Fantasy or imagination is, as it were, a treasure 
'11. p store of forms received through the senses" (Blackfriars, Vo., 
139). 
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58. See chapter 6, section D for a more detailed discussion. 
59. His attitude towards the imagination is shared by some of his 
precursors. For example, Tauler in sermon 37 (Shrady & Sclhm-4dt (eds), 
p 126), The Cloud (chs iv and ix) and John of the Cross (eg The As,: ait 
of Mt Carmel, bk 2, ch 4, para 4 in Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio 
Rodriguez (eds), The Collected Works of St lohn of the Cross (-. CS, 
Washington, 1979), p 113). 
60. ST la, 75,6 (Blackfriars, Vol 11, p 29). 
61. ST la, 82,4 (Vol 11, p 227). 
62. ST 1 a, 79,8 (Vol 11, p 175). 
63. Here, of course, he takes sides in the scholastic debate as to whether 
the intellect or the will is primary in the experience of beatitude. 
The Dominican school defended the primacy of the intellect's union 
with God in contemplation. See, eg Edmund Colledge and Bernard McGinn 
(eds), Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises 
and Defense (Paulist Press, New York, 1981), "Theological Summary", p 
56. 
64. Ch 1xiii. 
65. The Cloud of Unknowing (Paulist Press, New York, 1981), p 92. 
66. Justin McCann (ed), 772e Cloud of Unknowing CB & 0, London, 1924 
[19473), note, p 80. 
67. Ibid p2 10. 
68. Interestingly, the Oxford English Dictionary records no use of the 
word "mentality" in this sense prior to 1691, but it is definitely used 
in Holy Wisdom in 1657 and presumably in Baker's writings before his 
death in 1641. 
69. ST la, 75,2 (Blackfriars, Vol 11, p 11). 
70. See, eg Low on inspiration and obedience, pp 96f. 
CHAPTER 6 
I. HW, p 10 6. 
2. De controversils, tom 2, lib 3, cap 2 (Naples, 1857); quoted in Avery 
Dulles, Models of the Church, p 31. 
See chapter 4, footnote 98. 
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10. DS 1725. 
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14. See Anthony Levi on St Francis de Sales in James Walsh (ed), 
Spirituality throug-h the Centuries (B & 0, London, 1964), p 271: "rhe 
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sacraments ... 11 
15. Henry Benedict Mackey (ed), Treatise on the Love of God (B & 0, London, 
1884), p xix. 
16. Published in 1551; the quotation is from the English edition, A Book of 
Spiritual Instruction, edited by a Benedictine of Stanbrook (B & 0, 
London, 1955 (trans. 19001). 
17. Op cit p 48. 
18. See The Rule, chs 8-19. 
19. A. Wikenhauser, Pauline Mysticism (Herder, Ed inb urgh- London, 1960). 
Even if we question Wikenhauser's use of the word "mysti,: 31", as 
several writers have done, there is no denying the warm 
intimacy of 
"the close union of Christ and the Christian" in Pauline theology; see 
J. Fitzmyer in Terome Biblical Commentary (Chapman, Londccn, 1969), 
"Pauline Theology", p 823. Fitzmyer gives a balanced summarý, of the 
issues. 
20. See appendix 2. 
21. Dictionnalre de Spirituall. tý, Voi 1 Beauchesne, Paris, 1937ý, col 1733. 
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through the Centuries, p 268). 
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AL Fll F, 1-: 7 IN ID : 11 : )-c I 
SOURCES FOR A BIOGRAPHY OF BAKER 
The would-be biographer of Baker is singularly well-served with 
primary sources. There are three published autobiographical works: Da 
discussion of his spiritual development found in the MS treatise Secretum 
sive Mysticum (1629), 11) the Rythms (1636), a collection of some thirty- 
five rough stanzas, and iii) an unfinished prose autobiography that ends 
about 1596 (1637-38). The first was published in an abbreviated form, 
edited by Justin McCann, as The Confessions of Venerable Father Augustine 
Baker (London, 1922) and the second and third, edited by Justin McCann and 
Hugh Connolly, in Memorials of Fr Au8-ustine Baker (Catholic Record Society 
33, London, 1933). 
Alongside these there are biographies by Baker's friends and 
disciples, Leander Prichard (1643, published in CRS 33) and Peter Salvin 
(1646), and by his editor, Serenus Cressy (1657). The Salvin and Cressy 
biographies have been published in a single volume by Justin McCann, The 
Life of Father Augustine Baker (London, 1933). In addition there is a 
fragment of a biography in MS by Dame Clementia Cary, (c 1650, see note on 
this is Placid Spearritt (1974) p 290). 
All the biographers had privileged knowledge of their subject. Leander 
Prichard, also from Monmouthshire and possibly a kinsman of 
Baker (see CRS 
33, footnote p 6), must have been born around 1605. In spring 1620 
Baker 
took him as his companion (P, p 103) and placed 
him in a school near London 
(P, p 104). By 1624 Prichard, "a young monk newly professed" 
was at St 
Gregory's, Douai, acting as Baker's secretary and personal assistant 
T, p 
116). He was not with Baker during the 
Cambrai years, but describes how 
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helpful he had found Baker's spiritual teacning . I, p 1117). He looked after 
the older monk on his return to Douai, but was *, hen sent to Enw, 3nc (P 
120). Returning from England, Prichard began tc gather information for a 
life of Baker (P, p 124). It was now the mid 162,. Os and he had been Baker's 
confessor for several years (P, p 124). When Bak--: ýr was sent to England in 
1638, Prichard was sent as well, so he realized tnat the authorities wanted 
to be rid of him also (P, p 145). Peter Salvin accompanied them. In England 
they eventually had to split up, although Prichar I kept in touch with Baker. 
Prichard died in 1685 or 1686 CBirt (1970) p 57j. 
Prichard's biography of Baker is described by an early commentator as 
"thoroughly written" (Weldon, Vol 2, p 315). It is a long, sprawling, detailed 
piece of writing by someone who was a close friend and warm admirer of 
Baker. The tone is humble and self-effacing and does not give an impression 
of axe-grinding. Nevertheless, the author was sensitive to the suggestion of 
bias: "And lest anybody should think (as some do pretend) that it was and 
is my affection to Fa. Baker, which makes me doat on him and his writings 
and books, and not any worth or rare spirit in the said writings ... " and he 
goes on to say that he was greatly moved by a spiritual work before he had 
been told it was by Baker (P, pp 117f). 
Peter Salvino who describes himself as "a disciple and intimate 
friend" (S, p 1) of Baker, was born in County Durham in 1605. He visited 
Baker at Cambrai in 1630 and found him very helpful in discerning his 
vocation. He was professed at St Gregory's in 1632 and remalined fai,,. h,, Iul to 
Baker's method of prayer. He was associated with him at Douai and returned 
with him to England in 1638. He died in 1675. Weldon deGcribes Salvin'G 
account as written "in a very particular manner and very devoutly" (Vol 2, p 
315). It is not so much a systematic biography as a spiritual appreciation 
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of Baker, written at the request of the Cambrai community. Weidcri descrites 
Salvin as "a most wonderfull candid sincere soul and a very --, e,, iout man" I 
(Vol 2, p 438). There is a simplicity and attractiveness in his ac----un,,. 
Dame Clementia Cary (1615-1671), eldest daughter of the first 
Viscount Falkland and sister of Lucius Cary, the more famous second, was 
professed in the Cambrai community in 1640 (Birt, p 217). She wou., -- have 
had detailed information about Baker's period at Cambrai. When Prichard was 
urging Baker to write an autobiography the latter had said "Goe to the nuns 
of Cambray, and they will tell you somewhat" (P, p 124). Weldon refers to 
Cary's piece as "very curiously and notably" written" (Vol 2, p 315). 
I have discussed Cressy, the editor of HdlY Wisdom, in chapter 1, 
sect ion D. 
Accessible modern sketches of Baker's life include James Gaffney, 
"Biographical Preliminaries for a Life of Dom Augustine Baker" in American 
Benedictine Review, Vol XIX: 4 (Dec 1968); Anthony Low, Augustine Baker (New 
York, 1970), pp 26-52; and David Lunn, The English Benedictines 1540-1688 
(London, 1980), pp 202-217. Lunn adopts a more critical approach than the 
others; see also his "William Rudesind Barlow OSB - Il" in Downside Review, 
No 284 (Sul 1968). 
274 
IAL Fll F> JE* 1111-i ID : 11 : >c .2 
INDEX OF PERSONS AND BOOKS 
This index lists all the persons referred to in Holy Wisdom. Some of 
these are characters mentioned merely for purposes of moral editication; 
others are authors to whose works Baker refers. He often gives a Latin form 
of the names, particularly of continental authors. I have listed the names 
as he has them, but have in many cases added the more common vernacular 
orm. 
I have, where relevant, given the dates of the individuals and have 
indicated the religious orders to which they belong. In this I shall use the 
following (anachronistic) abbreviations: 
Augustinian: OSA 
Benedictine: OSB 
Canon Regular of the Lateran: Canon R. L. 





Franciscan Capuchin: Cap. 
Jesuit: Si. 
Abridgement of Perfection 435 
Adam 4,5,6,7,40,168,170,206,423 
Albertus Magnus 450 
(OP, c 1200-1280) 
Alphonsus of Madrid 405,465 
(OFM, dc 1535) 
Alvarez, Baltazar 339ff 
(SJ, 1533-1580) 
Anatomy of the Soul 59, see also 
Barbanson 









Angela de Foligno 
(OFM tert, c 1248-1309) 
Angels (and Saints) 
477 
Annunciata nuns 






(OP, c 1225-1274) 
Aristotle 
Arsenius 
Athanasius (c 296-373) 
Augustine of 
Canterbury (d 604) 
Augustine of Hippo 
(354-430) 
Avila, John of (1499-1569) 
Barbanson, Constantine 
(Cap. 1582-1631) 
Barocius, Bp of Padua 
Basil (c 330-379) 
Bede (c 673-735) 
Bellarmine, Card. 
(SJ, 1542-1621) 
Benedict (& Rule) 

























20, 48,59,65, 66, 67.68. 71, 72,84, 
99, 101,114, 115, 1,21, 123, 1L4.125, 
126, 12,, 128, 129, 132, 131, 140,141, 
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144, 145, 15 1, 154, 155,1-80,187,1 ý5 8, 191, 195p 196, 197, 199,20', 234,253, 273, 281, 282, 283, 284,285,287l 289, 
291, 308, 317t 323, 324.4 2 8,4 ---' j- 
Bernard (1090-1153) 15,16,116,117,128,141,14 151, 
197,238,287,3 13,338,343, -345,343. 367,388,413,414,418,427,445,455, 
479 
Bernard, Br (OFM) 462 
Blosius (Louis of Blois 59,94,370,391,396,397,462 
OSB, 1506-1566) 
Bonilla (Juan de Bonilla 205 
OFM, fl 1571) 
Bruno (c 1032-1101) 114 
Caesar 78 
Cajetan Ost ref possibly 149,254 
St Cajetan (1480-1547; 2nd- 
Cardinal Cajetan, 1469-1534) 
Canfield, Benet (Fitch, 59,351,376,415,455,464,465,490 
Cap. 1562-1610) 
Carthusians 15 
Cassian (c 360-435) 59,68,122,125, (135). 231,238,242, 
317,318,320,321,397,436,454 
Catherine of Siena 23,51 
(OP Ord order) c 1347-1380) 
Chrysostom, John (c 347-407) 108,312,313 
Cistercians 254 
Cloud of Unknowing 46,49,54,59,61,114,335f, 461,464f 
Colette (1381-1447) 472 
Conferences (& see Cassian) 59,122,125,135,318,397,454 
Constantiensis, Michael 
(Carth. possibly Michael 
of Prague, d 1401) 
David the King 






Denys the Areopagite 89,343,345,49. 
Desert Fathers 59,433,463, see also Ancient monks 
Devil (& unclean spirits) 5; 17t 22,26, 34, 40, 45,56,94,96, 
99, 115, 122, 124, 165, 171, 174,186, 
196, 210, 241, 245, 248, 259, 260,280, 
3000 303, 304, 314, 327o 337, 339,364, 
388, 389, 424, 425, 444, 449, 463,467ff, 
473, 488 
Disciples 317 
Eschius (Nicholas Van Esche, 308 
c 1507- 1578) 
Eugenius III (Cist. d 1153) 149,413 
Evangelist (Mt? ) 78 
Fitch See Canfield 
Florentius (bp of 109 
Utrecht/MUnster) 
Francis of Assisi 480 69t 151l 462 
(1181/2-1226) 
Francis of Sales (1567-1622) 510 59 
Francis Xavier (SJ, 1506-52) 57 
Franciscans 254 
Gandia, Duke of (Francis 59 
(Borgia SJ, 1510-1572) 
Germanus (friend of Cassian) 320 
Gerson, Jean (1363-1429) 48,59 
Good Works 59, see also Gandia 
Granada See Louis of Granada 
Gregory the Great 1249 154,158,234,279l 343,348,444 
(c 540-604) 
Gregory Nazianzen (329-389) 1089 307 
Gregory of Nyssa (c 330-395) 108 
Harphius (OFK Henry Herp, 27,59,215,220.235,308,326,327,434 
d 1477) 435,437,439,452 
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Hesychius (d after 451) 135, 164 
Hilarion (c 291-371) 196 
Hildegard (OSB, 1098-1179) 232 
Hilton, Walter (OSA, d 1396) 31, 46,59,379,471 
Hippocrates 427 
Ignatius Loyola 304, 344,347,348,349,406 
(SJ, c 1491-1556) 
Illuminates 345, 447 
Imitation of Christ 399, see also Kempis 
Institutions 436, see also Cassian 
Interior Abnegation 471, 482 
Isacius, Abbot 232 
Jacob, a hermit 339 
Jeremy 471 
Jerome (c 342-420) 418 
Johannes a Jesu Maria 414, 467 
(Carm. Dis. 1564-1615) 
John Climacus (c 570-c 649) 241 
John of the Cross 25, 48,56,59,144,308,339,47 1,474, 
(Carm. Dis. 1542-91) 476 
John Damascene (c 675-c 749) 108 
John the Evangelist 16, 199,224 
John, a hermit 320 
Kempis, Thomas A 395, 399 
(OSA, c 1380-1471) 
Lateran I 
Lessius (Leonhard Leys, 
SJ, 1554-1623) 
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(hermit, 1542-1596) 
Louis of Granada 59,360,367,413 
(OP, 1504-1588) 
Madriliensis, Alphonsus 405,465 (see Alphonsus) 
(error for Madridensis? ) 
Magothi, Michael 152 
(OFM brother) 
Marchantius (Pierre Marchant) 253 
(OFM, 1585-1661) 
Mary (Our Lady) 
Mary Magdalene 
Massaeus, Br (OFM) 
Maxentius, Emperor 
Mercurian, RF Everardus 
(SJ, 1514-1580) 
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Of the Threefold Will of God 59, see also Canfield 
Osanna (Osanna Andreasi 344 
of Mantua, OP tertiary, 
1449-1505) 
Paul 66,77,89,181,210,271,285,291. 
314ff, 338,34, j 406,475,479 
Paulinus (353/4-431) 130 
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59, see also Rodriguez 
215,229,471 
see Puente 
Puente, Ludovicus de 59,340,360,367 
(SJ, Luis de la Puente 
1554-1624) 
Rabbins (rabbis) 414 
Richard of S Victor (d 1173) 59 
Rodriguez, Alphonsus 
(SJ, 1538-1616) 
Roger, Br (OFM) 
Rojas, Antonio de 
(fl. 1st half 17th cent) 
Romuald (c 950-1027) 
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Secrets Sentiers 
Seraphinus Firmanus 
(Seraphino of Fermo 
Canon R. L. 1496-1540) 
Soto (Domingo de, 
(OP, 1494-1560) 
Stephen of Grammont 
(c 1054-1124) 
Suso (Heinrich Seuse, 








31,46,59,379,471 see Hilton 
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Syncletica, St 241 
Teresa, St (Carm. Dis. 259 48,50f, 59,142,173,201,308,339, 
1515-1582) 3660 388,4400 446,448,469f, 474,477ff 
Thaulerus (Johann Tauler, 25,50fq 53,59,80,90,94,119,142, 
c 1300-1361) 149,151,267,308,428,436,444,445, 
452,462 
Theodoret (c 393-c 466) 339 
Timothy 491 
Trent, Council of 294 
Turrecremata (Juan de, 288,320 
Torquemade, OP, 1388-1468) 
Willian4 Prince of Juliers 326 
William of St Thierry 128 
(Cist. c 1085-1148) 
Wise Man, the 249 247 
Writers, spiritual 15,23,41,47,54j 60f, 72f, 93,105, 
107,1150 151,163,178,1800 188,191, 
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PRIMARY SOURCES 
I HOL Y WISDOM 
Sancta Sophia or Directions for the Prayer of Contemplation &c (Patte 
Fievet, Douai, 1657) 
Sancta Sophia &c (Dunigan, New York, 1857) 
Sancta Sophia &c (ed Norbert Sweeney OSB, B&0, London, 1876) 
Holy Wisdom &c (ed Sweeney, B&0, London, 1911; reprint of 1876) 
Holy Wisdom &c (ed Gerard Sitwell OSB, B&0, London, 1964; reissued, 
Anthony Clarke, Wheathampstead, 1972) 
Apart from the editions of Holy Wisdom itself there are several paraphrases 
of the work, listed in Antony Low's bibliography. I have not used these and 
here refer only to one: 
Weld-Blundell, Benedict (ed), Contemplative Prayer (Washbourne, London, 
1907) 
II PUBLISHED MATERIAL 
The following titles are works by Baker. Further small sections of his 
writings are printed in recent articles by Hywel Wyn Owen and Luke Bell 
(see secondary sources, articles). 
Benedictines of Stanbrook The Substance of the Rule of St Bennet 
(eds) (Stanbrook Abbey, Worcester, 1981) 
McCann, Justin (ed) The Confessions of Venerable Father 
Augustine Baker GO & W, London. 1922) 
"A Commentary on the Cloud by Father 
Augustine Baker" in 77)e Cloud of 
Unknowing and other Treatises GO & W9 
London, 1947 119231) 
McCann, J. & Connolly, H. (eds) Rhymes, autobiography & historical 
account of the English Benedictine 
mission, in Catholic Record Society, Vol 
XXXIII (London, 1933) 
"Of Finding God within our 
Soul" 
Downside Review, No 181 (Jan 1942) 
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Weld-Blundell, Benedict (ed) The Inner Life and Writings of Dame 
Gertrude More, Vols 1&2 (Washbourne, 
London, 1910) 
III BAKER MSS 
The following MSS were consulted, all from the Douai Abbey library: 
Unknown scribe (17th century) ABC 
Unknown scribe (1694) 
James Roberts (19th century) 
IV LIVES OF BAKER 
De Conversione Morum 
Custodia Cordis 
The following 17th century lives have been published in the present 
century: 
Prichard, Leander (c 1643) McCann, Justin & Connolly, Hugh (eds), 
Catholic Record Society, Vol XXXIII 
(London, 1933) 
Salvin, Peter (1646) McCann, Justin (ed), The Life of Fr 
Augustine Baker (1575-1641) by Fr Peter 
Sal vin and Fr Serenus Cressy GO & W, 
London, 1933) 
Cressy, Serenus (1657) published in above 
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I ARTICLES 
Alston, G. C. "Contemplative Prayer", Downside Review, 
No 77 (July 1907), pp 125-135 
Baumgartner, Charles "Concupiscence", Dictionnaire de 
Spiritualitd, Vol 2 (Beauchesne, Paris, 
1953), pp 1343-1373 
Bell, Luke "Augustine Baker's Exposition of the Rule 
of St Benedict", Downside Review, No 367 
(Apr 1989), pp 86-105 
Bethune, Brian "Aelred of Rievaulx & Human 
RelationshipS19, Cistercian Studies, Vol 
XX (1985/2). pp 98-112 
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Engelberg, Joseph "The Integrative Power of Religion", 
Review for Religious, Vol 42, No 3 
(May/June 1983), pp 416-421 
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Gaffney, James "Biographical Preliminaries for a Life of 
Dom Augustine Baker", Aineri can 
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pp 515-535 
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